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ART. I.—*A Commentary on the Apocalypse.* By MOSES STUART, Prof. of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover, Mass. 2 vols. 8vo. Andover: Allen, Morrell & Wardwell. New-York: M. H. Newman. 1845.

WE at length have a Commentary by an American scholar and divine on the Revelation of St. John; and a work of which we may be proud: a work which, while it does not despise the labors and opinions of its predecessors, is eminently original and sound. Moses Stuart, the author, has long since come to be considered a Coryphæus among Biblical scholars and interpreters, both in this country and in Europe. His commentaries on some of the most difficult portions of the Scriptures, as the Epistles of Paul to the Romans and to the Hebrews, have won for him an elevated rank as a commentator, on both sides of the Atlantic. The immense learning, fervent piety, and clear, sound sense of the author, peculiarly qualify him for the work of interpretation. The occasion and manner in which the work was composed are thus stated in the Preface:—

“When I began my official duties in my present station, I had no other knowledge of the book, than what the reading of Bishop Newton on the Prophecies, and of others who were of the like cast, had imparted to me. The classes of pupils under my instruction soon began to importune me to give them some information respecting the Apocalypse. I commenced the study of it with a design to comply with their request. I soon found myself, however, in pursuing the way of regular interpretation, as applied to other books of Scripture, completely hedged in; and I felt, at the same time, that to pursue my former method of interpreting the book, would cast me inevitably upon the boundless ocean of mere *conjectural* exposition. I frankly told my pupils, therefore, that I knew nothing respecting the book which could profit them,

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and that I could not attempt to lecture upon it. After still further examination, I came to a resolution not to attempt the exegesis of the Apocalypse until a period of ten years had elapsed, which should be devoted, so far as my other duties would permit, to the study of the Hebrew prophets. I kept my resolution. After this period had passed, I began, with much caution, to say a few things in the lecture-room respecting the book in question. Every three years, these lectures, such as they were, I repeated, with some additions and alterations. In process of time I began to go through the whole book. This I have done several times; and the present work is the result of these often-repeated and long-continued labors."—P. 5.

Prof. Stuart sets out with the proposition that this book has one great object in view,—and that is to declare the final victory of the church over all her foes, the triumph of Christ, and the glorious establishment of his kingdom here in the earth. It is maintained that this is discernible by even common and ordinary readers, and still further, that we cannot suppose the revelator wrote a series of unintelligible symbols, but that the book really was *intelligible* to all well-informed readers of the seven churches of Asia, to whom it was immediately addressed. That the book is substantially the same in form and manner with other prophecies, as those of Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah. The import of their prophecies was understood by the well-informed Hebrew converts scattered through the churches of Asia Minor, and that these could have explained it to others. The *Paradise Lost* of Milton is intelligible and read with interest by common readers, but there are some things, as its frequent classical allusions, which only well-informed readers would comprehend. So with the Revelation; by the common spiritual Christian it may be read with interest and profit, though the prophetic images and symbols, and striking orientalisms, may be understood only by the reader well-instructed in the Old Testament Scriptures. In illustration and confirmation of this position, follows an elaborate section on the similarity of the Apocalypse with other Scriptural prophecies. There is only a general, not a minute, resemblance as to *form* and *method* between the Apocalypse and the Old Testament prophecies. The same general theme is observable, viz.: "The final and universal triumph of truth and holiness over error and sin." In many a passage of the Old Testament and of the New, we find the *kernel* or *nucleus* of the Revelation. The chief difference is, that the Revelation is more extended and diffuse in its descriptions of the great struggle between the powers of sin and holiness. The Old Testament descriptions are rather simple statements of the great result—the glorious triumph of the gospel; while the Apocalypse gives us

the several stages of the triumph, the successive steps of victory. The revelator himself lived in the midst of the contest, "and powerful representation and vivid feeling might have been expected of him in circumstances like these."

Not only in the Scriptures, but also in heathen writers, do we find evident traces of this Scripture doctrine of the final reign of peace and happiness on earth. Who can read the fourth Eclogue of Virgil, and not be struck with the similarity of some of its sentiments to the Christian doctrine of the Messiah and his reign? Especially to the passage which begins thus:—

"Ultima Cumaei venit tam carminis aetas;
Magnus ab integro Saeclorum nascitur ordo."

Lactantius* and Constantine† the Great, together with some moderns, as Chandler, Whiston, Cudworth, and Lowth, have looked upon it as a genuine *Messianic* prediction. But we may go still further back than Virgil and the classics to find this idea of a general ἀποκατάστασις or restoration. We find it unequivocally in the Zend Avesta of Zoroaster, who flourished about the time of Darius Hystaspes, about the middle of the sixth century before Christ. In the theory‡ of Zoroaster sometimes good prevails and sometimes evil prevails during the four ages of the world, until finally the earth is to be burned up and purified, a new heaven and a new earth are to come forth from the conflagration of the old—the wicked will be punished in a dreadful manner, and the triumph of good will be complete. The similarity of this to some points of the Scripture doctrine will be readily observed by almost every reader.

The Bible presents us every variety of style, as might be expected from a book which deals in so great a variety of subjects. It is a book of history, a book of law, a book of *poetry*. It is didactic and prophetic, and reveals the secrets of the spiritual world. It is, therefore, in its style necessarily figurative and symbolical; for things spiritual can only be explained by things natural. The style of the later prophets, as Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah, is more strikingly symbolical than Jeremiah and Isaiah. The Hebrew, like other languages, presents differences during the different ages in which it flourished. Many new words and some new grammatical forms were introduced, especially after the captivity. A great change was introduced, as Prof. Stuart ably argues, in regard to the prophetic style from and after the date of the Jewish

* Inst., vii, 24.

† Orat. ad Sanct. in Euseb. Vita Constant., c. xix.

‡ For a more particular description of the theory, see the work of Prof. Stuart.

captivity. The latter prophets are especially symbolical, while the earlier, as Isaiah and Jeremiah, are more simple and direct. "Ezekiel from beginning to end is almost an unbroken series of symbolical representation." The Book of Daniel is, if we except a little of it which is occupied with historic narrative, *nothing but symbol* from beginning to end. The same is substantially true of Zechariah. From these facts we are disposed to accord with the professor, that there was a great change in and after the captivity in the prophetic style, induced, probably, by a change in the tastes and habits of their readers, who had imbibed, by their eastern sojourn in Babylonia, Persia, and Media, a love for the peculiar imagery and symbolic style of those countries.

The conclusion is finally arrived at, that *the taste and manner of the Apocalypse are the taste and manner of the Hebrew prophets, and of the age in which John himself lived.*

If it be objected, that the Saviour himself and the apostle Paul did not employ the symbolic method in their predictions, the author answers, "That the *prophetic* declarations of both are exceedingly brief, rarely comprising more than a few sentences, and in declarations of such a character there is not room for composition of such a nature as John exhibits." Besides, it may be said the *parables* and *similitudes* of our Saviour, together with the description of his coming to punish the Jews, in Matt. xxiv, is a very similar mode of writing to the *symbol* of the Apocalypse.

But now arises a question of much interest:—Are there other writings contemporaneous with the Apocalypse, which show a like taste and mode of composition? We answer, There are many writings of this character belonging to the first century, both of heathen, Jewish, and Christian origin, which are now extant, and many others which, during the long night of ignorance in the dark ages, have probably perished irrecoverably; and their titles are only known to us from the works of ancient writers, whose productions have been more fortunate in being preserved till the present day. A catalogue is given, together with what is known of them severally, by our author. For the information of our readers, who may not have the work, we subjoin the titles in a note below.*

* The following is a list of the apocryphal Apocalypses which are not known to be now extant. (1) The Apocalypse of Elijah. (2) The Apocalypse of Zephaniah. (3) The Apocalypse of Zechariah. (4) The Apocalypse of Adam. (5) The Apocalypse of Abraham. (6) The Apocalypse of Moses. (7) The Prophecies of Hystaspes. (8) The Apocalypse of Peter. (9) The Apocalypse of Paul. (10) Revelations of Cerinthus. (11) The Apocalypse of St. Thomas. (12) The Apocalypse of Stephen the Martyr.

The apocryphal revelations still extant are as follows. 1. The Ascension of Isaiah the prophet. 2. The Book of Enoch. 3. The Fourth Book of Ezra. 4. The Sybilline Oracles. 5. The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs. 6. The Shepherd of Hermas. 7. The Apocryphal Apocalypse of John. A long and elaborate synopsis, in all comprising near one hundred pages, is given of each of these works; and many passages are quoted of much interest and instruction, as to the peculiarly symbolical style which prevails in these writings, often, it must be acknowledged, very similar to that of the Apocalypse of John. In this synopsis Prof. Stuart has rendered a most acceptable service to the theological public. Of these works, some of which have never been translated into our language, and none of which we believe have been published in this country, very little has been known among us. And though the discussion of them seems to occupy a very large space in the Introduction to the Commentary, yet we feel very grateful to the professor for so large an amount of information concerning these rare productions. Many new and striking illustrations are brought forward of many passages in the Revelation, and the same oriental and highly figurative and symbolical style abounds in these works, which clearly sustains the position that *the taste and manner of the Apocalypse are the taste and manner of the age in which John lived*. With these remarks we must leave the subject of these apocryphal writings, and consider some things in the form and arrangement of the Apocalypse.

The first peculiarity in the form and arrangement of the Apocalypse is what Prof. Stuart calls its *numerosity*; that is, "the Apocalypse throughout, with scarcely any exception, is so arranged, that either the number 3, or else 7, 4, 10, and 12, control its modes of development, that is, the arrangement of its parts, greater and smaller,—the grouping of its objects, the assignment of attributes to them, the epexegetical clauses, and the order of action, main and subordinate. Above all the number THREE stands conspicuous in the whole plan, in all its parts, considerable or minute. Next to this stands the so-called sacred number *seven*, then *four*, then *twelve*, and lastly *ten*."

As a specimen of the trichotomy, or tripartite divisions and groups in the Apocalypse, we will quote the first leading divisions of this nature as presented by Prof. Stuart. The book is thus divided:—

"(1.) (a) The prologue, chap. i–iii. (b) The visions, or main body of the work, iv–xxii, 5. (c) The epilogue, xxii, 6–21. Each of these divisions exhibits trichotomy, moreover, in all its gradations throughout its appropriate subdivisions.

"(2.) THE PROLOGUE.—After the title of the book, (which is joined with a brief historical reference to its author, and a commendation to the notice and study of the reader,) follows, (a) The dedication of the work to the seven churches of Asia, i, 4–8. (b) The christophany, or manifestation of Jesus to John, i, 9–20. (c) The Epistles to the Seven Churches.

"The portions *a* and *b* are too short and too terse with descriptive matter to permit of subdivision; but not so with the epistles. Each of the latter is divided into three parts: (a) A description of him who addresses the churches, by the mention of some of his attributes, ii, 1; ii, 8; ii, 12; ii, 18; iii, 1; iii, 7; iii, 14. (b) Disclosure of the characteristics of each church, with appropriate admonition or reproof; (in the sequel to each of the preceding texts quoted.) (c) Each epistle closes with excitement to obedience, rendered more urgent and efficacious by promises of reward, or by threatenings. In these respects there is an entire uniformity through the whole of the epistles.

"(3.) THE VISIONS.—On these (iv–xxii, 5) there are three great *catastrophes*, to which all else has reference and is adjusted. (a) That of Sodom *spiritually* so called, that is, 'the place where our Lord was crucified,' or Jerusalem, (xi, 8,) comprising chap. iv–xi. (b) That of mystic Babylon (Rome,) chap. xii–xx, 3. (c) That of Gog and Magog, chap. xx, 4–10. Each of these catastrophes has a prologue or poem: (a) chap. iv, v; (b) chap. xii; (c) chap. xx, 4–7. Where the thousand years and the end of them stand as introductory to the loosing of Satan."—Vol. i, p. 131 et seq.

This subject has been almost entirely overlooked by writers on the Apocalypse, except Ewald and Züllig. These writers, however, have done but little on the subject; and Prof. Stuart claims that his developments and conclusions are altogether his own, discovered by a long-continued and oft-repeated study of the book. To one whose attention has not been drawn to this subject, there will be much in this that is new and surprising. The trichotomies seem to reign everywhere, in almost every chapter and section. So far is this numerosity carried, that it verges almost to the cabbalism of the Jewish rabbies; and one feels, in the developments of this matter by Prof. Stuart, that there was really some foundation for their numbering propensity. Prof. Stuart himself has felt this, and forthwith defends the Apocalypse from any fancies of this kind.

But is there anything like this in any other part of the Scriptures? Prof. Stuart contends that there is; and that the Book of Job especially exhibits many of these trichotomies. And this, indeed, would be natural, for as Job is the epic of the Old Testament, and the only one, so is the Apocalypse the epic, and the only one, of the New. A part of the first paragraph, in which the proof of this is exhibited, we deem of sufficient importance to quote.

"The first grand division of it is into (a) Prologue. (b) The poem proper. (c) Epilogue. Then (i) The prologue is subdivided into accounts, (a) Of Job's prosperity. (b) Of his losses. (c) Of his sickness and trials. Then (ii) the poem proper is divided into three leading parts: (a) The dispute of Job with his friends. (b) The address of Elihu, who proffers himself as umpire. (c) The closing address of Jehovah. Next as to subordinate *triplicities*, we are presented with three friends who come to console Job, &c. * * * The epilogue closes the piece, which consists (a) Of Job's justification. (b) Of his reconciliation with his friends. (c) Of his final prosperity."—Vol. i, p. 140.

So, also, there are many instances in the New Testament of triplicity; but for the examples we must refer the reader to the work itself. We might find fault with some of the *triplicities* quoted by Prof. Stuart, but the great mass of them must be admitted. They are so on the surface of the composition, and appear evident to the most casual reader. For the examination of the heptades and groups of four and twelve, we must refer the reader to the work itself.

Nor is this numerosity a mere matter of style, especially the trichotomy part of it. Important results depend upon it in the criticism and elucidation of the book. It settles the question in Prof. Stuart's mind, whether there is more than one catastrophe in the book.

He thus presents it:—

"This is a great question. It decides, moreover, in regard to subordinate parts of the book which are of the like tenor, how far they extend, and in many cases whether they sustain a near relation to each other. It extends itself to the interpunction of many passages, deciding how the writer grouped them in his own mind, and how we also should group them, and consequently how we should distribute the interpunction; e. g. in xii, 18, the usual printing is thus: δούναι μισθὸν τοῖς δούλοις σου, τοῖς προφήταις καὶ τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ τοῖς φοβουμένοις τὸ ὄνομά σου, τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ τοῖς μεγάλους. This is plainly wrong. There are two groups of three each; the first is the generic τοῖς δούλοις σου, with the exegetical or specific προφήταις and ἁγίοις; the second is the generic τοῖς φοβουμένοις, (corresponding plainly to τοῖς δούλοις σου,) followed by the specific μικροῖς and μεγάλους. And so of not a few other places in the book. In fact, the hasty reader, and even any one who does not enter minutely upon the examination of the book, can scarcely conjecture how much the smaller points of interpretation, as well as not a few of the larger, are affected by the numerosity of the book."—Vol. i, p. 149.

Thus far we have gone along with Prof. Stuart without finding any serious occasion for differing from him. But we find some views advanced in the tenth section, which we do not feel at liberty to pass over without strong animadversion. He has advanced,

though, it must be confessed, in a very cautious manner, some views on the subject of the *inspiration* of the sacred writers, which we believe are far from being true and Scriptural. We are compelled to believe that this venerable teacher in Israel has advocated loose views on this all-important subject, and we feel compelled to withstand him, notwithstanding the great respect we have for his powers and attainments.

The doctrine of a verbal inspiration of the sacred writings we had supposed was the doctrine of all orthodox divines, and the doctrine which has been generally received in the evangelical churches, and that not the thoughts only were inspired, but the *writing*; that the sacred writers were not merely in an inspired *state*, but were *moved* and *excited to action* in writing by the Holy Ghost. 2 Peter i, 21. But such does not seem to be the view of Prof. Stuart. He asserts that inspiration is a *state* and not an *act*. And that the reader may see we do not join on a false issue with the professor, we will quote his own statements.

“The result of all my researches into the nature of inspiration is a full belief that its influence is rather to be considered as resulting in a *state* than in an *act*. What I mean, is, that by inspiration the state or condition of him who is the subject of it is affected; his mind is enlightened respecting things proper to be said, of which he was before totally or partially ignorant; his views and affections are elevated; his powers of mind are in a degree quickened and heightened; things sensual, and deluding, and degrading, recede, and for the time being cease to annoy him; and his judgment, as to what he is to communicate, becomes not only more discerning, but more sound and safe. The *inspired* John, for example, is the same individual as the *uninspired* John, and retains all the innocent peculiarities of his character and habitudes; but the inspired John is elevated, enlightened, quickened, keen of discernment, even to such a degree that future things can be seen from his elevated condition; and he is so guided by all the combinations of influence upon him, that he will communicate nothing but truth. Were I to choose a simile for illustration, I should say that the inspired man ascends an intellectual and moral eminence, so high that his prospect widens almost without bounds, and what is altogether hidden from ordinary men is more or less distinctly within his view.”—Vol. i, p. 107.

Here we have the views of this venerable teacher and expounder of God's word in respect to the theopneusty, or divine inspiration, of the Holy Scriptures. We read the extract above, together with several pages which follow, with mingled feelings of surprise and regret. The paragraphs on this subject are written with much caution, and we feared, on the first reading, that our impressions of his doctrine might be erroneous. But on carefully re-reading

what he has written on this subject, our impressions became still stronger that Prof. Stuart gives up the doctrine of a *verbal inspiration*; and even scarcely admits that which is technically called the *inspiration of illumination*. The professor says, "the inspired man ascends an intellectual and moral (?) eminence;" not that he is taught by the Spirit of God, but he is elevated in respect to his understanding, and improved in respect to his moral powers. Inspiration is a "*state*" of the sacred writer's soul, and not the "*act*" of the Holy Spirit. The "inspired writer is not the mere *passive* instrument of the Spirit of God," so as to write "what is dictated to him *verbatim et literatim*." The office of the Spirit of God is not so much to teach man what to write, as to elevate his soul, so as to prepare him to write the truth.

With Prof. Stuart *truth* seems to be that which is inspired, and not the *words* and *costume* of the sacred writers. For an illustration of his views he refers to the eighteenth Psalm for an example. He remarks:—

"If we peruse attentively the eighteenth Psalm, we shall soon see that the picture there given of the descent of the divine Majesty, of his bowing the heavens, shaking the earth, riding upon a cherub, surrounding himself with dark clouds, and lightning, and thunder, scattering the enemies of David by hailstones and coals of fire, laying bare the deepest abysses of the sea, and drawing the chosen king out of many waters—that all this is plainly *costume*. The simple truth that lies under all these symbols, is, that God appeared for David, that is, manifested his favor toward him, oftentimes and in an extraordinary manner, and delivered him from enemies and persecutors. No one who well understands the nature of poetry and the use of symbols will object to this view; and surely no one can regard all this as in any measure derogatory to the dignity and truthfulness of the sacred writings."—Vol. i, p. 170.

He proceeds now to apply these views to the Apocalypse, and asks the following questions, which, it is evident in the professor's mind, should be answered in the affirmative:—

"Is the Apocalypse now only a more protracted series of symbols, which are of the like nature? Are the visions themselves and all the objects of them merely the drapery thrown around the body of truth that lies within? Do all these things depend merely on the judgment and imagination of the writer, as to the manner in which he should develop the views which he entertained?"—Vol. i, p. 170

"All these things," that is, the symbols and the visions, and of course the language in which they are conveyed,—"*all* these things depend *merely* on the *judgment* and *imagination* of the writer." Let it be remarked, he says they depend *merely* on the *judgment* and *imagination* of the writer. This we conceive to be next door

to a total denial of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures,—or of the inspiration of them in a proper sense. “It is enough,” says the professor, “that he (the sacred writer) is guarded from error, and that truths beyond his natural powers are impressed upon his mind.” And even then, when the sacred writer would reveal “truths beyond his natural powers,” he only “ascends an intellectual and moral eminence.” By what means this is done we are not distinctly informed.

To say the least of these views of inspiration by Prof. Stuart, they are exceedingly loose, and in our opinion decidedly dangerous. This is not the time for us who love and reverence the Bible as the word of God, to give an uncertain sound on this subject.

There is a numerous class of persons who are mostly made up of German theologians, (we might better say, perhaps, German *Neologians*,) such as Schleiermacher, Dewette, and many others, both of Germany and of this country, who reject all miraculous inspiration, and attribute to the sacred writers what Cicero attributes to the poets; *afflatum spiritus divini*, “a divine action of nature, an interior power like the other vital forces of nature.” Prof. Stuart does not belong to this class, but seems to approach nearer to those who hold to the inspiration of *superintendence* and *elevation*, where the thoughts of the writers are preserved from error, while their language is altogether human.

It is to this latter view that we must earnestly object. In regard to the other view referred to above, though we consider it altogether erroneous, we do not consider it important at present to travel out of our way to refute it. We have to do especially at present with the author of the Commentary on the Apocalypse. That his views are wrong on this subject we as fully believe as we believe those of Dewette and Schleiermacher are wrong; and wrong at this point, that he does not admit a full, a plenary inspiration of the very words and imagery, as well as the thoughts, of the sacred writers.

In confirmation of this doctrine of inspiration we need only refer to a few plain passages of the Scriptures themselves. In 2 Peter i, 21, it is said, *The prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost*. By “prophecy in old time,” is meant the Old Testament Scriptures. These (*οὐ ποτε*) never came by the will of man,—man’s will had nothing to do in originating them; neither were they written by man’s will, but holy men of God *spake as they were moved* by the Holy Ghost. That is, holy men even uttered the words of their prophecy as they *were moved* (*φερομενοι*, being borne

along, as a vessel is moved or borne on the waters by the wind) by the Holy Ghost. Here is involved not only verbal inspiration, but also *passivity* in him who is inspired; both of which ideas Prof. Stuart does not seem to admit.

Again, in the Second Epistle to Timothy iii, 16, the apostle Paul declares that "all Scripture," Πᾶσα γραφή, all the sacred writing is, θεοπνευστος, by divine inspiration. But how can the *writing* be said to be by divine inspiration, if the words are not inspired as well as the thoughts? It is for this reason that the sacred writings are called αἱ γραφαί, the *Scriptures*, by way of eminence, because the very *writing* is given of God. But if this passage be not thought perfectly conclusive, we would adduce the declaration of the apostle Paul to the Corinthians, ii, 13: "*Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth; but which the Holy Ghost teacheth.*" Thus we find, remarks Mr. Watson, that the claim which the sacred writers make on this subject is, that they were in truth what they have been aptly called, "the penmen of the Holy Ghost;" and that the words, in which they clothed "the wisdom given unto them," were "words taught" by the Holy Spirit.

Prof. Stuart also objects to *passivity* in the inspired writer. It is not necessary to suppose that the sacred writers were always, or even generally, passive in their prophetic communications; but as a fact, it appears to have been the case sometimes. Job tells us "*he uttered what he understood not.*" Job xlii, 3. Daniel also tells us, that when he wrote his last pages he did not himself know what the Spirit had caused him to write. Dan. xii, 8, 9. When Caiaphas uttered his prophecy, it is said, "*He spake not of himself,*" that is, he was a passive instrument in the hand of God, having neither the knowledge nor understanding of what God made him speak. John xi, 51. When Balaam went three times to the summit of the rock to curse Israel; and three times words of blessing proceeded from his lips in spite of himself, "*because the Most High had met him and put these words in his mouth.*" Num. xxiii, 16. The language of the prophets, "The hand of the Lord was strong upon me," Ezek. iii, 14; "I was carried out in the Spirit of the Lord," Ezek. xxxvii, 1; "and I was carried away in the Spirit," Rev. xvii, 3; are phrases which show the power of the Spirit, and the comparative weakness of the prophet in moments of inspiration. Mr. Watson judiciously remarks, that "the same *force* of inspiration, so to speak, was not probably exerted upon each of the sacred writers, or upon the same writer throughout his writings, whatever might be its subject. There is no necessity that

we should so state the case in order to maintain what is essential to our faith,—the plenary inspiration of each of the sacred writers. It is sufficient that every thought and every word be communicated under the influence and direction of the all-wise Spirit.”

That this is, and ever has been, the doctrine of the orthodox body of the church in every age may be clearly proved. Our limits, however, will not permit us to enter upon this extensive field of investigation. We must content ourself to refer the reader to a late admirable work on the theopneusty of the Holy Scriptures, by S. R. L. Gaussen, professor of theology in Geneva, which was ably reviewed in a late number of this Quarterly, for full satisfaction on this interesting subject.*

If these views, expressed above, be correct, we must conclude that our learned and excellent author of the Commentary on the Apocalypse has wandered to some length from the true doctrine on the subject of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. In a late work on the Old Testament Canon, Professor Stuart has labored to show that some of the inspired books have been lost. His low views of inspiration may serve to account for so extraordinary an hypothesis. On some future occasion we intend, Providence permitting, to enter upon an examination of this last-named work. At present it would be drawing us too far from the original object of this paper.

The principles of interpretation, as laid down by Prof. Stuart as applicable to the Apocalypse, we believe, are the only true ones. He very ably shows the folly of those interpreters who would make the images and symbols of this book a mere syllabus of civil history. “John was no chronicler of *civil* events. He was no sooth-sayer like those of Delos and Delphos. Such things, and such only, as relate to the *spiritual* welfare and prosperity of the church are the objects of his prophetic vision.” Some writers on the thirteenth chapter of the Apocalypse have seen in the first beast the city of Rome, the pope and his adherents; and in the second beast the Church of England!

“But a multitude of expositors are not content with finding even minute *ecclesiastical* matters in the Apocalypse. They must needs find profane as well as sacred history. The Goths, the Vandals, the Huns; petty kingdoms and states of remote ages; battles fought centuries after John was dead; local famine even, and pestilence, earthquakes,

* Theopneusty, or, the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, by S. R. L. Gaussen, professor of theology in Geneva. Translated by E. N. Kirk. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co., 145 Nassau-street.

droughts, volcanoes, tornadoes, and other evils, at divers times and places, are all to be found in the pages of the Revelation."—Vol. i, p. 204.

We agree with Prof. Stuart that no man of sober discretion, who has ever studied Hebrew prophecy, can give ear to such interpretations as these. An expositor, for example, finds in Rev. vi the description of a certain war or pestilence. What now is his reason for making his specific application? Is it not because he finds certain things in the Apocalyptic picture which might tally well with the subsequent events in question? But the difficulty with this is, that it might tally equally as well with any other war, or any other pestilence, as with that to which he applies it. The truth is, the Apocalypse is designed simply to encourage the church by the prophetic assurance that Christ shall eventually reign over all his foes; and these pictures and symbols declare this in a *generic*, rather than in a *specific*, way. Besides, it is one continuous and connected composition; and to suppose that John, in his brief description of the church's victories, should turn aside to note minor incidents in civil or natural history, which are only very remotely or in no respect connected with the great subject in hand, is plainly inconsistent.

The more we have studied, the more we are disposed to accord with the views of Prof. Stuart, that there are three catastrophes in this book. The first is the downfall of the Jewish persecuting power; the second is the downfall of the Romish persecuting power; and third, the downfall of Gentileism—of Gog and Magog, and Satan and his hosts. All that exalts and opposes itself against Christ must at length be destroyed. Now if the pope and his adherents resemble the beast and the false prophet, and oppose themselves to Christ and his cause, they must be overthrown. Or if any other power, whether civil or ecclesiastical, oppose itself to the progress of Christ's kingdom, the Lamb in his wrath shall trample them down,—*he shall dash them in pieces as a potter's vessel*. It is not necessary to suppose that the writer of the Apocalypse had the Romish hierarchy, or the English hierarchy, or any other, definitely before his mind when he wrote. Nor is it necessary to suppose that John, when he wrote, had distinctly before him any future civil occurrences, as the irruptions of the Goths, Vandals, and Huns, or the destruction of the Mohammedan empire. It was sufficient for the then afflicted and distressed churches of Asia and Europe to know, bleeding under the cruel wounds of that heartless and abominable tyrant, Nero, that the end of their sufferings would come, and that Christ, their prince, should reign victorious over all his foes.

The able and earnest reasoning of Prof. Stuart in support of the above theory must commend itself to every candid mind ; and we believe the time is not distant when an entire change will come in the views of Christian and theological writers in respect to the applications of the Apocalyptic prophecies.*

The question as to the time when the *Apocalypse* was written, is elaborated and discussed by Prof. Stuart with equal care and ability. Very much depends on the decision of this question. If it was written near the close of the apostle's life, after the destruction of the city of Jerusalem, which is the commonly received opinion, then Prof. Stuart's theory of the three catastrophes, viz., the downfall of the Jewish persecuting power, and of the Roman persecuting power, and of Gog and Magog, falls to the ground. If the work was written by the apostle after the destruction of the city of Jerusalem, then there could be no prophecy of that event ; and the prophecies, from chap. vi to chap. xiii, cannot refer to that event. Prof. Stuart maintains that the *Apocalypse* was among the earliest of John's writings, and that it was composed before the destruction of the city of Jerusalem, as it appears to us on good and substantial grounds. The evidence for both of these opinions is ably and fairly presented, and the conclusion is finally made up with great power, that John wrote the *Apocalypse* in the time of Nero, about the year of our Lord 68.

The fourth argument of Prof. Stuart, that this book was written in the reign of Nero, is so conclusive that we cannot forbear quoting it in part:—

“Rev. xvii professedly undertakes to explain the symbols of the beast, introduced at the commencement of the second catastrophe in the *Apocalypse*, chap. xiii, 1, seq. The last verse of this chapter leaves no room for mistake as to the application of the symbol. The woman sitting upon the beast, means ‘the great city which hath dominion over the kings of the earth.’ When John wrote the *Apocalypse*, no city but Rome could be thought of as corresponding to this description. Besides, in ver. 9 the seven heads are said to symbolize ‘the seven hills on which the woman sitteth ;’ that is, the seven hills on which Rome was built, the *septicollis Roma* of the Latin writers. There is no room for mistake here. And as little room, it seems to me, is there for mistake in another part of the same explanatory chapter, viz., ver. 10. Here it is said, that the seven heads of the beast also symbolize *seven kings*, viz., of Rome. The writer proceeds: ‘Five are fallen ; one is ; the other has not yet come ; but when he shall come he shall remain but

* We would especially commend to the reader's consideration the twelfth section on the hermeneutical principles applicable to the *Apocalypse*, wherein the above view is maintained.

for a short time.' That the Roman emperors were usually styled βασιλῆις by the Greeks, needs no proof. That the line or succession of *emperors* is here meant, and not the primitive kings of Rome, is certain from the connection of the five with the one *who is*, and the one *who is to come*. We have only to reckon then the succession of emperors, and we must arrive with certainty at the reign under which the Apocalypse was written. If we begin with Julius Cæsar it stands thus: Cæsar, Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius; these make up the five who have *fallen*. Of course the Apocalypse was written during the reign of Nero, who was the sixth."

The above argument is clear and conclusive. There are others quite as clear and convincing as the one above, that the Apocalypse was written in the time of Nero, as the testimonies of Epiphanius and Andreas, and the inscription to the Syriac version. Did our limits permit, we should be glad to give at least an abstract of them.

If the evidence is so conclusive, the reader will be ready to inquire, how happens it that the opinion is so common, that the Apocalypse was written near the close of the first century, and near the apostle John's death? This opinion seems to rest almost altogether on the supposed testimony of Irenæus, in *Hæres.*, v. 30, who lived at the close of the second century, and who is the first writer that we know of who has said anything expressly on the point before us. The testimony referred to is as follows: οὐδε γὰρ πρὸ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐράθη [ἡ Ἀποκάλυψις,] ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας γενεᾶς, πρὸς τῷ τελεῖ της Δομετιάνου ἀρχῆς; that is, "*the Apocalypse was seen not long ago, but almost in our generation, near the end of Domitian's reign.*" These words of Irenæus are cited verbatim by Eusebius, in his *Ecclesiastical History*, iii, 18, and v, 8, who flourished about one hundred years after Irenæus; and Jerome, who wrote about seventy years after Eusebius, has quoted his account, (in *Catal.* v,) and thus this supposed testimony, that John saw his vision in the reign of Domitian, has been handed down from writer to writer till Dr. Lardner, apparently without ever supposing that there might be any mistake in their understanding of Irenæus. But so it turns out;—or at least it is exceedingly probable, that the whole stream of Christian writers have misunderstood the testimony of Irenæus. It has been suggested recently by an acute German critic, Guerike, that when Irenæus says, "that when the Apocalypse was seen not long ago, but almost in our generation, πρὸς τῷ τελεῖ της Δομετιανῶν ἀρχῆς," that the adjective Δομετιανῶν (for *adjective* it may be, says Prof. S., and if so, it is one which is *generis communis*, and not the proper name of Domitian,) belongs in accordance with the Greek formations to the

name *Domitius*, and not to Domitian, which would make an adjective of the form *Δομιτιανικός*. If it were a proper name, he says it should be written *τῶν Δομετιανῶν*. Now Nero's name was *Domitius* Nero, and not Domitianus, which is the name of the latter emperor. It follows, of course, that Irenæus himself has testified to the fact, that the Apocalypse was written in the time of Domitius Nero. Prof. Stuart adds :—

“If he is right in his criticism on the word *Δομιτιανῶν*, past opinions in respect to it present one of the most singular cases of long-continued and oft-repeated philological error which has ever come to my knowledge.”

As to the time in which the Apocalypse was written, Mr. Benson says nothing; and Dr. Clarke, after quoting Dr. Lardner to some length, who advocates the common opinion, remarks :—“If the date could be settled, it would be of the utmost consequence to the right interpretation of the book; but amid so many conflicting opinions this is almost hopeless.” But Prof. Stuart in our opinion has set this matter quite at rest. On such a subject it may be impossible to attain to absolute certainty as to the year; yet that it was antecedent to the destruction of the city of Jerusalem seems altogether clear from the internal evidence, as adduced by Prof. Stuart.

The great labor of Prof. Stuart, in composing his Introduction and Commentary, cannot be too highly praised. He seems to have waded through all the Greek, Latin, and German literature which relates to the Apocalypse. He has attentively considered every objection which could be, or has been, advanced against his views. He answers, with great pains-taking and care, more than sixty objections against the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse, culled out of various German writers. As a specimen of his labor in answering these objections, we would quote the twenty-ninth on page 385, vol. i. Ewald objects that the apostle John was not the author of the Apocalypse, because *composite* verbs are much more frequent in his Gospel than in the Apocalypse. Prof. Stuart answers :—“I have been through *the whole Greek Concordance* in order to see whether this is correct; and find it to be so far from being so, that even the contrary position, viz., the Apocalypse makes the more frequent use of them, is nearer the truth.”

The twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sections of the Introduction have been to us the most interesting and instructive parts of it. In these sections are presented a short historical account of the estimation in which this book has been held in different ages of the

church; also an historical sketch of its interpretation. These sections are written in Prof. Stuart's most lucid and spirited style, and, from his long attention to the Apocalyptic literature, he has brought together a mass of information here, which entitles him to the hearty thanks of every student and investigator of this most interesting portion of God's Word. We would gladly, did our limits permit, give the reader a synopsis of this part of the work. But as it is, we must be content to refer him to the work itself.

To prevent the establishment of error, as well as to sustain and propagate truth, is the solemn duty of every Christian writer. And when error comes indorsed by such a man as Prof. Stuart, it is the more dangerous and needs a more vigorous and caustic remedy. There is one more topic brought to view in the Introduction to the Commentary which seems to call for animadversion. He says, "What *moral* and *spiritual* edification is derivable from such portions of Scripture?" e. g., as the architectural directions for building the tabernacle, the minute details of rites and forms under the Levitical priesthood, &c. What, thought we, as we read the paragraph from which the above is taken, has this learned professor forgotten what God says by the apostle Paul to Timothy, that *all Scripture is profitable for doctrine*, &c.? But we were in some degree relieved, though not altogether, by an explanation on a succeeding page, where he admits that even such Scripture is profitable for doctrine, &c., in an indirect way. Our impression is, that Prof. Stuart yields too much oftentimes in his writings to the heterodox, the skeptic, and the infidel. He oftentimes gives too much *place* to the devil. Holy Scripture is too sacred and too precious to be given up or abandoned in one jot or tittle.

But so signal are the attainments of Prof. Stuart as a commentator, so earnest, so candid, so learned, and withal, in general so judicious, that we have regretted to mark anything as spots on the work on the Apocalypse, lest we should unduly diminish respect for it with the readers of this Review. We intended to take up several passages in the Commentary, and present our views at length on several controverted passages. We do not agree with Prof. Stuart in all these, especially on Rev. xx, 6. But in his main principles, in his views as to the general object of the book, —*the coming and completion of the kingdom of God*, in his view of the catastrophes, we go with him heart and soul. His work is the most candid, most clear, most learned, and altogether the most satisfactory of any on the Apocalypse we have ever read. We hope and believe it will put an end to those profane uses made of this sacred book by intelligent Christian ministers and

writers, in making it a syllabus of civil history. We consider this the *chef d'œuvre* of Prof. Stuart, an honor to him; and that it will prove an honor and blessing to the church of God in this land and throughout the world. We would it might be in the hands of every intelligent layman, and of every minister—and especially of every *young* minister—in the land.

Pine Plains, N. Y., Oct. 10, 1846.

ART. II.—1. *The Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban, and Lord High Chancellor of England.*

2. *Life of Sir Isaac Newton.* By SIR DAVID BREWSTER.

3. *Macauley's Miscellanies; Art. Lord Bacon.* [Edinburgh Review. 1837.]

THE name of Bacon marks an era of light in the history of science. He did not introduce, it is true, the great revolution which has taken place in the state of human knowledge; but he alone fully comprehended it. If he did not begin that revolution, he imparted the true aim and direction to its resistless energies. He, above all other men, felt its mighty impulse; and, by still mightier impulses of his own, he extended and deepened its influence. This impulse became, in his mind, something more than a dark feeling and sense of want; it became a rational and enduring conviction, giving rise to a hope too great and too firm to be shaken. He saw that the most magnificent anticipations of the human mind might be realized; nay, he comprehended and pointed out the precise method in which they would be realized. All the honors justly due to the immortal labors of his predecessors can, therefore, detract nothing from the glory of Bacon. Some of his predecessors are worthy of our veneration and gratitude; but yet he has been generally, and we believe very justly, regarded as the great restorer of true learning and science.

It is a great advantage of those who have made discoveries in the mathematics, or in the physical sciences, that the extent of their services can be accurately measured and universally appreciated; while the services of those who have labored to improve philosophy, which is the science of the sciences, are continually open to cavil and objection. Accordingly, the fashion has been set, of late, to depreciate the lofty pretensions of the Baconian philosophy; and it remains to be seen whether or not it will be extensively followed. We can no longer say with Dugald Stewart, that "the merits of

Bacon, as the father of experimental philosophy, are so universally acknowledged, it is superfluous to notice them." But, after all, though the remark of Aristotle, that philosophies seem destined to rise and set like the stars, may be true in general, we have no serious fear it will ever prove true in regard to the philosophy of Bacon. The unexpected opposition, however, which has been raised to this philosophy, proceeding, as it does, from authors of undoubted learning and ability, is worthy of a respectful consideration. This we shall accordingly bestow upon it, in the survey which we are about to take of the commentators and critics of the Baconian philosophy.

David Hume is the most distinguished of those philosophers who have exerted their ingenuity to lessen the splendor of Bacon's reputation. He has ventured to express the opinion, that, as a philosopher, Bacon was "inferior to his contemporary Galileo, perhaps even to Kepler." It is not our intention at present to dwell upon the peculiarities of Bacon's genius, or endeavor to show wherein he greatly excelled all other men; for we are now concerned only with his commentators and critics. Hence we shall confine our vindication of his fame against the unfavorable judgments of his critics to an examination of the reasons on which those judgments are founded. We may very easily dispose of the reasons assigned by Mr. Hume. "The Englishman," says he, "was ignorant of geometry; the Florentine revived that science, and excelled in it." This is true; but geometry, however important as a branch of science, is only one element in the character of a philosopher. Tried by this test, both Galileo and Hume would have to give place to their inferiors in philosophy. Descartes was superior to the former as a geometer; and almost any geometer is superior to the latter. The position of philosophers cannot be determined by their attainments in the mathematics. Neither Plato nor Aristotle could extract the cube root of numbers, and yet they were greater philosophers than Mr. Pike.

It is also alledged, that Galileo not only pointed out the road to philosophy, but made, himself, considerable advances in it. But it should be remembered, that Galileo pointed out the road to philosophy only by a finger-board placed at the entrance upon it; whereas Bacon mapped out this road from beginning to end. And, besides, he indicated the many by-paths which had led all his predecessors astray, and the many pit-falls in which thousands had perished. He showed how the dangers of the road might be shunned, and its difficulties overcome; and, above all, he animated the world with hope, by revealing, in the clear sunlight of his own

prophetic genius, the inexhaustible treasures to which it would inevitably conduct the traveler. If Galileo made considerable discoveries in one branch of science, Bacon generalized the process by which he made them, before he knew what his great cotemporary had done, and showed how discoveries might be made in all sciences. The navigator who pursues the right course to discover, and actually discovers, a single island, deserves well of mankind. But still greater honor is due to the man who confidently points out the region in which vast continents may be found, and induces mankind to give credit to his apparently wild prediction, though they should not be really discovered until long after his death. Though Columbus had never touched upon the shores of America, yet the grand conception which always occupied his mind, and the almost supernatural confidence with which he never ceased to proclaim it, would have conferred a far greater benefit on mankind than was ever derived from any other navigator of the seas. Bacon was the Columbus of modern science; and his visions, as magnificent as those of his great prototype, and as confidently proclaimed to a narrow-minded and unbelieving world, have been as fully and as triumphantly realized.

We admit that Bacon rejected the Copernican system, and that Galileo was one of its most powerful advocates; but it is not true that he rejected it "with the most positive disdain." This coloring is given to the position of Bacon, we suppose, from Mr. Hume's passion for artistic effect; it certainly has no foundation in truth. The opinion of Copernicus, said Bacon, touching the rotation of the earth, "*is not repugnant to any of the phenomena.*" The opposite system, said he, "*at present, appears to us the truer hypothesis.*"* His rejection of the Copernican theory was not, as has been commonly supposed, founded on a vulgar prejudice; he withheld his assent, not because he was a narrow-minded "bigot of common sense," but because he believed there was not, at that time, sufficient evidence to establish a rational conviction. Though Galileo had for a long time rejected the Copernican system, to use his own words, "as a piece of solemn folly," yet he afterward atoned for this conduct by the activity with which he collected, and the sagacity with which he weighed, the evidence in its favor, after he had been persuaded, by a person whose name is unknown to philosophy, that it was a subject not altogether worthy of contempt.

As to the style of Galileo and Bacon, the only remaining point in which Mr. Hume has compared them, we think it hardly worthy

* Theory of the Firmament.

of being taken into consideration in estimating the intellectual character of two great philosophers. Galileo was undoubtedly a more "lively and agreeable writer" than Bacon. In this respect, they have both been excelled by Addison and Washington Irving. Mr. Hume has compared their style in no other particular; and in regard to this, we are very happy to agree with him. Indeed, through the whole of this famous parallel, Mr. Hume has studiously compared those things for which Galileo was the most distinguished with those in which Bacon was the most deficient. He has compared the brightness of the lesser light with the spots on the glory of the greater. We may truly say of this parallel, therefore, what Gibbon has so emphatically said of Mr. Hume's History of England, to wit: "It is specious, but superficial."

No one has gone further in denying the importance and the influence of Bacon's philosophy than Sir David Brewster. We have derived so much pleasure from his interesting Life of Newton, his excellent treatise on "Optics," and his fascinating work on "Natural Magic," that we are sorry to find ourselves opposed to him on the subject of Bacon's claims to the gratitude of mankind. His position on this important subject is certainly a most anomalous one for a cultivator of the physical sciences; but we are at no loss to account for it; he has himself fully revealed the secret. That profound thinker and beautiful writer, Dr. John Playfair, had spoken of Bacon "as a man who has had no rival in the times which are past, and as likely to have none in those which are to come." This was more than the biographer of Newton was disposed to bear. Hence he exclaims, "In a eulogy so overstrained as this, we feel that the language of panegyric has passed into that of idolatry; and we are desirous of weighing the force of arguments which tend to depose Newton from the high priesthood of nature, and to unsettle the proud destinies of Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler." Sir David, in an eloquent passage at the opening of his Life of Newton, has placed him "at the head of those great men who have been the ornaments of their species;" and he has used language in regard to him fully as strong as that which Playfair has applied to Bacon. He even thinks there is no "extravagance" in the encomium which Halley pronounced on Newton,—

"Nec fas est proprius mortali attingere Divos."

"So near the gods—man cannot nearer go."

It is to be suspected, then, that it is not so much the sin of idolatry which has given the offense, as the circumstance that it was not

committed in the worship of the right object. But we have not the least idea that either party has committed any such sin. And as to the controversy between them, we are decidedly of the opinion that both are in the right. Bacon is without a rival, and so is Newton. Bacon was the first teacher of the human race who effectually taught the sublime art of creating sciences; and no other philosopher can ever achieve anew the glory of having taught it, until the name and memory of Bacon shall be forgotten. In like manner, Newton was the first philosopher who solved the stupendous problem of the world; and the glory of every subsequent solution must be merged and lost in the recollection of the first. Lagrange solved this problem; and yet he sighed that Newton had solved it before him. The language which Dr. Playfair has so well applied to Bacon may, therefore, be applied to Newton with equal propriety; for "if a second [Newton] is ever to arise, he must be ignorant of the first."

The discrepancy between Sir David Brewster and Mr. Macauley is very remarkable. The latter does not consider Bacon's analysis of the inductive method "a very useful performance;" because "it is an analysis of that which we are doing from morning to night, and which we continue to do even in our dreams;" because it "has been practiced ever since the beginning of the world by every human being." On the other hand, Sir David is of the opinion that it was "never tried by any philosopher but Bacon himself."* And the example he has given us of its application, he continues, "will remain to future ages as a memorable instance of the absurdity of attempting to fetter discovery by any *artificial* rules." "It is an elaborate and correct analysis," says the one, of a process so perfectly natural, that all men practice it; and "it is not likely to be better performed merely because men know how they perform it."† It is so unnatural and artificial, says the other, that no philosopher ever tried it but the author himself, and he only to make a blunder, for the warning and instruction of future ages. It is of no value, says the one, because it is natural; it is of no value, says the other, because it is artificial. No man ever made a discovery in any other way, objects the one; no man ever made a discovery in this way, objects the other. If we may believe the one, the plain man, who seeks the cause which has put his stomach out of order, "proceeds in the strictest conformity with the rules laid down in the second book of the *Novum Organum*," no less than the philosopher who explores the profound mysteries of nature. If we may believe the other, "the impatience

* Life of Newton, p. 297.

† Macauley's *Mis.*, vol. ii, p. 474.

of genius spurns the restraints of mechanical rules, and never will submit to the plodding drudgery of inductive discipline."* Both, certainly, cannot be in the right; and, if we are not mistaken, it may be shown that both are very clearly in the wrong.

But before we proceed to do this, we must notice a still more remarkable discrepancy between Sir David Brewster and—himself. He contends that the successors of Bacon did not derive "the slightest advantage from his precepts."† And yet he confidently affirms that "the necessity of experimental research, and of advancing gradually from the study of facts to the determination of their cause, *through the ground-work of Bacon's method*, is a doctrine which was not only inculcated, but successfully followed, by preceding philosophers. In a letter from Tycho Brahe to Kepler, this industrious astronomer urges his pupil 'to lay a solid foundation for his views by actual observation, and then, by ascending from these, strive to reach the causes of things;' and *it was no doubt under the influence of this advice that Kepler submitted his wildest fancies to the test of observation, and was conducted to his most splendid discoveries.*"‡ Now herein is a very wonderful thing. It is not that the author has contradicted himself in affirming, in one place, that no philosopher ever tried this method but Bacon himself; and, in another, that it was successfully followed by preceding philosophers. It is this:—Sir David says, "that Bacon was a man of powerful genius, and endowed with varied and profound talent—the most skillful logician—the most nervous and eloquent writer of the age he adorned, are points which have been established by universal suffrage." This great man exerted his matchless powers, during a long life, in order to bring his system to perfection; he recommended every part of it by an eloquence which has never been surpassed. His successors derived not "the slightest advantage from his precepts;" and yet a hint respecting the very same method which he recommended, contained in a single sentence from Tycho Brahe, conducted Kepler "to his most splendid discoveries." Such are the inconsistencies into which the best writers are inevitably betrayed whenever they have any other object in view but truth. She is a jealous mistress, and will divide her honors neither with a Newton nor a Bacon.

Sir David Brewster strenuously maintains the position that Newton would have pursued the right method, and "enriched science with the same splendid discoveries, if the name of Bacon had never been heard of." We do not wish to deprive Newton of

* Life of Newton, p. 299.

† Ibid., p. 296.

‡ Ibid., p. 295.

his honors in order to deck the brow of Bacon. The glory of Bacon needs no borrowed effulgence. But we think the statements of Sir David are quite too broad and unguarded. He even declares, that "nearly two hundred years have gone by, teeming with the richest fruits of human genius, *and no grateful disciple has appeared to vindicate the rights of the alledged legislator of science.* Even Newton, who was born and educated after the publication of the *Novum Organum*, never mentions the name of Bacon or his system; and the amiable and indefatigable Boyle treated him with the same disrespectful silence."—P. 297.

The silence of Newton proves nothing. First, because his philosophical writings are so exceedingly brief and condensed in their form, that they did not admit of general speculations about philosophy and philosophers. And, secondly, Newton was a member and president of the Royal Society, which was instituted for the express purpose of trying "the new experimental philosophy;" and which, from the time of its foundation, resounded with the praises of Bacon.

There is testimony on this subject, however, quite as strong as could be desired. Dr. Henry Pemberton, in the introduction to his "View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy," has given an elaborate analysis of the Baconian method; and he concludes by saying, "This is that method of induction whereon all philosophy is founded." He ascribes the splendid discoveries of Newton to the circumstance that he adopted and pursued the method pointed out and recommended by Bacon. This is the most unexceptionable testimony, because Dr. Pemberton was a great admirer of Newton, as well as of Bacon; and, besides, the former had so high an opinion of his learning and ability, that, after the death of Cotes, he employed him to edit the third edition of the *Principia*. This is not all; *for the work of Dr. Pemberton was read by Newton himself, and received his approbation.*

"An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries" has likewise been given by Maclaurin—a man universally admired for the greatness of his genius. He was one of Newton's most ardent admirers. In this production, we are informed that Newton "used to call his philosophy the *experimental philosophy*, intimating, by the name, the essential difference there is between it and those systems that are the product of genius and invention only."—P. 25. We are not to conclude from such language, however, that either Newton or his disciple intended to deprive Bacon of the glory of having founded the experimental philosophy. The meaning is, that this was Newton's philosophy *by adoption*; for

Maclaurin does not hesitate to say, in the same volume, that "Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, who was contemporary with Galileo and Kepler, is justly held among the restorers of true learning, but more especially as the founder of the *experimental philosophy*. . . . He saw there was a necessity for a thorough reformation in the way of treating natural knowledge, and that all theory was to be laid aside that was not founded on experiment. He proposed his plan in his *Instauratio Magna*, with so much strength of argument, and so just a zeal, *as renders that admirable work the delight of all who have a taste for solid learning*."—P. 59. Neither Pemberton nor Maclaurin, then, deemed it any detraction from the glory of Newton to ascribe to Bacon the honor of having founded the philosophy under whose guidance he was conducted to his sublime discoveries.

We have still more conclusive testimony, however, to show that when Newton called the experimental philosophy his philosophy, he merely meant it was his by adoption. In the preface to the second edition of the *Principia*, Cotes has said, that there are three classes of philosophers; and after disposing of two, he adds,—"*There is left the third class, which profess experimental philosophy*." Having alluded to the method of this philosophy, he says,—"*This is that incomparably best way which our renowned author most justly embraced before the rest, and thought alone worthy to be cultivated and adorned by his excellent labors*." It is well worthy of remark, that this edition of the *Principia* by Cotes was prepared under the eye of Sir Isaac Newton himself, and received his entire approbation. Indeed, the preface itself was written by Cotes at the special request of Newton. Now, if Bacon was not the father of the experimental philosophy, which Newton embraced before the rest, and determined to cultivate, to whom shall we award so great an honor?

We do not say that Sir David Brewster is bound by these high and impartial authorities, two of which received the sanction of Newton himself; but it seems to us, that they should have precluded the assertion, that "nearly two hundred years have gone by, teeming with the richest fruits of genius, and *no grateful disciple has appeared to vindicate the rights of the alledged legislator of science*." Where, then, is Pemberton, and Maclaurin, and Playfair, and Herschel, and Stewart, and Leibnitz, not to mention a hundred other names, who have contributed to swell the full chorus of Bacon's universal praise? We may truly affirm, that no "legislator of science," whether ancient or modern, whether real or pretended, has ever received more generous applause than has

Bacon from a host of illustrious disciples. His reputation has been absolutely overwhelming. If his rights have not been heretofore vindicated, it is because they have not been assailed.

If Boyle had never read the works of Bacon, nor derived any advantage from them directly, this would not prove that he had not been greatly benefited by them. It is well known that he was a great admirer and student of Gassendi, who, in his turn, was an ardent admirer and devoted disciple of Bacon. We have no doubt that the greater part of Bacon's influence has been exerted in acting upon those who have acted upon the world. But it is not true that Sir Robert Boyle has derived no advantage directly from Bacon's works, or that he has passed over his name in silence. No person familiar with the writings of Bacon can read those of Boyle without perceiving that he is greatly indebted to "the master of wisdom." The pages of his admirable treatise on the "Usefulness of an Experimental Philosophy of Nature" are, in particular, not unfrequently enriched with wisdom, and even adorned with imagery, which must have been suggested to his mind by the writings of Bacon. And in this very treatise he has quoted Bacon as an authority, and called him "that great and solid philosopher."

It is remarkable that, in his attempts to preserve "the proud destiny of Copernicus," Sir David Brewster has objected to the philosophy of Bacon, that it was known before his time. Now this objection, if it has any weight in it, would entirely undermine all the glory of Copernicus. In the preface to Sir Isaac Newton's profound work on "The System of the World," (a work which we have no doubt Sir David has repeatedly read,) the author has mentioned several ancient philosophers by whom the Copernican theory was maintained. It is well known that Copernicus was not the first who conceived the system which goes by his name. He revived that system; he saw its evidences more clearly, and he grasped its commanding positions more firmly than the rest of mankind; and he caused the world to awake to its importance. Such, precisely, is the nature of the services which Bacon rendered to experimental philosophy. It is no derogation from the glory of either, that the truth for which they contended had been advocated, with unequal ability, by preceding philosophers. They have both founded philosophies, which other men had labored in vain to establish.

"It has been attempted by some," says Sir John Herschel, in his most delightful and instructive "Preliminary Discourse to the Study of Natural Philosophy," "to lessen the merit of this great achievement by showing that the inductive method had been prac-

ticed in many instances, both ancient and modern, by the mere instinct of mankind; but it is not the introduction of inductive reasoning, as a new and untried process, which characterizes the Baconian philosophy, but his keen perception, and his broad and spirit-stirring, almost enthusiastic, announcement of its paramount importance, as the alpha and omega of science, as the grand and only chain for the linking together of physical truths, and the eventual key to every discovery and every application. Those who would deny him his just glory on such grounds, would refuse to Jenner or to Howard their civic crowns, because a few farmers in a remote province had, time out of mind, been acquainted with vaccination, or philanthropists, in all ages, had occasionally visited the prisoner in his dungeon."—P. 114. Such was the manner in which Sir John Herschel replied to the objection in question, before it was reproduced by either Sir David Brewster or Mr. Macauley. Those who object to Bacon's services on such grounds should certainly not do so in order to uphold the fame of Copernicus, whose system was maintained long before his time. If they would be consistent, they should even withhold the honor which is due to Columbus, because he received hints from preceding navigators, and deduced an argument from the flight of birds.

Sir David Brewster has admitted, it is true, that the greatness of Bacon's genius is established by universal suffrage; but yet if his remarks are true, we should entertain a very mean opinion of Lord Bacon's ability. For he says, that although Tycho Brahe was "skillful in the observation of phenomena, his mind was but little suited to investigate their cause;" and yet he has, according to Sir David, compressed, by anticipation, "the whole Baconian philosophy into a single sentence." Lord Bacon devoted many years of meditation to his philosophy. The first book of the *Novum Organum* was written over twelve times with his own hand. It would require a greater than Tycho Brahe to compress the whole of it into a single sentence; or else Lord Bacon must have exerted his great powers to render it as thin and attenuated as possible. We shall now take leave of Sir David; and if we have been at all severe or harsh in our strictures on a particular portion of his excellent *Life of Newton*, it is not because we admire Brewster less, but Bacon more.

Everybody has read Macauley's splendid dissertation on the philosophy of Bacon, which first appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*, and afterward in his *Miscellanies*. It is impossible, however, that our admiration should be unqualified, when we perceive that

the brilliant effect of antithesis has been so often substituted for the sober light of truth. Whenever the writer seizes the truth, no one can present it to the mind of the reader with greater fullness or vividness of illustration; but it is seldom that he does seize the truth while treating of the philosophy of Bacon. The reader of this remarkable performance will find it as impossible to forget the bright things which the writer has said, as he will to learn from it the sober things which Bacon has taught. We can hardly resist the conviction, while perusing it, that the author has read the *Novum Organum* in order to write about it, and has not written about it because he had read it. His account of the philosophy it teaches is certainly the most brilliant, the most showy, and the most superficial thing he has ever written. It is a pity that so beautiful a production should not be true, we admit; and we should not attempt to dispel the fascination and the charm, if we did not agree with the author himself, that "an acre in Middlesex is better than a principality in Utopia."

Mr. Macauley has made himself merry with the inductive method, by presenting it in connection with trivial and insignificant instances. Thus, says he, "it is constantly practiced by the most ignorant clown, by the most thoughtless schoolboy, by the very child at the breast. That method leads the clown to expect that if he sows barley, he shall not reap wheat. By that method, the school-boy learns that a cloudy day is best for catching trout. The very infant, we imagine, is led by induction to expect milk from his mother or nurse, and none from his father. . . . A plain man finds his stomach out of order. He never heard Lord Bacon's name. But he proceeds in the strictest conformity with the rules laid down in the second book of the '*Novum Organum*,' and satisfies himself that minced pies have done the mischief." Nay, it even seems that it is "induction which leads us to the conclusion that the presence of the sun is the cause of our having more light by day than by night." It is one thing, we have been accustomed to suppose, for a plain man to ascertain the cause which has put his stomach out of order, and quite another for a philosopher to discover the law which keeps the universe in order. It is one thing for an infant to ascertain that it has derived milk from its mother, and not from its father; and quite another for a learned commentator to determine what he has derived from Bacon, and not from himself. The plain truth is, Bacon's method was not designed to teach how infants know the mother's breast, or to teach men that the sun gives light by day. These are discoveries which both children and men make, because they cannot

help making them. These are depths into which all may safely venture, without needing any support from the arm of a Verulam. That he never designed to afford us aid in such cases, must be as plain to every diligent and impartial student of his works, as is the noon-day sun itself. Bacon freely admits, that many things may be easily discovered without the aid of his philosophy, "but," he adds, "*before we are allowed to enter the more remote and hidden parts of nature* it is necessary that a better and more perfect use and application of the human mind and understanding should be introduced."—*Preface to the Novum Organum*. Indeed, if after so many years of meditation, Bacon had merely analyzed the process by which such discoveries as those indicated by his reviewer are made; and then ushered his performance into the world with the magnificent boast, "I have now held up a light in the obscurity of philosophy, which will be seen long after I am dead," he would have deserved anything rather than our admiration.

The reason why Mr. Macauley sets so little value on the philosophy of Bacon, is, that he does not understand it. Take, for example, the following representation of the inductive method of Bacon. Says he,—“We have heard that an eminent judge of the last generation was in the habit of jocosely propounding, after dinner, a theory, that the cause of the prevalence of Jacobinism was the practice of bearing three names. He quoted, on the one side, Charles James Fox, Richard Brinsley Sheridan, John Horne Tooke, John Philpot Curran, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Theobald Wolfe Tone. These were *instantia convenientes*. He then proceeded to cite instances *absentiæ in proxime*,—William Pitt, John Scott, William Wyndham, Samuel Horsley, Henry Dundas, Edmund Burke. He might have gone on to instances *secundum magis et minus*,” &c., &c. After selecting other kinds of instances, the writer concludes, “Here is an induction, corresponding with Bacon’s analysis, and ending in a monstrous absurdity.”

Now, with the learned judge, who “jocosely propounded” this induction, we have no quarrel; it might be well, however, if learned judges would be more careful in future how they joke after dinner, if their jokes are to be mistaken for sound philosophy. The above induction, so far from “corresponding with Bacon’s analysis,” is an open and flagrant violation of every principle of it.

To set out with a preconceived hypothesis of any kind, and then select such instances as will serve to establish it, overlooking the

rest, is the very course condemned by Bacon. He has repeatedly, and most eloquently, denounced this practice of rising from a few particulars to a general proposition, as "the source of all error." He exhorts us to lay aside every preconceived opinion, and come with clear, unbiased minds to study the works of God. This is the very first lesson to be learned in the school of Bacon. It is flagrantly violated in the induction produced by Mr. Macauley. The learned judge set out with a *preconceived absurdity*; he found in the kingdom of Great Britain six Jacobins with three names, and six anti-Jacobins with two! No very wonderful discovery this! The induction in this case did not lead to the "monstrous absurdity"—the absurdity led to the monstrous induction.

As the supposed induction of Mr. Macauley imbodyes a popular error in regard to the analysis of Bacon, we shall proceed still further to expose its violations of that analysis. The above specimen of inductive reasoning is clearly and broadly distinguished from every other mode of induction, whether ancient or modern. The facts on which it is based would authorize a rational being to conclude, that there are some Jacobins with three names, and some anti-Jacobins with two. This is all he should conclude from his facts. Now, let us suppose that the learned judge had gone further, and, instead of six instances, he had found a thousand, in which Jacobins had three names, and as many in which their opponents possessed only two; nay, let us suppose that the same thing were true in relation to all the Jacobins and their opponents throughout the kingdom. He might then have concluded, as a matter of fact, that Jacobins have three names, and their opponents two; but this would not have been a Baconian induction. It fulfills the conditions laid down by Aristotle, who says, "Induction is an inference drawn from *all* the particulars which it comprehends;" but, as we shall see, it is far from meeting the requisitions of the *Novum Organum*. If we should examine a thousand roses, and, finding them all red, we should conclude that roses are red; this might be an Aristotlean induction, but not a Baconian. It would be an exceedingly frail structure; the very next rose we came across might be white. This method of framing inductions proceeds by the way of simple enumeration: it merely counts up or enumerates all the objects on which it is based, and, finding them to have a *common property*, it states this fact in a compendious form of expression. It simply affirms, that roses are red—that Jacobins have three names. This kind of induction is most emphatically condemned by Bacon. "In forming axioms," says he, "we must invent a different form of induction

from that hitherto in use ; not only for the proof and discovery of principles, (as they are called,) but also of minor intermediate ; and, in short, every kind of axioms. *The induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is puerile, leads to uncertain conclusions, and is exposed to danger from one contradictory instance.*"

—*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 105. To show how utterly puerile, in the estimation of a real Baconian, is the kind of induction furnished by Mr. Macauley, we shall quote from the same page on which it is recorded. "If the learned author of the theory about Jacobinism," says Mr. Macauley, "had enlarged either of his tables a little, his system would have been destroyed. The names of Tom Paine and William Wyndham Grenville would have been sufficient to do the work." Thus, the very induction which the writer says perfectly corresponds with the analysis of Bacon, he himself demolishes by the application of a test which he has unwittingly drawn from the *Novum Organum*.

This is not the only principle on which, as disciples of Bacon, we should condemn the induction of the learned judge. If we had observed that every known Jacobin had three names, this might enable us to say, that Jacobins, *so far as we had observed*, have three names. This would be a very wonderful coincidence, if it existed, but not a discovery in science. We could not conclude from such a coincidence, that "the practice of bearing three names *is the cause* of Jacobinism." The inductive method of Bacon presupposes that man is a rational animal ; that given by Mr. Macauley presupposes him to be devoid of reason and common sense. It is what Bacon calls an empirical induction ; and its deficiency is very clearly marked by him. "The empiric school," says he, "produces dogmas of a more deformed and monstrous nature than the sophistic or theoretic school ; *not being founded in the light of common notions.*"—*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 64. And again,—"We must not only search for, and procure a greater number of experiments, but also introduce a completely different method, order, and progress of continuing and promoting experience. For vague and *arbitrary experience* is (as we have observed) *mere groping in the dark*, and *rather astonishes than instructs.*"—*Nov. Organ.*, aph. 100. The process pursued by the learned judge, perfected and held up by Mr. Macauley as a true specimen of the Baconian method, could not have been more clearly described, or its puerility and folly more impressively pointed out by Lord Bacon, if it had been actually before him. We might point out other particulars if it were necessary, and our limits would permit, in which the example in question very widely departs from the

directions given by Lord Bacon; but surely these are sufficient.

The learned writer does not seem to have caught the most distant glimpse of the grand problem which Bacon proposed to himself, and which the *Novum Organum* is designed to solve. A knowledge of this problem will place the key to the Baconian method in our hands, and serve to correct many erroneous notions in regard to it. Let us, then, see what it is. Preceding philosophers, in the opinion of Bacon, had attempted to obtain a knowledge of nature in one of two ways. According to one method, they set out with certain abstract conceptions, or universal propositions, or ideas, from which they had attempted to deduce the nature and order of things in the external world. This is called by Bacon the sophistic or theoretic method. Those philosophers who have thus spun systems of the world out of their own brains, he compares to spiders that spin their web out of the substance of their own bowels. "The wit and mind of man," says he, "if it work upon matter, *which is the contemplation of the creatures of God*, worketh according to the stuff, and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, *then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of the thread and work, but of no substance or profit.*"—*Advancement of Learning*, book i, pp. 170, 171.

The other, in the language of Bacon, is "the empiric method." This rejects "the light of common notions," which he elsewhere calls "reason." Hence it is "a mere groping in the dark." It feels its way instead of seeing it. It has no guiding principle—no polar star—no compass. It is confined to the dark shore; it dare not explore the great ocean of discovery. What it handles and feels, it knows; and beyond this it cannot pronounce. This method, says Bacon, "produces dogmas of a more deformed and monstrous nature than the sophistic or theoretic. . . . This kind of experience is nothing but a loose fagot, and mere groping in the dark, as men at night try all means of discovering the right road; while it would be better, and more prudent, either to wait for day, or procure a light, and then proceed."—*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 82. Those who have pursued this method, he compares to ants, that are careful to deprive whatever they collect of the power to germinate, so that it is unfruitful and barren. The inductions, formed according to this method, are as blind and arbitrary as that of the learned judge who constructed the theory about Jacobinism.

Now, seeing that philosophers had, in all ages, followed the one

or the other of these partial and exclusive methods, to the infinite detriment of human knowledge, Lord Bacon undertook to establish a real and legitimate union between them. He did not wish to grope in the dark with the blind empiric, nor to soar in the blaze of grand abstractions with "the well-bred sophister." He wished to study nature, to contemplate the creatures of God, "in the true and genuine humiliation of the human soul," both in the light of reason and the light of experiment wisely combined. There never was a falser notion, though it is a common one, that there is an affinity between the Baconian philosophy and empiricism. The most eloquent passage which has ever been penned on such a subject, he concludes with the lofty declaration, that "we think we have established for ever the real and legitimate union of *the empiric and the rational faculties, whose sullen and inauspicious divorces and repudiations have disturbed everything in the great family of mankind.*"—*Preface to the Novum Organum.*

If Mr. Macauley's account of the Baconian philosophy be correct, it entirely rejects and repudiates the rational faculty. It pursues an absurdity with as much zeal as it does a rational conception. Bacon the father of the empiric school! Empirics are, and ever have been, too prone to call themselves Baconian philosophers; and it is to be regretted that the most brilliant and fascinating writer of the Edinburgh Review should have given his sanction to their absurd pretensions.

As Mr. Macauley, in his attempt to do the contrary, has so clearly shown what the inductive process recommended by Bacon *is not*, let us see what it really *is*. This may be best seen in a single case, which fulfills and illustrates the conditions prescribed by Bacon. Sir Isaac Newton, then, having examined twenty-two different substances, found that the forces with which they refracted light were very nearly proportioned to their densities. He observed a remarkable exception to this law in several substances; all of which were combustible. It occurred to him, that there might be, and probably was, some connection or bond of union between the high refractive power of these substances and their combustibility. Hence, he conjectured that the *diamond*, which likewise possessed a high refractive power, was an inflammable substance. This conjecture, it is well known, was afterward verified by experiment. The same law was also found, by Sir David Brewster, to obtain in relation to phosphorus; and it was still further extended, by M. M. Arago and Biot, to hydrogen. Thus, the induction is established, that substances possessing high re-

fractive powers, when compared with their densities, are inflammable.

Now let us mark the wide difference between this induction and that of the learned judge. The one seeks to establish a *preconceived absurdity*; the other, to verify a *rational* conception. The one proceeds not in "the light of a common notion;" the other proceeds under the guidance of a connection between things, *which is suggested by observation, and not contradicted by reason*. The true induction fairly appealed to experiment, in order to obtain a knowledge of things; the false, carefully selected its *instantiæ convenientes*, in order to support a wild and crazy phantom of the brain. The one supposes that man is possessed of a rational faculty, for which he has some use; the other supposes that he is a poor blind empiric, equally in love with monsters and fables as with the truth itself. In short, the one is a Baconian induction, and the other is a Macaulean.

The difference between the induction which led to the "monstrous absurdity" about Jacobinism, and one which leads to a discovery of truth, consists, says Mr. Macauley, "not in the kind of instances, but in the number of instances." And he asks, "What is slight evidence? What collection of facts is scanty? Will ten instances do, or fifty, or a hundred?" We answer, If he would convince us that "the practice of bearing three names is the cause of the prevalence of Jacobinism," neither ten, nor fifty, nor a hundred instances will do. If he would persuade us out of our reason, the collection of a thousand facts would be scanty. It is plain, that the difference between such an induction and one leading to truth, does *not* consist in the number of instances, but in the nature of the induction. No number of instances could ever convince us that the crowing of the cock is the cause of the sun's rising.

Since Mr. Macauley entertained so imperfect a notion of the method analyzed by Bacon, it is no wonder he should have believed that Bacon had been anticipated by Aristotle. This remark has been repeatedly made since the publication of the Analysis of Aristotle's works by Dr. Gillies; but it has been made by no one, we believe, who had formed correct views of the induction of Aristotle and that of Bacon. It is very remarkable that this objection, which has been anticipated and fully answered by Bacon himself, should be so often reproduced by authors who have taken no notice whatever of Bacon's reply to it. "Others may object," says he, "that we are only doing that which has already been done, and that the ancients followed the same course with our-

selves. . . . But to any one," he truly adds, "not entirely forgetful of our previous observations, it will be easy to answer this objection, or rather scruple."—*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 125.

But it is objected, as we have seen, that the process analyzed and recommended by Bacon "has been practiced ever since the beginning of the world by every human being." Every human being has tried to practice some such process, we admit; but yet have even ingenious men very often mistaken a process like that of the learned judge for a true induction. But suppose the above assertion were perfectly true, to what does it amount? It is not pretended that all men have performed the inductive process equally well; and hence the necessity of giving direction and assistance to their efforts.

Every art has preceded its corresponding science. Men talked, and reasoned, and declaimed, before grammar, or logic, or rhetoric were reduced to principle. They fought battles before the science of war and fortification was heard of. They traded, and grew rich or became poor, before political economy was ever dreamed of as a science. Indeed, no art can be mentioned which was not practiced before its corresponding science had an existence. Nothing can be more futile, then, than to object to the usefulness of any science, that the art which it is designed to cultivate and perfect was practiced before the science was known. If this objection is good against one science, it is good against all; and all scientific learning must be swept away.

Locke spurns the logic of Aristotle, because he is quite sure that the Almighty did not merely make us two-legged creatures, and leave it to Aristotle to make us rational beings. But neither Aristotle nor Bacon imagined that they were going to make rational creatures of us. If these philosophers had undertaken to analyze and describe any process which is not natural to the mind, they would have conferred no benefit upon us. They would have laid down laws for the operation of the human mind, which nature itself would have rendered it impossible for us to pursue. The very circumstance, then, which should have formed the subject of their praise, has been made the ground of their censure. It was not their design to render man a rational being, but to reveal to him the processes of his own mind, in order that he might perform them with the greater certainty, and more uniform effect, as well as to point out his manifold dangers in order that he might escape them. Nature might have been left to herself if she had not been eternally drawn from her course by the operation of mighty causes, whose influence had not been suspected. They

wished to lay no artificial restraints upon nature, but to take off those restraints which had rendered her course so unequal, and her efforts so unavailing. This was the avowed design of Bacon. He condemns "the induction which the logicians speak of;" because "it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature;" and "he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge," shall find "that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it."—*Advancement of Learning*. And again, in relation to the *Novum Organum*, he says, "It is at least new, even in its very nature; but copied from a very ancient pattern, no other than the world itself, and the nature of things, and of the mind."—*Letter to King James*. If any one would judge Bacon, let him not do so on principles which he has expressly repudiated. He has professed to copy from nature; and let not this be objected against him until it be shown to be a defect; until it be shown that he might have found a better model than the work of God.

Lord Bacon did not lay so great stress on the second book of the *Novum Organum* as we should be led to suppose from the writings of those who have endeavored to lessen his merits. Sir David Brewster and Mr. Macauley, in particular, have passed over the first book entirely, and directed their animadversions against the second. This is exceedingly unfair; especially as the first has always been regarded as by far the most valuable, and as it was so regarded by Bacon himself. It is in the following language (with which he concludes the first book of the *Novum Organum*) that he shows what estimate he placed on "the elaborate and correct analysis" of the second:—

"But it is time for us to lay down the art of interpreting nature; to which we attribute no absolute necessity (as if nothing could be done without it) nor perfection, although we think our precepts most useful and correct. For we are of opinion, that if men had at their command a proper history of nature and experience, and would apply themselves steadily to it, and could bind themselves to two things—1. To lay aside received opinions and notions; 2. To restrain themselves, till the proper season, from generalization, they might, by the proper and genuine exertion of their minds, fall into our way of interpretation without the aid of any art. For interpretation is the true and natural act of the mind, *when all obstacles are removed*; certainly, however, everything will be more ready and better fixed by our precepts."

Now, it was the object of the first book of the *Novum Organum* to bind the mind to these two things, and to remove all obstacles out of the way; and, hence, if any man will follow it, he will,

according to Bacon himself, stand in no need of the analysis contained in the second. Newton stood in no need of that analysis; he could proceed without it; but it does not follow from hence, that he derived no advantage from the philosophy of Bacon.

Having considered the objections of Mr. Macauley to the Baconian philosophy, we shall now proceed to notice what he has said in its praise. "The chief peculiarity of Bacon's philosophy," says he, "seems to us to have been this,—that he aimed at things altogether different from those which his predecessors had proposed to themselves. . . . The more carefully his works are examined, the more clearly, we think, it will appear that this is the real clew to his whole system; and that he used means different from those used by other philosophers, because he wished to arrive at an end altogether different from theirs. . . . What, then, was the end which Bacon proposed to himself? It was, to use his own emphatic expression, 'fruit.' It was the multiplying of human enjoyments and the mitigating of human sufferings. . . . Two words form the key of the Baconian philosophy—utility and progress. . . . We conceive that from this peculiarity all the other peculiarities of his system directly, and almost necessarily, sprang." We might quote various other passages in which the writer asserts that "the useful" is the grand object of pursuit which is proposed by the philosophy of Bacon; and that if other men had proposed the same end, they would have been led to adopt the same means; but we presume that the above extracts are amply sufficient to set his views, on this subject, in a clear and satisfactory light. Are those views correct? This is a deeply interesting question; for the end which a philosopher proposes to himself is all in all.

It is a very remarkable circumstance, that Bacon supposed he would be misconceived, and that he would be unjustly reproached for having made "the useful" the chief end of his philosophy. He did not dream that this would ever be held up, not only as the grand peculiarity, but as the distinctive glory of his philosophy. Since he is so directly in conflict with Mr. Macauley respecting the chief end of his philosophy, we must give this striking passage in his own words. Says Bacon,—

"Another objection will, without doubt, be made, namely, that we have not ourselves established a correct, or the best goal or aim of the sciences, (the very defect we blame in others.) For, they will say, that the contemplation of truth is more dignified and exalted than any *utility or extent of effects*: but that our dwelling so long and anxiously on experience and matter, and the fluctuating state of particulars, fastens the mind to earth, or casts it down into an abyss of confusion and

disturbance, and separates and removes it from a much more divine state, the quiet and tranquillity of abstract wisdom."

Now, does not Bacon reject such reasoning with scorn? Does he pour the contempt upon it which his reviewer uniformly makes him pour upon all speculation that has no direct or immediate use in view? His reply, we are aware, will shock Mr. Macauley's sense of propriety; but the question is not what is proper, but what has Bacon taught. He instantly adds, "*We willingly assent to their reasoning, AND ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO EFFECT THE VERY POINT THEY HINT AT AND REQUIRE.*" Yes, Bacon was most anxious, as his whole philosophy shows, to exalt the truth above utility or any extent of effects. We are most anxious to accomplish this very end, says he, in a noble strain of eloquence,—

"For we are founding a real model of the world in the understanding, such as it is found to be, not such as man's reason has distorted. Now, this cannot be done without dissecting and anatomizing the world most diligently; but we declare it necessary to destroy completely the vain, little, and, as it were, apish imitations of the world, which have been formed in various systems of philosophy by men's fancies. Let men learn (as we have said above) the difference that exists between the idols of the human mind and the ideas of the divine mind. The former are mere arbitrary abstractions; the latter, the true marks of the Creator on his creatures, as they are imprinted on, and defined in, matter, by true and exquisite touches. Truth, therefore, and utility are here perfectly identical, and THE EFFECTS ARE OF MORE VALUE AS PLEDGES OF TRUTH THAN FROM THE BENEFIT THEY CONFER ON MEN."

Bacon was not a utilitarian; he was a philosopher. Utility and progress are not the two words which form the key to his philosophy; they are—truth and utility.

Bacon has taken the utmost pains to guard against such a misconception of his philosophy. In the most elaborate attempt which he has ever made to state its end and aim, he bestows the most exalted praise upon all useful arts; but yet he is careful to add, that "the contemplation of things as they are, free from superstition or imposture, error or confusion, *is much more dignified in itself than all the advantage to be derived from discoveries.*"—*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 129.

We do not deny that the philosophy of Bacon is deeply imbued with the spirit of that *philanthropia*, which was so rooted and "fixed in his mind that it could not be removed." This, unquestionably, forms one of the grand and distinguishing features of his philosophy. His great soul, yearning over the sad condition of the human race, often seems to labor to give utterance to his in-

tense desire "to relieve man's estate." This spirit was imbibed neither from the school of Plato, nor of Aristotle; it was drunk in at the feet of an humble Nazarene. He delighted to repeat, that the great Physician of the soul did not disdain to be also the physician of the body: as his doctrine was delivered for the good of the one, said he, so his miracles were wrought for the benefit of the other. Hence, "the majestic humility," of which Mr. Macauley has so well spoken, "the persuasion that nothing can be too insignificant for the attention of the wisest, which is not too insignificant to give pleasure or pain to the meanest." This feeling of divine sympathy with mankind has inspired some of the finest bursts of eloquence to be found in Bacon's writings. He says,—

"It may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the holy faith; well declaring, that it was the same God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws to inanimate creatures, that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves anathematized and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion."—*Advancement of Learning*.

But how desirous soever Bacon may have been to mitigate the sufferings, and to multiply the enjoyments, of the human race, we deny that he made the useful the great end of his philosophy. This is not its distinguishing peculiarity, "from which all its other peculiarities naturally flow." To exhibit his philosophy in this light, is to represent it, not "such as it is found to be, but such as it is distorted." If, in painting a portrait, all the features should be merged in the mouth, or compressed into the nose, however beautiful that particular feature might be in itself, it would be the picture of a monster rather than of a man. In like manner, to represent utility as the first and all-comprehending element of the Baconian philosophy, is violently to distort the admirable proportion and relation of its parts.

In truth, the Baconian philosophy is divided into two parts, namely, "Speculative Natural Philosophy" and "Operative Natural Philosophy." The object of the first is the discovery of truth; the object of the second, the application of truth to human uses. By the one, we make "inquisition of causes;" by the other, we secure "production of effects." By the one, we obtain a knowledge of the secrets and powers of nature; by the other, we bend down these great powers, and compel them to do the

work and drudgery of man. The one is the eye, and the other is the hand, of his philosophy. They are co-ordinate members thereof; and if either is subordinate, it is the operative branch; for, as we have seen, "the effects are of more value as pledges of truth than from the benefit they confer on men." Such may not be the philosophy of others; but such is the philosophy of Bacon.

As for truth, this is to be sought first, and for the intrinsic satisfaction and delight it affords the mind. Says Bacon,—

"The pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning far surpasseth all other in nature. . . . We see in all other pleasures there is satiety, and after they are used, their verdure departeth; which sheweth well they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that it was the novelty which pleased, and not the quality: and, therefore, we see that voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitious princes turn melancholy. But of knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and appetite are perpetually interchangeable; and therefore appeareth *to be good in itself simply, without fallacy or accident.*"—*Advancement of Learning.*

So far from having represented "the useful" as the *alpha* and *omega* of philosophy, nobly has he rebuked those who have corrupted and retarded the progress of truth by their premature and extreme devotion to it. He says,—

"We must by no means omit observing that all the industry displayed in experiment has, from the very first, *caught with a too hasty and intemperate zeal at some determined effect*; has sought, (I say,) *productive rather than enlightening experiments, and has not imitated the divine method, which on the first day created light alone, and assigned it one whole day, producing no material works thereon, but DESCENDING to their creation on the following days.*"—*Pref. to Nov. Organ.*

And again, those noisy empirics, those little contracted utilitarians, who can neither perceive the intrinsic majesty and glory of truth itself, nor grasp the great idea of Bacon's philosophy, that "TRUTH IS NEVER BARREN," have been more finely reproved by the author of the *Advancement of Learning* than by any other philosopher. How is the sound of the "*cui bono*," which they are eternally ringing in the ears of the cultivator of "the speculative philosophy," drowned and lost in the following strain of masculine and dignified eloquence:—

"If men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient fable, in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do; nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest: so

if any man think philosophy and universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from them served and supplied. And *this I take to be a great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because the fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage.* For if you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth, and putting new mold about the roots, that must work it."—*Advancement of Learning.*

When we pass from the pages of Lord Bacon, in which we find so much in praise of a simple inquiry after truth, to those of his distinguished reviewer, we cannot but feel that we have undergone a painful descent, and that we breathe a wholly different atmosphere. "If others had aimed at the same object with Bacon," says he, "we hold it to be certain that they would have employed the same method with Bacon. It would have been hard to convince Seneca that the inventing of a safety lamp was an employment worthy of a philosopher. It would have been hard to persuade Thomas Aquinas to descend from the making of syllogisms to the making of gunpowder. But Seneca would never have doubted for a moment that it was only by a series of experiments that a safety lamp could be invented. Thomas Aquinas would never have thought that his *barbara* and *baralipon* would enable him to ascertain the proportion which charcoal ought to bear to saltpetre in a pound of gunpowder. Neither common sense nor Aristotle would suffer him to fall into such an absurdity." Thus, it seems, that the learned reviewer of Bacon would, in theory at least, have philosophers to lay aside the framing of brilliant conceits, like those of Seneca, and abstruse speculations, like those of Thomas Aquinas, and betake themselves to the constructing of safety lamps, the making of gunpowder, and such like useful occupations. This may be very sound philosophy; we call it not in question now; but is it the Baconian philosophy? Does "the master of wisdom" teach us to abandon ourselves at once to "productive experiments," in order to find our way to "enlightening experiments?" Does he teach us to study the fundamental knowledges in passage? Does he teach us to bestow all our labor upon the boughs of the tree, and none upon the roots? Does he teach us to lop off and strike out the great central and digestive function of human knowledge, by which truth is first discovered and elaborated, in order to be afterward carried off and applied to use? We have already answered these questions out of Lord Bacon himself; and we shall only add the following from his tract in Praise of Knowledge:—"Shall we not as well discern

the riches of nature's warehouse as the benefit of her shop? Is truth ever barren?"

It is very plain, we think, that Mr. Macauley is greatly enamored of the operative branch of philosophy, and has but little affection for the speculative. The former alone is properly termed philosophy, the great end and aim of which is the discovery of truth; the latter should be called art, the great object of which is to produce the useful and the beautiful. If the speculative branch was unduly elevated by some of the ancients at the expense of the operative, the latter has been as extravagantly magnified by Mr. Macauley at the expense of the former. Indeed, his intense scorn of all speculation, which has not a direct palpable use in view, has given point and piquancy to some of the most brilliant antitheses of his production. The fine sayings which blaze on the pages of Seneca, especially, seem to have called down the severest strokes of his ridicule. "We shall next be told," exclaims Seneca, "that the first shoemaker was a philosopher." "For our own part," replies Macauley, "if we are forced to make our choice between the first shoemaker, and the author of the three books 'On Anger,' we pronounce for the shoemaker. It may be worse to be angry than to be wet. But shoes have kept thousands from being wet; and we doubt whether Seneca ever kept anybody from being angry." With all Mr. Macauley's "love of the vulgar useful," we doubt whether he ever made a pair of shoes. We are certain he has framed conceits as splendid as those of Seneca himself; and we doubt whether they are vastly more solid or useful.

We do not object to the useful. In its proper place, it cannot be too highly esteemed. But we do not wish it to intrude into our inquiries after the truth. We wish it to be an after-thought and an after-work. Let art appropriate every truth, if possible, in the whole range of science, and apply it to every use which can, in the least degree, tend to alleviate the suffering or promote the enjoyment of man. Herein is the sphere of the useful; and here let it reign supreme. But let it not be set up as the end of philosophy, as the goal at which we are to aim in our inquiries. The love of the useful is the good genius of the arts; it is the evil genius of science. It is the little, sneering demon, which has attended every great discovery. It mocked at the "*swing-swangs*" of Hooke; and yet the swing-swangs of Hooke led to an improvement in the clock, as well as other valuable inventions. It poured ridicule on Boyle's experiments on the elasticity of the air; and yet experiments on the elasticity of the air continued to be made

until they ended in the steam-engine. It looked down with a sovereign sneer on the grave philosopher, who, with sapient eye, curiously pried into the jerking of a frog's leg : but the philosopher went on with this prying, which seemed to be the most unpromising of all idle curiosity, until the truth which he discovered enabled him to construct the "Voltaic pile," that mighty instrument of modern times ; by which the science of chystology has been created ; the wonders of chemistry revealed ; the *materia medica* enriched beyond all conception ; in short, by which the world has been incalculably benefited. Appolonius was governed by the love of abstract truth alone, when he spent his days and nights in discussing the properties of the conic sections. He did not dream of the sublime uses to which, two thousand years afterward, his discoveries would be applied, in helping to unveil the mechanism of the heavens, and to display the inconceivable wonders of creative wisdom. And but for some superficial uses, which must have struck the minds of all, the German who industriously constructed his glasses, and put them together, in order to look through them at distant objects, would have met with the ridicule and scorn of the same little spirit of utilitarianism. But his labors led Galileo to construct the telescope, with which he pierced the depths of the universe, and beheld the glory of its "wilderness of suns."

In one word, the whole history of science shows the absurdity and folly of setting up the useful as the guiding principle of inquiry. In philosophy, the great question is, What is truth ? The philosopher well knows, that apparently the most insignificant truth may be attended with important results, of which he can, at first, form no conception. It may lead to a hundred uses of which he does not dream ; these uses may lead to the discovery of other truths ; which, in their turn, may be followed by other uses ; and so on in endless and wide-spreading progression. The man, then, who would fetter discovery, by our perceptions of the useful, is not the benefactor of his fellow-man. He would, indeed, extinguish the light of science, and cripple the energies of art. He would devote the one to blindness, and the other to barrenness.

Mr. Macauley has well said, that "the knowledge in which Bacon excelled all men, was a knowledge of the mutual relations of all departments of knowledge." He saw precisely the relation of the true and the useful. The first was the great end of his philosophy. The *Novum Organum*, or New Machine, as he has called it, was not a new machine for the making of shoes, or the constructing of steam-engines, but for "the building up of the sciences." It was an instrument designed to help the human mind

in "the interpretation of nature," the constructing of "axioms," the discovery of truth. This, we repeat, was the great leading object of his philosophy. It was not the pursuit of new continents, but the pursuit of new truth, which enabled him to bear up under all the difficulties that surrounded him. He says,—

"We, for our part at least, overcome by the eternal love of truth, have committed ourselves to uncertain, steep, and desert tracks, and, trusting and relying on divine assistance, have borne up our mind against the violence of opinions, drawn up, as it were, in battle array against our own internal doubts and scruples, against the mists and clouds of nature, and against fancies flitting on all sides around us; that we might at length collect some more trustworthy and certain indications for the living and posterity."

Yet the mistake of Mr. Macauley is not unnatural. It is very evident that "the vulgar useful" is the great end and aim of his philosophy; and, hence, in contemplating the philosophy of Bacon, he very naturally concluded that the little planet in which he himself dwells is the great centre of the system.

We have been greatly surprised to find Bacon placed at the head of the sensuous philosophy. We have before us an exceedingly valuable little "History of Philosophy," which forms a part of the Harpers' Family Library, and which contains the following passage:—"The principle laid down by Bacon, *that sensations are the sole matter of which the tissue of human knowledge is formed*, contained a whole psychology; but, before it could develop itself completely, this principle was applied to cosmology by Gassendi, to morals and politics by Hobbes. Then it produced its proper psychology in the works of Locke and Condillac."—Vol. ii, p. 31. This little work is, in general, very correct; but in this particular it is greatly at fault. No evidence is produced in support of the above assertion; and we can only say, at present, that although we have repeatedly read all the writings of Lord Bacon, we have never met with a single passage in which any such principle is laid down, or from which it can be fairly deduced. There is as great an affinity between Plato and Bacon as there is between Bacon and Hobbes. Indeed, Bacon represents the harmonious combination of the two opposite philosophies of which Plato and Hobbes are the principal types. Hobbes has merely appropriated the sensuous elements of Bacon's philosophy, and despised the other, for the same reason that the cock in the fable preferred the barleycorn to the gem. It has fared with Bacon not otherwise than it did with Aristotle; he has been often judged and condemned, as well as praised and admired, for the errors and follies of his pretended disciples.

The sharp and striking contrasts which Mr. Macauley has presented between Plato and Bacon, seem to us better calculated to produce an effect than to elucidate the truth. "To sum up the whole," says he, "we should say that the aim of the Platonic philosophy was to exalt man into a god. The aim of the Baconian philosophy was to provide man with what he requires while he continues man. The aim of the Platonic philosophy was to raise us far above vulgar wants. The aim of the Baconian philosophy was to supply our vulgar wants. . . . Plato drew a good bow ; but, like Acestes in Virgil, he aimed at the stars ; and, therefore, though there was no want of strength or skill, the shot was thrown away. His arrow was indeed followed by a dazzling track of radiance, but it struck nothing. Bacon fixed his eye on a mark which was placed on the earth, and within bow-shot, and hit it in the white." It is true, that the philosophy of Bacon aims to supply our vulgar wants, and not to raise us above them ; but it also has as high and lofty an aim as the philosophy of Plato, or any other philosophy. If it be praise to have one's highest aim "set on the earth," it is praise to which Bacon is not entitled. In imitating the spirit of Him who wrought miracles for the good of the body, he did not forget that "his doctrine was delivered for the benefit of the soul." "The main and primitive division of moral knowledge," saith he, "seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind ; the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto." The exemplar of good which he proposes as our model is no less than the character of God himself. "Aspiring to be like unto God in power," he says, "the angels transgressed and fell ; by aspiring to be like unto God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell ; but by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. *For unto that imitation we are called.*"—*Advancement of Learning*. It is not easy to conceive how a higher aim could possibly be proposed. It is set far above the earth. It looks infinitely higher than our vulgar wants.

It was not the fault of Plato's philosophy that it aimed at the stars ; it was the fault of human nature that it did not reach so high an aim. There is an old adage, in relation to moral conduct, which says, "*Aim at the stars*, and your arrow will fly higher than if you take a meaner aim." It is not the business of the moral philosopher to recommend errors and imperfections to our imitation. Notwithstanding all the scorn and ridicule which have been

poured on the precepts of Seneca, we cannot doubt his wisdom in saying, that "it is the mark of a generous spirit to aim at what is lofty; to attempt what is arduous; and ever to keep in view what it is impossible for the most splendid talents to accomplish." An infinitely wiser than Seneca has said, "Be ye perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect."

Mr. Macauley admits that what Bacon has done for the inductive philosophy, has never been too highly estimated; but he places his sole and exclusive merit in this, that he set up the vulgar useful as the great end of philosophy. By this feature, his philosophy is distinguished from that of all his predecessors. What! was Bacon the first utilitarian? Did the nature of man undergo a great and radical transformation about his time? Does not Mr. Macauley himself tell us of the scorn with which Plato regarded "the vulgar crowd of geometricians," who "have practice always in view?"

It is well known that Socrates brought down philosophy from heaven to earth; because he deemed the study of moral and political science to be highly useful, and the study of natural philosophy to be vain and fruitless. It was under the guidance of the principle of utility that Socrates effected a great revolution in philosophy; and hence, this could not have been the distinguishing peculiarity of Bacon's labors, when he brought about a counter-revolution, and carried philosophy back from earth to heaven, or, rather, extended her dominion over both the heavens and the earth.

"True to this principle," says Mr. Macauley, "Bacon indulged in no rants about the fitness of things, the all sufficiency of virtue, and the dignity of human nature." As for the last, Bacon well knew that the dignity of human nature consisted in the hope set before it, and not in its possessions. Of the sufficiency of virtue he has said no less than this: "Certainly, it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth." We doubt if a loftier or more beautiful sentiment can be found in any writer of antiquity. It is true, Bacon says nothing about "the fitness of things;" he merely speaks of "the harmony of nature." Indeed, all the great philosophers of all ages have been deeply impressed with the idea, that the most perfect order and harmony prevail in the world; and this conviction is everywhere manifested in the writings of Bacon. There is this difference, however, between Plato and Bacon. Plato first drew his ideas of order and perfection from his own mind; and then expected to find this model realized in the uni-

verse of God. Bacon considered that this was an error, which sprung from a too great and "superstitious reverence of the human intellect;" and being fully persuaded, that the order and harmony which God had actually established was more wonderful than anything that had entered the imagination of man, he sought for the true model, not in "the little world within," but in "the great world without." In order to obtain a view of the divine harmony which pervades that, he wished to destroy all "the vain, little, and, as it were, apish imitations of the world, which had been formed in various systems of philosophy by men's fancies."

"Nature delights in harmony," he has repeatedly said, "and scarcely admits of anything isolated or solitary." He did not profess to have obtained a view of this harmony; but he longed to behold it. In his estimation, there is no pleasure on earth like that which the mind would derive from an ability to rise above the apparent darkness and perturbation of the world, and to behold the real order and harmony which God had established in the universe. If the sublime idea of Newton, that all things in heaven and earth are governed by the same law, was first suggested to his mind by the falling of an apple, it must have been because he had not read all the writings of Bacon. In his *De Augmentis* he says,—

"Whosoever shall reject the feigned divorces of the superlunary and of the sublunary bodies, and shall intently observe the appetites of matter, and the most universal passions, (which, in either globe, are exceeding potent, and transorbate the universal nature of things,) *he shall receive clear information concerning celestial matters from the things seen here with us!* and contrawise from those motions which are practiced in heaven; he shall learn many observations which now are latent, touching the motions of bodies here below; not only so far as these inferior motions are moderated by the superior, *but in regard they have a mutual intercourse by passions common to both.*"

And again,—

"Our chiefest hope and dependence in the consideration of the celestial bodies, is, therefore, placed in physical reasons, though not such as are commonly so called; *but those laws, which no diversity of place or region can abolish, break through, disturb, or alter.*"

How widely does this last sentiment differ from the doctrine of Aristotle, which placed the superlunary and sublunary bodies under entirely different laws; and how high does it rise above the conceptions of Galileo on the same subject, as well as of every other philosopher who preceded Newton! No philosopher ever entertained a more profound conviction of the union and harmony of all nature than Bacon; and if he never spoke "of the fitness of

things," it was because the language was too small for the grandeur and magnificence of his conceptions.

We must now take a reluctant leave of Bacon and his critics. We might have noticed many other strictures which have been offered upon his philosophy; but we have wished to confine ourselves to those which present questions of the greatest interest and importance to our consideration. Having derived our knowledge of Bacon's philosophy from a careful study of his works, we have been greatly surprised at the gross caricatures and misrepresentations of it which are afloat in the world; and we have been desirous to correct them. If our imperfect endeavors in this way shall have the effect of inducing other persons to study for themselves those great and wonderful productions, from which we have derived so much instruction and delight, our object will be fully attained. The student of Bacon will often find himself transported with views of the grand and beautiful, but never lost or bewildered in the cloudy heights of the transcendental. He says,—

"We do not desire to assume or acquire any majestic state for these our discoveries, by the triumph of confutations, the citing of antiquity, the usurpation of authority, *or even the veil of obscurity*, which would easily suggest themselves to one endeavoring to throw light upon his own name, rather than the minds of others. . . . *We exhibit things plainly and openly*, SO THAT OUR ERRORS CAN BE NOTED AND SEPARATED BEFORE THEY CORRUPT ANY FURTHER THE MASS OF SCIENCES."

Nor, on the other hand, will he who carefully and candidly studies this great master ever find himself shut up in the narrow confines of a sensuous philosophy, which necessarily excludes the light of a spiritual world, and of all divine things. In one word, he will find that Lord Bacon is the master of no school or sect; but that he is as he has been well called, "the master of wisdom."

ART. III.—*On certain Prejudices existing in the Community against Labor, against educated and professional Men, and against Men of Wealth.*

THERE are often found in communities constituted like our own certain prevalent notions or prejudices, as they may be termed, which have their origin in the circumstances and modes of thinking that pertain to different classes and orders of society, and which, if cherished and suffered to gain strength and widely diffuse themselves, are attended with danger. At least they tend to hinder that mutual co-operation, that carrying forward together of the common work, which the prosperity of each individual, of each class, and of the whole, imperiously demands. They tend also to mar the happiness and disturb the quiet of the social state, creating jealousies and strifes, and arraying against each other those who should dwell together as brethren. And when, as it sometimes happens, these prejudices connect themselves with civil divisions, and serve as the foundations of political parties, they even threaten the ruin and overthrow of the state. Such was the Agrarian party in ancient Rome; and such were some of the factions which led to the overthrow of the French monarchy. It will readily occur, that the prejudices of which we speak are the results of limited views, of looking at subjects in wrong lights, and through an obscuring and distorting medium. Hence, all which seems required to set the mind free from these wrong biases and erroneous notions, is to get on to higher ground, to rise above obscuring mists and deceitful shadows, and, looking over a wider and more extended field of vision, to see better the bearings of things,—to discern not only how they may affect our own interests, but their bearings on the welfare of others, and on the public good.

Let us then consider some of the more obvious and widely diffused prejudices of the kind to which we have referred. Let us endeavor distinctly to learn what these erroneous impressions are, in what views they have their origin, and what can, and may, be done for their correction and removal.

And here we may incidentally remark, that there is especial need of this attempt in a free, representative government, such as we enjoy. Divisions and parties will indeed always be found in a republic; for those who have freedom of thought and speech on questions of national policy will not always think alike on such topics. But it is ever deemed important that the grounds of party divisions should have as little of permanency attached to them as possible.

And such in truth they most generally are ;—mere foundations of sand heaped together by some strong conflict of elemental strife, to be scattered by the succeeding commotion. But let a party in the state be based on some principle permanent in its nature, and one which deeply interests the feelings and affects the prospects and standing of a large class in the community, and we are in the midst of danger. Little abiding evil is to be apprehended from the agitation of a presidential election, or from the allotments of the loaves and fishes of office to one individual or to his rival ; but let there spring up in a self-governing community a rich men's party, or a working men's party, and other distinctions based on the permanent relations of the social state, and no assurance remains for security or peace.

Entering, then, upon our proposed subject with a sense of its importance as connected with the public good, we would first ask the attention of our readers to an impression which, to some extent, prevails at the present day, that the laboring classes of the community have interests differing in some degree from those of other classes ; and that there is something less eligible—less to be desired in the condition of those thus occupied, than in that of others ; in fact, *that there is something rather degrading in labor*. We do not affirm that this opinion is often or ever distinctly avowed and defended. Few, indeed, would venture to express an opinion disparaging those to whose exertions they are indebted for the supply of so large a proportion of their wants, and to whose hands, it may be, they look for the bestowment of the coveted honors and emoluments of office. Still, we may detect the existence of the opinion to which we have referred, in the fact, that many hesitate to do for themselves or their friends, before others, those offices which, able-bodied men and at leisure as they are, they might perform. They would be ashamed to be caught in the soiled dress of the working-man ; and, if found with an ax or a spade in their hands, would be very ready to assure the passer-by that they were working for exercise. We may, also, detect the existence of this impression in the reluctance of so many of our young men to share their fathers' toil on the farm and in the workshop, preferring rather to crowd the ranks of professional life, or to press in throngs to our cities, urged on by the adventurous spirit of mercantile pursuits.

That labor and laborers should be lightly esteemed in slaveholding communities might reasonably be expected. The association is an easy one which connects the employments of the slave with his degraded condition. In those countries, too, where the distinc-

tions of rank are strongly marked, where an hereditary nobility and the ceremonials of a court are found, there will be those who think it degrading for a man to be engaged in any useful employment. At least, they will esteem it disreputable to one of noble birth to be thus engaged, as if to belong to a class of society, the end of whose existence is to do nothing, were to be of a privileged order. But it should not be so in a community of freemen, of those of equal rights and privileges, and whose dependence on each other in the social state is close and mutual. The idea, that there is anything degrading in any honest employment, which ministers to the general good, and tends to the supply of the common wants, is opposed to the spirit of our free institutions. It is also at variance with the economical interests of the community. A large proportion of our national supplies is derived from national industry. Here also is the main source of that increase of national capital, which is the attendant and index of national prosperity. By the estimate of one of our political economists, at least three-fourths of the annual national income is drawn from the industry of the people. Another able statesman has asserted, that the value of the work done in the single state of Massachusetts is more than one hundred thousand dollars every day. What then must be the ruinous effect of an impression which leaves in listless idleness or unprofitable amusement a large class of the inhabitants of a land? Besides, who sees not, as is sufficiently obvious to all, that there is in reality no ground for a distinction of the nature we are considering, since the dependencies of life are mutual? Of what avail are the treasures of the affluent to their possessors, if they are not surrounded by those skillful and able to minister to their wants? Indeed, of the two, is not he far more independent, who can help himself to the supplies furnished at nature's feast, than he who receives these supplies through the medium of another?

Why, then, the inquiry returns upon us, if this mutual dependence exists, and no honest employment is to be disparaged in this land of freedom and equality, why do we find so prevalent the prejudice against labor, of which we have spoken? We can offer in reply no better explanation than to say, that it is to be traced to certain associations which, even here, are wont to connect themselves with the employment and condition of the laborer. To some of these associations we will now advert; at the same time endeavoring both to show that they rest upon no good foundation, and to offer some suggestions which may tend to their removal.

Labor, then, is looked upon as degrading, because there is, in

most cases, a necessity that it be performed. It is the condition on which those who labor obtain their daily bread, and this idea of dependence and compulsion is by no means a grateful thought. Indeed, a different condition, that of wealth, or at least of competency, is ever looked upon as desirable; it is the aim of most during a great portion of their lives. Perhaps, too, in this connection, the thoughts sometimes wander back to the sentence pronounced upon guilty Adam and his race,—“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return unto the ground;” and they thus recur to the doom of man with any feelings rather than those of self-abasement and humility.

But here it may well be asked, Are these opinions as to the relative advantages of different conditions of life well founded? Is it certain, that he who feels no necessity for exertion resting upon him, is a happier man than his willing, plodding neighbor? Put this inquiry to the man of wealth, and he will acknowledge that his views on this subject differ much from those which he entertained in an earlier part of his course. He will have much to say of his cares and anxieties, his fears of losing, and his perplexities and vexations in the management of his multiplied concerns. Perhaps, if we could look into his heart, we should find him almost ready to envy him who is, as he once was, a poor man. At least, he will assure us that the satisfaction of acquiring far exceeds that of possessing.

And then again as to this necessity of labor, from which so many would be free, we have only to look at the human constitution, both mental and physical, to be persuaded that an exemption of this kind is by no means desirable. Man must have employment. He is made for daily toil. Deprive his mind or body of action, and they are at once shorn of their glory. The former sinks into idiocy or madness, the latter becomes enfeebled and diseased. The necessity, then, that men should labor, arises not from any condition in life. It is not imposed by man on his fellow-men. It is one which God imposes, and it must be obeyed. Even those who do not devote themselves to any useful toil, must, and do, seek employment. Hunting, fishing, riding, and even gambling and fighting, are only means, some of them objectionable enough, of obeying this fixed law of our natures.

A second unfavorable association, which in the minds of some is connected with labor, leads them to look upon the operations of industry as of a mechanical nature; or, we might rather say, to look upon the laborer himself as a machine,—perhaps a part of a machine. Hence they readily associate with labor, ignorance and

mere imbecility; and look upon a life spent in daily toil as an unthinking, degraded existence.

It is not to be denied, that the condition of the laboring population in some countries affords too much reason for this unfavorable impression. One may find in the crowded manufacturing population of Europe those thus degraded—those, whose lives from infancy to premature decrepitude are spent in ignorance and mindless toil; and of whom it may truly be said, that the whole history of their existence is comprised in a single line,—that they have been employed in making the eighteenth part of a pin. But thank Heaven such laborers are not found in this land. We have no human machinery here, and while our system of common schools, the rich legacy left us by our fathers, shall continue to be cherished and maintained, we never shall have. True, indeed, our laboring men cannot be men of learning, of literary and scientific attainments,

“Knowledge to their eyes her ample page
Rich with the spoils of time did ne’er unroll.”

Still, they may be, and they are, men of intelligence, of sound judgment and quick apprehension, well acquainted with whatever pertains to their own business in life, and conversant with the occurrences and agitated subjects of their day. Converse with them on questions of public policy, and they will soon show that they know their own rights and are not ignorant of what pertains to the public welfare. They will give good evidence, also, that on moral and religious subjects they are not without understanding—that they know how to read their Bibles, and to learn from this pure source what is duty and what is truth.

There is not, then, in New-England, at least, any necessary connection between a life of manual labor and ignorance, and there never need be this connection. Let the days of childhood and youth, the favorable season for mental improvement, be spent in the school-room, and in later periods of life let the fragments of time be gathered up and turned to good account; especially let the many opportunities for gaining useful information, presenting themselves in our villages and towns, be improved—the lyceum, the newspaper, and the scientific journal—and there need be no fear that there will not be knowledge enough diffused through our whole population, to be the stability of our times. And here let us add, that it is the duty of every one who knows the elevating influence of knowledge and the intimate connection between its general diffusion and the public welfare, to see to it, that his influence be felt in the cause of education and good learning.

But we will not consume more of the time and patience of our readers in thus defending labor from unjust and ill-founded associations. We would speak of it in another strain—we would claim for it respect. He, and he only, who spends his days in toil—in toil, either of the body or mind, fulfills the purposes of his being, and gives good proof of manhood. If man is to do nothing, why were his noble powers of mind bestowed upon him? Why was he made a thinking, contriving, reasoning being? For what purpose, too, is the cunning craft of the hand, the telescopic eye, the vocal chamber of the ear; why this complicated structure of joints and muscles, the very handy-work of God? Look also at man in his social relations, as a member of the community. How vast the amount to be provided for the supply of a nation's wants! How much work is to be done! And has he not a fair title to respect who ably and faithfully performs his share of this work? Where, too, shall we look for brighter examples of those virtues which truly ennoble our race, than are to be found in the laboring classes of society? A life of labor is a life spent in encountering difficulties and overcoming obstacles, in bringing to bear the energies of our nature for the accomplishment of important ends. And is there here no call for self-denial, for resolution, nothing allied to that nobleness of spirit which can boldly undertake great objects, and go forward unhesitatingly in their accomplishment? And here, too, we might speak of virtues of a different class, those homelier, lowlier virtues, which spring up and shed abroad their rich fragrance in the more humble walks of life. Beneath the rough exterior of the laboring man there throbs a heart alive to others' woes, and that toil-worn hand is ever ready to extend itself to succor and to aid. And what is it that sustains and animates the laborer in his daily toil? He is thinking of his home and of the loved ones there.

“His wee bit ingle, blinkin bonnily,
His clean hearth-stane, his thriftie wifie's smile,
The lisping infant prattling on his knee,
Does a' his weary carking care beguile,
An' makes him quite forget his labor and his toil.”

We have thus far spoken of what relates more particularly to those engaged in manual labor; but there is another class of laborers against whom an impression of evil tendency is abroad in our community, and one which requires to be corrected. We refer to a *prejudice against educated and professional men*, those whose employments are of a mental kind. Every one is aware that, to some extent, a feeling of this kind exists, especially among the

mass of the population who are occupied in manual labor. Not unfrequently, indeed, does it manifest itself either in the form of sarcasm and reproachful remark, or in feelings and acts of opposition to the interests of education ; at least in the undervaluing of its importance, and this not merely where we should expect to find such feelings and thoughts, in scenes of both mental and moral degradation, but among those who have influence in society, and sometimes even in the halls of legislation. Hence, the unwillingness to afford needed aid and support to the institutions of learning, and the opinion maintained by many, that whatever is thus expended is lost to the community. Sometimes, also, attempts have been made to connect prejudices of this kind with our political agitations ; and we have had in some portions of our country our working men's party, and some have even thought to exclude from the halls of national and state legislation an important class of professional men.

Fully to account for the rise of this prejudice, it might be necessary to look into the depths of the human heart and to bring out to public view some of the unlovely traits of character found there. But such exhibitions, it is well known, are by no means grateful, neither would this be the wisest way in which to attempt the removal of unfounded prejudice. We will direct our attention rather to the errors of the head than of the heart.

There are, then, two erroneous impressions pertaining to mental employments, on which, we are persuaded, the prejudice we are considering is mainly founded. One of these impressions is, that educated and professional men are not laboring men. They are not looked upon as belonging to the working part of the community. On the contrary, it is supposed, that they pass their time in indolence ; or, at least, that when occupied, it is for their own amusement only that they employ themselves. But is this impression a correct one ?

That there are educated men who are not working men, is not to be denied. Neither will it be denied, that there are uneducated men who are not working men. The truth is, there are found in every class of society those who are indolent, who dislike work, and who, so far as absolute necessity is not laid upon them, will not work. But does the concession here made authorize the conclusion, that educated men, as a class of the community, are not working men ? What is work ? Is it laboring with the hands, putting forth the powers of the body only ? Man is made up of mind and body. He has intellectual as well as physical powers ; and when these mental energies are called into full action, con-

stantly directed to the accomplishment of some object, and tasked to the utmost, is not he who is thus occupied a laborer? We may take as a standard of labor the effects produced on the human system—the exhausting of its powers, the impairing of its energies, and in this view we would ask, whether those employed in mental toils are not laboring men? Else, why are there found so many in this class of society with enfeebled, shattered constitutions? Why so many who sink into a premature grave?

The other impression, to which reference has been made, is, that educated men are, in a great measure, useless members of the community; at least, that they do little or nothing toward furnishing the supply of the common wants, and promoting the general welfare: in fact, they are rather looked upon as drones in the hive, who consume, indeed, their share of the sweets, but gather them not.

That intelligent men, those acquainted with the relations and dependencies of man in the social state, and with the connection between science and the arts, and who have liberal views as to human wants and employments, should maintain an opinion of this kind, can hardly be supposed. Still, it may be expedient to offer some statements which may show its incorrectness.

Let us look, then, first at professional labor; and look at it in its connection with the general prosperity, the economical interests of the community.

A lawyer investigates and establishes one's title to his farm. By papers drawn up according to legal forms and properly certified and recorded, the individual is enabled to hold possession of this farm for his own use and benefit, to the exclusion of all others. And now would he be ready to esteem the man an important help, who should aid him to place a fence around this farm, that his crops may be in safety against the inroads of brute force, and would he look upon *him* as effecting nothing for his advantage, through whose instrumentality he is made secure against intrusion and loss in other forms? A laborer is sick, and for successive days is unable to pursue his daily toil. Does *he* effect nothing toward the common good, who directs him to a remedy which restores an effective laborer to soundness and his accustomed health and strength? That men may dwell securely, and that the processes of industry may be successfully conducted, there must be good laws—laws which derive all their binding force from the power of public opinion. Does not he then promote the prosperity of a nation, who, by diffusing abroad a healthful moral and religious influence, makes secure these foundations of public justice, and gives

strength to the arm of public authority? But we have not time to dwell on these views, neither is it necessary. The truth is, professional men are working men, having the same interests, and carrying forward a part of the same great work in which other laboring men are engaged.

But it may here occur, that there are educated men who are not professional men; who are rarely or never seen abroad in the walks of life, but who pass their days in the retirement of their studies, conversant for the most part with books only, or occupied with the investigation and development of the laws of nature. And here, perhaps, those who entertain the prejudice we are examining, may think it difficult to show a connection between the labors of such and the interests of the community, or, at least, to point out their direct bearing on the general good.

But let us look for a moment at this point; and first, as to men of science. Every one must have noticed to what extent men in civilized life avail themselves of the assistance of nature, in carrying forward those processes by which the wants of the great national family are supplied; and this, not only where natural agency is directly employed, as in agricultural processes, but in other instances in which man avails himself of the properties of natural objects about him, and of the laws of nature, in furnishing himself with tools and machinery. But how are these properties and laws to be found out and turned to the best account? Evidently, these are no easy tasks. They require long-continued, patient investigation, oft-repeated and skillfully conducted experiments, and much thought; and unless there are those devoted to these pursuits, those who have time and ability to investigate, and experiment, and reason, none of these important results are to be looked for. Here, then, is labor, and appropriate labor for educated men; and labor most intimately connected with the public prosperity.

It might be interesting in this connection to refer our readers to the history of inventions, and thus to place before them the testimony of facts to the close connection between scientific labors and the arts of life. What aid has been given to the agriculturist in the investigations made by Sir Humphrey Davy and others, of the properties of different soils! How much has been effected by the same science within a few years for the improvement of the process of tanning hides! The same is also true of the art of dyeing cloth. How, without the aid of chemistry, would the products of the loom be tinged with hues, fixed and made permanent, and various as the fancies of the fair!

Every farmer knows that some soils are better adapted to the

raising of certain crops than others; but how to remedy these defects, what course of cultivation should be followed, and what applications should be made to different soils, that they may be rendered fertile, it is the office of the chemist to determine. But here it may occur to some, that many important inventions and discoveries are the result of accident, or have been made by practical men, who are directly employed in conducting processes of manual labor.

This is indeed sometimes, though not always, the case. Many important inventions have resulted from long-continued experiments alone; and most of the discoveries that have been made of those great laws and principles of the natural world which serve as the foundation of useful inventions, have been imparted to the world by scientific laborers.

It is also here to be noticed, that in those instances where accidental discoveries and inventions have been made, it is science which has perfected these inventions and tested their value, by referring them to the great principles of nature, and by applying them to the various purposes they may be made to subserve. We might here refer to that wonder of our age, the steam-engine. Any man sitting by his kitchen fire might be the discoverer of the expansive power of steam; but it is science which has investigated the laws by which this mighty agent is governed, and has subjected it to human control. And then, when the power is created and ready to do our bidding, what mechanical knowledge and skill are required in its various applications! Think, for a moment, of the different directions which are given to this power, and of the different offices it is made to perform. Now it reaches down to the depths beneath, and brings up to the regions of light the hidden treasures of the mine;—and now, burying itself in some subterranean cell, it sends up its Herculean arm and Briarean hands and fingers of iron to do its wonders of skill and of power in the workshop above. At one time it conceals itself beneath the deck of the vessel, and the huge mass, which lies “floating many a rood,” becomes instinct with life and motion; like leviathan of old, “it maketh the sea to boil like a pot, and out of its nostrils goeth smoke and sparks of fire leap out.” At another time, “swifter than a post,” it speeds its way over hill and valley, hurrying onward, in its rocket-like course, its train of rattling cars. But it is not only in the perfecting of inventions, and in multiplying the useful application of discovered powers, that the aid of science is felt. We might speak of its importance as it teaches men the limits of discovery and invention, telling them not only what may be done, but what may

not be done. How much time and useless labor are thus saved! How many highly raised expectations are shown to be delusive! But we must not dwell longer on this topic, for we have to speak of another class, whose labors are of a mental kind. We refer to those whose employments are more strictly of a literary nature, the historian, the poet, the essayist; and it may be that in the minds of some the connection between the labors of such and the welfare of the community may not be obvious. But here let us ask ourselves, In what way is the general welfare to be promoted—what are the wants of a community? Is it simply that man may be sheltered from the storm, and have food and raiment convenient for him? Are there no other constituents of his happiness, nothing else for which he may reasonably toil and spend his strength? Has the intellectual part no wants to be supplied? Are there no gratifications to be ministered to the mind? But apart from these considerations, which, it may be seen, look rather to the individual than to the community, we may ask, does not literature tend directly and powerfully to the public welfare? Are not the benign influences she exerts intimately connected with a nation's prosperity and happiness? What made ancient Greece and Rome differ from other nations around them? Why had they more elevation of character, more kind feeling, more of mental enjoyment, and of the charities of life? Eloquently has one of our own orators answered these inquiries by telling us what Greece owes to her first-born of song. A nation was cast in the mold of one mighty mind, and the land of the Iliad became the region of taste, and the birthplace of the arts.

But we need not refer back to ancient nations in proof of the refining influences of literature. We speak of a people as civilized, and we think of a region around which civil government has placed its defenses, and where the arts of life are cultivated, and its decencies are regarded, a region over which knowledge and religion shed their combined radiance. But there is still another principle at work, of powerful and benign efficacy. It is that which makes itself seen in the order and beauty spread over the whole face of the country, which gives a grace and charm to the civilities of social intercourse, and which shows itself in the habitations, the furniture, the dress,—all that even the useful arts contribute for the accommodation of men. And this pervading principle is taste. Most obviously then, whatever tends to the cultivation of the taste is justly to be ranked among the most efficient causes in the great work of civilization. Such, in an eminent degree, is literature. If it were necessary to establish this position, we might here refer

you to England. She has been called the land of classical scholars; and, without doubt, the influence of her literature is widely felt in almost every class of her population. And who that wanders over her fields, and looks on her villages and towns, her cottages and her palaces, her scenes of moral elegance and civic splendor, sees not around him the fruits of a refined and cultivated taste? Who that enters her dwellings and marks the manners of her inhabitants, and the objects around them in their domestic retirements, will fail to discover even here the traces of a refined taste? At least we may ask, who that reads the sketches of these scenes and objects, as they are delineated by one who is the ornament of our own literature, will doubt, that the land of literature is the dwelling-place of taste? We may, then, claim for those who rank themselves as the followers of literature some title to the respect and gratitude of their country. Milton, and Shakspeare, and Addison, did not live in vain, and spend their strength for naught.

There remains one other impression injurious to the interests of the community, to which we would invite your attention. It is *a prejudice against men of wealth*. Many, indeed, there are around us on whom Heaven has bestowed Agur's desired blessing, giving them neither riches nor poverty; still, in this country, as in all other communities where the rights of property are respected, the distinction of rich and poor is known. Here, too, as in other lands, spring up some of those jealousies and heart-burnings which have their origin in these diversities of outward condition. But it is not to the repinings and murmurs of discontent that we would now advert: neither is it our present object to adduce considerations which may moderate the earnestness with which the riches of earth are sought. We would look rather at the bearings of the subject on the public safety and welfare, persuaded, as we are, that let the prejudice, to which we have referred, become deeply fixed and widely diffused, and there is just reason for apprehension of danger. Those who think themselves defrauded of their just share of the national wealth, and who are ready to think that a more just and equal distribution should be made, will not long hesitate to assert and maintain what they esteem their just rights. It will soon be found out that here is work for the reformers of our age. Such indications have already shown themselves among the signs of the times. And it is because attempts have been occasionally made in some parts of our country by political demagogues and ranting partisans, to call out these prejudices in aid of their selfish and dangerous purposes, that we deem it important to mention this topic in this connection.

And here the first thought that occurs to us is, that in every civilized community the distinction of rich and poor will be found. It grows out of the nature of man and the constitution of civil society. Wherever the rights of property are regarded and men are made secure in their possessions, some will acquire and accumulate more than others; and so long as men differ in their habits of industry and frugality, in enterprise, and skill, and good management, this must ever be the case.

And not only is this arrangement necessary, it is beneficial. Many are the processes of industry; and those, too, most intimately connected not only with the prosperity, but with the comfort and existence, of a large community, which could not be conducted without the accumulation of capital. Without capital where would be our internal improvements, our railroads and canals; where our commerce, and our manufacturing establishments, and the multiplied powers of machinery by which the powers and objects of nature around us are made to minister most essentially to the aid of man? On these inequalities of wealth are also based, in part, that division of labor without which the social system could hardly exist. There must then be accumulations of capital in every prosperous community. And we may add, that of all the members of a community, none are more interested in its possessing capital, than such as are most ready to join in the cry against those by whom it is possessed.

There is another general proposition which we offer. Every man of wealth, who, to use a common expression, has made his own fortune, in other words, who has by his own industry and use of the productive powers at his command, created the riches which he possesses, every such individual, while he has benefited himself, has at the same time conferred important benefits on the community in which he lives; and hence, instead of being regarded with prejudice, he should be looked upon as a public benefactor.

It can hardly be necessary to dwell for a moment on this proposition. Every one is fully aware, and readily acknowledges, that a man of wealth, who uses his property so as to give employment to those about him, is a benefactor to the town or village in which he is found. And if, too, as often happens, he places before others an example of industry and frugality, of good management and skillful conduct of his affairs, it is an example worthy of all praise and all imitation too.

But here, perhaps, it may occur to some that there are other ways in which men become possessed of wealth, and other ways, too, in which they employ it; and it may be thought that there will

be found in these other ways of obtaining and using wealth some ground for the prejudice we are considering. We will, then, briefly dwell on this view of the subject before us.

Men sometimes obtain wealth by extortion, by oppression and violence, by grinding the face of the poor, and by defrauding the weak and defenseless of their just dues. No one will complain, that a prejudice exists against those who thus become affluent. Let it not only exist, but let it be manifested, till the oppressed go free, till the strong arm of national justice place those who are thus injurious where they can injure and defraud no more.

Nearly allied to extortion and injustice is gambling, in all its forms, whether it be at the fashionable billiard or card table, at the lottery-office, or in those resorts of gamblers emphatically and appropriately called the "hells" of our cities. By such modes of acquiring wealth the community receives no benefit, and many are injured. Small, indeed, is the respect to which the rich gamester may consider himself entitled. Others there are who have acquired wealth by successful speculation. In one of those seasons "when madness rules the hour," they have engaged in some hazardous enterprise, and after venturing all, and having been tossed for awhile by the agitated waves of hope and fear, a fortunate current has brought them, as they think, to a safe and desirable harbor. Hardly knowing why it is, or should be so, they find themselves rich men.

Acquisitions of wealth thus made can hardly be looked upon as attended with any important benefits. Often, indeed, they prove injurious to the speculator himself; for sudden riches bring a snare, and further, as the sad lessons of experience have taught many in our community, to the speculator there often in the end cometh disappointment and perplexity. Evidently, the community is not benefited, because in such acquisitions of wealth there is no creation of value. They are mere transfers from one member of the community to another; and often from the more deserving to those less so. And this is not all the injury done to the public. The established course of things becomes unsettled, the business habits of the community are broken up, and our young men, no longer contented with slow and sure gains, desert the good old ways of their fathers. If to these many evils which attend speculation there is any counterbalancing advantage, it is this, that by these means a new impetus is given to the enterprise and energies of a people; but surely those who dwell in this land of enterprise and exertion need rather the check-rein than the spur.

But having thus adverted to these ways in which the oppressor, the gambler, and the speculator obtain wealth, and having granted

that such have no claim on the favorable regards of the community, let us add, that there is here found no ground for any prejudice which fixes itself on men of wealth as a class. All the concessions now made may be granted, and still we may claim respect for him, who, while he benefits himself, confers benefits on those around him.

And here, had we not already exhausted the patience of our readers, we might speak in the same light of the different ways of using wealth. On the one hand, he who hoards it might receive our pity and contempt; for he who lets his soul so grovel in the dust as to love money for its own sake, can hardly be regarded with other feelings than contempt for his sordid meanness. And surely he who denies himself a reasonable supply of his own wants, who, Tantalus-like, in the midst of flowing streams dies with thirst, is a just object of our pity. He, too, may well be pitied, who, having in his hands the power, knows not the luxury of doing good. On the other hand, we might dwell on the folly and the sin of the spendthrift,—of him who wastes in extravagance and hurtful dissipation a father's frugal earnings, thus becoming a moral pest to those among whom he dwells, and making his own destruction sure. For those who thus use their wealth, we ask not that they should be regarded with favor. Let the finger of public scorn be pointed at them till they learn to respect themselves, and to act more worthily of their obligations and responsibilities. But there are other ways in which wealth may be employed, connecting its possession with the improvement and happiness not only of a community, but of the world. And many there are in our own age and nation, who, by deeds of beneficence, not only show that they well know the true value, the right uses of wealth, but justly claim for themselves and for others of the same class in the community the respect and gratitude of those among whom they dwell.

We have thus adverted to some of the more common prejudices found in the different classes of our community, and have, at the same time, endeavored to effect something toward their removal. If we mistake not, the views presented on these topics well sustain the remark made at the commencement of our article, that what is needed to set the mind free from these prejudices, is to stand on higher ground and enlarge the field of vision. We need to look upon ourselves and others as members of the great national family, and to see in the labors of the individual that which, from the nature of the social relations, must benefit the whole community. We need also to see and to feel what the old trite couplet well expresses,

"Honor and shame from no condition rise,
Act well your part, there all the honor lies."

and this is indeed the sum of the whole matter.

The course of remark that has been followed, must have suggested the intimate connection between an enlightened public opinion and the safety and welfare of our country. More especially is this the case in a self-governing community like our own. Let different individuals and different classes of society understand their relation to each other, and their own true interests in their connection with the general prosperity, and we trust there is virtue and patriotism enough in our country to secure the permanency of our institutions and social arrangements.

ART. IV.—*Evangelische Homiletik*. VON CHRISTIAN PALMER. Zweite verbess. Aufl. (*Evangelical Homiletics*. By CHRISTIAN PALMER. Second edition.) Stuttgart: J. F. Steinkopf. 1845.

(Translated from the German of Hüffell, in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, for October, 1845. By Professors M'CLINTOCK and BLUMENTHAL.)

[WE know of no good treatise on the art of preaching in the English language. Dr. PORTER's "Lectures on Homiletics" stand, doubtless, at the head of our books on the subject; but that work falls far short of the scientific accuracy which so important a theme demands. The same may be said of GRESLEY's recent "Treatise on Preaching," which, although it contains much useful and instructive matter, is discursive and immethodical, as well as incomplete. STURTEVANT's "Preacher's Manual" has been of late republished in this country, much to our sorrow; for it would be hard to find a worse book in any department of scientific theology. A vast mass of materials is accumulated by this author, it is true, but he does not know how to use them; there are bricks and mortar enough, but no building.* A scientific treatment of homiletics in English is a thing yet to be accomplished.

In this field, as in most others, the Germans have outstripped us. The most learned and philosophical treatise which they have

* In this wholesale sentence of condemnation we do not agree with the excellent and learned "translators" of the following able article. We may yet have translated from the German a better work than *Sturtevant's*; and when it comes, we shall hail it as a prize—but if we may judge from the review of *Palmer's* work, which we here present to the reader, that will scarcely be the one.—EDIT.

yet produced is, "Die Theorie der Beredsamkeit," &c., (Theory of Eloquence, with special Reference to the Eloquence of the Pulpit,) by the late Professor SCHOTT, of Jena. An abstract of its fundamental principles may be found in the "Bibliotheca Sacra," for February, 1845, which we heartily commend to the attention of our readers. The latest work on homiletics is that placed at the head of this article, the first edition of which appeared in 1842. PALMER's book has obtained a good reputation in Germany, and, indeed, deserves it. In depth and comprehensiveness of thought, as well as in vigor and freshness of expression, it presents a marked contrast to the dry and soulless compilations which English readers have to put up with. It will be seen, from the following article, that PALMER is the exponent of a reaction against rhetorical preaching, which has been going on for some time in Germany, and which has even advanced so far that many preachers eschew all order and form in their discourses. The writer (HUFFELL) is himself the author of a treatise on the "*Character and Calling of the Gospel Preacher*," (Wesen und Beruf des evangelisch-Christlichen Geistlichen,) which has passed through four editions. It will be seen that while he holds very just views in regard to the use of rhetoric in preaching, assigning to it its proper place as a means only, not as an end, he yet combats the views of the new school so far forth as they tend to encourage a loose and careless style of preaching, and urges the importance of the laws of thought and speech in the pulpit. As PALMER's book will probably be translated and published in this country, we have thought that a translation of this article might be acceptable to the readers of the Quarterly.—THE TRANSLATORS.]

It cannot be denied that nearly all that has been done in homiletics, at least until of late, has been the offspring of sheer empiricism. We have treatises upon sermon-making, with directions and propositions enough—all simply because *sermons are preached*; but rarely has the question been raised *why* we preach thus and not otherwise, or, indeed, why we preach at all. To be sure, in all these books we can recognize some dim outlines of a consciousness that preaching is a very necessary and important thing; but sadly discordant results have followed from all attempts to give shape and form to these unsubstantial shadows.

Neither can it be denied that the prevailing mode of preaching (we mean the *rhetorical* form) has had too wide a sway; a sway, however, to be easily accounted for. Eminent masters of rhetoric

led the way, and it was easy, especially for men who thought that the true *material* of preaching had been exhausted, to follow in their footsteps. The masters, it is true,—the REINHARDS and the THEREMINS,—held fast the Christian elements of the sermon amid all the graces of oratory in which they arrayed it; but their successors have not always imitated them thus far, and many of their sermons are nothing else than mere specimens of rhetorical artwork.

Of late a better spirit has arisen, and under its influence we have begun to see our old errors: in a word, a reaction, in many respects both necessary and just, is taking place in our midst. But we fear that this movement, like most reactions, is in danger of going too far, and of subsiding into a one-sided theory, just as bad as the old one. Formerly, the rhetorical form was *everything*; there is danger now that we shall end with making it *nothing*. How often, in the history of the race, has truth suffered by these sudden leaps of human thought from one extreme to the other! Too often the newest passes for the best.

We have had frequent occasion of late to lament the sad negligence, both in point of logic and language, which has characterized many printed sermons that have come under our eye; for, in spite of innovation, we still remain of our old opinion that neither sound logic nor true rhetoric is incompatible with evangelical preaching. But the first attempt at a scientific development of the new principles is, perhaps, to be found in the work before us, the "Evangelical Homiletics" of Christian Palmer, a work to which we give our attention the more readily, not only because it presents many clear and truthful views, but also because it attempts (though without a strictly scientific execution) to unite into one whole the straggling and scattered elements of the reaction to which we have referred. We do not intend fully to review Palmer's work, or even to give a complete exhibition of its contents, but principally to make use of it for the development and extension of our own views. And while we shall be compelled to assail some of his positions, we are sure that our excellent friend will only rejoice to find that his book is producing such stirring effects in us, and in others, through our means.

Our object in this article is to answer the questions, why preaching is kept up at all in the Christian church, and why the *form* of preaching is such as it is. But a few preliminary remarks must be offered before we enter upon the main topic of inquiry.

It is an error, we think, to ascribe the low estimate in which preaching, and indeed Christian worship generally, may be held at

any particular period, to faults either in the form of our preaching or the nature of our worship. The evil lies far deeper than this. It must be looked for in the decay of vital piety; men undervalue preaching, because they do not sympathize with its objects; men neglect worship, because they have no heart for it. Attempts may be made to remedy this state of things by greater attention to the external garb of the sermon and the worship, and we do not censure them; but yet, we repeat, that the real cause of this crushing evil is to be looked for elsewhere. Reinhard was a very refined and elegant preacher, it is true, but his audience was doubtless as much edified, so long as he set forth the gospel message—the one thing needful, with clearness and power, as the audience of any other preacher, even though his style were the very reverse of Reinhard's. We are thus compelled, in the very outset, to come into conflict with the views of Palmer, who is continually attacking Reinhard and his school on the ground of the rhetorical form of their sermons; although he finds himself constrained at last to admit the necessity of a *proper* attention to logic and rhetoric. More of this hereafter. It is more to our purpose just now to cast a glance at the notions of our author in regard to the true conception of the sermon, and consequently to the grounds of its preservation in Christian worship. "The idea of the sermon," says he, "presupposes that of a congregation and its worship. . . . The sermon of the missionary, and that of the preacher to a Christian congregation, differ entirely from each other, although the same gospel is to be preached in both." Our author says that the rationalists hold a different conception of preaching. We are no rationalists—though we think we could raise a strong *Christian* objection here—we let it pass, however, for the present, hoping by and by to convict our author of false conclusions from his own premises. He continues:—

"It is clear, then, if preaching is what we have represented it to be, that it cannot be placed at the mercy of the transient impulses of any and every member of the church. To form clear and vigorous conceptions of Christian truth, and to express such conceptions in appropriate language, requires high endowments of nature, and not less the culture of art (?) Hence the necessity of a special profession of theology, and of a special education thereto."—P. 9.

But on page 315 our author states that preaching is kept up in the Christian church simply because this special form of interpreting the word of God is sanctioned by *ecclesiastical usage*. Now, granting to the word "usage," in this connection, even the full benefit of the sense which Schleiermacher attaches to it when he

calls Christian "morals," Christian "usage;" we can yet make nothing more of it than "habit," "custom," "prescription." According to this notion, then, we preach, simply because there is a congregation before us, with certain "usages" to which it has been accustomed. Just as truly might we say that the mass is kept up in the Catholic Church only because it is the "usage" of that church to perform it. And, moreover, the idea of the congregation and of worship presupposes that of preaching, just as much as the idea of preaching presupposes that of the congregation and worship. Palmer himself seems to feel this when he speaks as follows of the interpretation of Scripture:—

"The original Word, the revelation of God in Christ, is set forth, and its history is given, in the sacred writings. But the word of God is further, and continually, uttered by divinely inspired men—that word of God, whose beginning and pattern is the testimony of the apostles, especially as laid down in the epistles, and which, in Christian worship, is uttered in *preaching*, where it blends itself, in perpetual freshness, with human individuality. Now the relation between these two, namely, God's revelation and man's utterance thereof in preaching, gives us of itself the true notion of interpretation, which is identically the same in essence with preaching itself. Interpretation, then, in the Biblical sense, takes place whenever God, the invisible, manifests himself to men."—P. 62.

Now, after such a statement as this, can Palmer assert, without inconsistency, that "ecclesiastical usage" alone is the rule of preaching, even as to its outward form? But, says he,—

"The second point involved in the nature of preaching is 'ecclesiastical usage,' by which the individuality of the preacher (which forms the *punctum saliens* of the sermon) is limited, without being robbed of its liberty. Heretofore we have only spoken of interpretation in general terms, without reference to the particular form which evangelical preaching assumes in the work of interpreting. If we have spoken of themes, divisions, subdivisions, &c., it has only been because things must be separated in scientific discussion, which in the realities of life are not separated at all. The definite form which exposition has received from ecclesiastical usage is (like all usages) as much the work of intrinsic necessity as of chance. . . . The practical points involved in the matter group themselves as follows: (1.) Preaching connects itself with the order of Sundays, festivals, and occasional services, which are indispensably interwoven with the spiritual life of the congregation; and so we have an order of sermons not specially connected with any order of Scriptural exposition, but deriving their origin from ecclesiastical usage. (2.) As the whole word of God is the property of the congregation, and thus the proper object of exposition, there is no obvious necessity for culling select passages for *texts*; nevertheless, ecclesiastical usage enjoins upon the preacher the

use of a text as the foundation of his sermon, and even goes so far as to fix special texts for special occasions. (3.) Ecclesiastical usage demands a regular arrangement of the sermon; it demands a *theme*, which must be developed in the *subdivisions* of the discourse, and be rounded off by an *exordium* and *peroration*. But all this is owing, not to any necessity arising from the nature of exposition, but solely to ecclesiastical usage. (4.) Finally, the *delivery* of the sermon is not left to individual taste; e. g., whether the sermon shall be delivered with, or without a manuscript; for usage has settled it that the manuscript must not be taken into the pulpit."—P. 315.

Let us take up these four points in order. As to (1,) we are inclined to reverse our author's position, and—instead of saying that preaching connects itself with the order of Sundays, festivals, &c.—to assert that these latter have connected themselves with preaching. Where, without preaching, should we find, not to say the *order* of Sundays, festivals, &c., but even Sundays or festivals themselves? The pillar and ground of all these—nay, of the very life and being of the church itself—is *the preaching of Christ*. As to (2,) we must again reverse our author's position. There could be no *sermon* without the word of God for a foundation; for what else is preaching but the "testimony of God," (1 Cor. ii, 2,) and where can this find its ground except in the word of God? And, in dividing the word of God into separate passages for exposition, we do not obey the demands simply of ecclesiastical usage, but of the necessity of the case. Could a man interpret the whole of God's word at once? Usage, even though it may be of as gray an antiquity as the times of Ezra, did not introduce the use of *texts*; for preaching could never have existed without the text, any more than without the word of God itself. Our author's point (3,) is, that "ecclesiastical usage demands a regular distribution of the sermon into theme, development," &c. Ecclesiastical usage demands no such thing; it is the inherent necessity of an address to a congregation that demands exordium, theme, and peroration. But we cannot here resist the inquiry, What has our author, who wishes to banish all rhetoric from preaching, to do with such demands as these? For what are arrangement, theme, and subdivision, but *rhetoric* and *logic*? We should like to see the preacher, who, without rhetoric and logic, or (since names are of no moment so long as we have the thing) without a definite arrangement and distribution of his subject, can preach an instructive and edifying sermon. Even our author himself calls the sermon a work of art in another place. Yet we agree with him in believing that the preacher must not mount the pulpit simply as an artist, must not make art the predominant feature of

his preaching, but must seek its chief excellence in the faithful exposition of his text. But of this more hereafter.

After these preliminary remarks, we now take up the question proposed in the outset, namely, *Why is preaching kept up in the Christian church?*

The answer is to be found in the express injunction of the founder of the church: "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." Matt. xxviii, 19, 20. We preach, then, because the gospel is to be taught to all men; because the Holy Ghost connects its energy with the word and with the sacrament; and, finally, because the congregation of believers cannot *stand* except upon the knowledge of the truth derived from the preaching of Christ. "Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and *wherein ye stand*; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you." 1 Cor. xv, 1, 2. "So, then, faith comes by hearing, but hearing by the word of God."

Hence, then, the existence of preaching in the church is not due to ecclesiastical usage, but is a continuation (absolutely necessary) of the preaching of Christ and his apostles. And this view of its necessity assigns both its matter and its form.

Let us now look at the *matter* of the sermon a little more closely. It might be objected (in the spirit of a mode of preaching now obsolete) that "if the *matter* of preaching must remain in all time one and the same, as in its origin, then all edification must stand still, and we need speak no more of a progress and development of Christianity." To such an objection we should answer, that no other matter than that of which we have spoken (the preaching of Christ) has any *right* in the Christian church, nor indeed in theology either. As to the question whether rationalism, supernaturalism, or simple Biblical faith, be the most correct view of Christianity, there may be dispute; but there can be none as to the question which of these has *right* on its side; the Bible-trusting faith alone is sustained by church history. And preaching is so interwoven with the elements of Christian faith, that it must stand dumb without them. Occasional deviations in the church from Bible truth are not to be regarded in settling this question; they are, as deviations, violations of an acknowledged right. The development of Christianity is, indeed, hindered by our view of it, if by *development* is meant apostasy; but no hinderance is offered to the *progress* of Christianity by means of the growth of genuine

Christian piety. And for this progress how wide, how endless a field is offered! How long has our Christian knowledge moved only over the surface of the ocean of truth, and how slowly do its depths reveal themselves even to believers! Here, then, is the true matter of preaching; matter, ever old, yet ever new, adapted to all times and to all men; compassing, in its wide embrace, all that concerns the life of mortals, without the least change of its own immortal essence. We find around us, ever, sinners such as those to whom Christ offered repentance and forgiveness; and we ourselves stand ever in need of the same rest which he offered to the weary and heavy laden.

So much for the *matter* of preaching. As to its *form*, it may be supposed that, although we are commanded to teach, the manner of our teaching is fixed rather by usage than by any intrinsic necessity. The contrary, however, is the case. According to the express command of Christ, above cited, the congregation is to be instructed; and this must be done either by the catechism or the sermon. The instruction, commenced by the catechism, must be followed up by constant warning, encouragement, and reproof. With the older part of the congregation, catechetical instruction would be not only impracticable, but unsuitable. There remains only the method of free discourse; the essential elements of a free discourse (speech) must be found in the sermon, and thus its form is necessarily fixed. An intelligible speech must include unity of conception, (the *theme*,) a connection of thoughts, and arguments, (*arrangement*,) language adapted to the audience, (*style*;) and, finally, a corresponding delivery, (*elocution*.) Thus, then, these characteristics of a sermon are not burdens laid upon it either by rhetoric or by ecclesiastical usage, but spring from the very nature of the sermon itself, as an oral address to an audience; usage, indeed, plays quite a secondary part in the business.*

On the same ground, also, is the manifestation of genuine *eloquence* in preaching abundantly justified. When we address a congregation, we *discourse*; that is, we do not merely talk, in the language of common life, but we use a peculiar and definite form of language, which was extant among men before either church or church-usage existed; and which, with the other forms of language, poetry and prose, will remain long after church-usage shall have passed away. We use a form of language, which becomes

* Surely no one would think of asserting that the character of speeches in parliaments, public meetings, &c., is fixed by usage. They carry their necessity within themselves, and take only certain external features from usage.

an oration, not merely in virtue of its treating connectedly of a certain subject, but also because the speaker, feeling an intense interest in his subject, (an interest in this case given by the Holy Spirit,) seeks to awaken a correspondent feeling in the minds of his hearers. Is this objectionable? Bring your objection, then, against the will of the Creator, who saw fit to endow man with the faculty of speech, and with an interest in truth. Silence, then, the preaching of the word in the congregation, and adopt other means in its stead. Must we divest our preaching of eloquence, that is, in plain terms, of all interest either on the part of the speaker or his hearers, because, forsooth, it has come to be a cry that rhetoric must be banished from the pulpit? It is to this issue that our modern innovators are hurrying unawares. Without repeating what we have said before, we freely, and with deep conviction, admit that there are elements of oratory which cannot find place in the pulpit; that rhetoric, even in its best sense, must play only a subordinate part there; must be regarded as a means, not an end; and that the preacher, whose sole desire is to figure as an orator, is utterly unworthy of his office: but we can never grant that preaching can attain its full objects without any rhetoric whatever, or that the preacher who makes a just use of it, thereby ceases to be a minister of Christ. We allow that the school of Reinhard was too rhetorical. But Reinhard himself has told us, and all his printed sermons confirm the assertion, that in the subject matter of his preaching he adhered strictly to the Scriptures and the confession of faith.* Reinhard, then, was not led astray by his style; and the same may be said of many of his followers; if others have erred, their error must be charged upon their false theology and upon the spirit of the age. Reinhard's fault was that he considered theology more in its relation to the head than to the heart; in the pulpit he was rather a thinking dogmatist than a feeling interpreter of God's word; more a supernaturalist than a pietest, in the elevated sense of that word; more intent upon bringing out certain definite theological conceptions than upon stirring the affections of his hearers.

To return. We have, in another place,† given our opinion freely in regard to the abuse of rhetoric in the pulpit. But we have before remarked in this article that the guilt of the excessive influence of art in modern times lies not at the door of rhetoric, but is due to the want of *religion*. When Christianity found no place in the pulpit, rhetoric had to be all in all. When the preacher

* Reinhard's Geständnisse, (Confessions,) p. 90, seq.

† Character and Calling of the Gospel Preacher, vol. i, § 27.

had no *matter* for his sermon, he had, of necessity, to make use of *form* for a substitute: abandoned by the Holy Ghost, he took refuge in the arms of art. But, on the other hand, now that Christianity is reinstated in her rights, is it necessary that art should be rudely jostled from her position? A wise discretion will rather use her as a handmaid and auxiliary, for which office alone she is fitted by her nature. Preaching still is, and ever must be, *a discourse*, and the preacher an *orator*, though an orator of God. Preaching is, and must be, in its formal development, a work of science and art; when it ceases to be this, it will cease to be itself.

If it be granted, then, (as it must be,) that preaching is, in its essential principle, a discourse before a congregation, all that we demand as the results of that principle must be granted also. Among these necessary results are *invention, arrangement, development, and delivery*,—departments essential to every discourse before an audience.

The doctrine of invention treats first, of the theme, as the synthesis of the subject; and secondly, of the matter for the development or analysis of the fundamental proposition. As it is not every proposition which can be formed into a sermon, rhetoric demands of the theme certain essential qualities, viz., *unity, precision, clearness, matter*, (in amount corresponding to the extent of the sermon,) *interest, dignity, &c.* Is the theme to be without these attributes? Can it possibly be without them? True, it is often the case now, when the nature of preaching *as a discourse before an audience* is lost sight of, that themes are presented to which these attributes are wanting; but what is the consequence? A theme without unity is a logical contradiction, and can lead an audience to no unity of knowledge: a theme without precision or clearness is a speaking proof of the lack of clear conceptions in the preacher, and a rack for hearers' brains: a theme without purport contains nothing on which a congregation can lay hold; and, finally, a theme without interest can awaken none in the hearer. If the text be made the theme, the product will be a homily, a style of preaching deservedly esteemed in its proper sphere. We hope that the coming better times will introduce it anew; for the interest and edification of a homily, when it is what it ought to be, is vastly greater than that of purely synthetic preaching.*

The next element of preaching *as a discourse before an audience*,

* Palmer, as an advocate of the homily, (p. 448,) gets into trouble with his "ecclesiastical usage," which admits the homily only as an exception, although the old usage of the church is decidedly in its favor!

is the arrangement, or disposition. We have already shown how strikingly PALMER owns the necessity of a definite order and of subdivisions in the sermon; nay, even of the proper finish to be given to the whole by the introduction and conclusion. But he evidently mistakes the true ground of this necessity, when (p. 319) he ascribes it to ecclesiastical usage. On the contrary, the necessity of a logical arrangement arises from the simple fact, that whatever is said without apparent arrangement cannot have been clearly conceived; and whatever is not clear in the conception of the speaker, cannot be made so to the minds of his auditors. Ecclesiastical usage had nothing to do with originating this law. Even the apostle (1 Cor. xiv, 27) gives his warning against unintelligent speech. "If any man speak in an unknown tongue . . . let one interpret. But if there be no interpreter, let him keep silence in the church." The real ground, then, on which we demand a logical arrangement is, that the *speaker must be intelligible to his hearers*; and this end is hindered, to some extent, even by trifling deviations from a logical order, the very least of which cannot but disturb the connection of thought in the mind of an intelligent hearer. Yet in these days how often is a theme advanced in one way, and treated in quite another: divisions and subdivisions made with no other object, apparently, than to conceal the preacher's purpose: parts introduced that have no connection whatever with the theme: repetition following repetition, and digression succeeding digression, until the poor audience, deluded and forsaken, longs for the amen! Now we do not insist upon any approved or stereotyped form of division; we do not ask (after the old type) for a fivefold application to every sermon; but we do demand of every preacher a definite arrangement of his material, and an obvious connection of thought throughout his discourse. We grant to the speaker liberty to adopt what precise system of arrangement he pleases, but on *any* system his discourse must combine unity, order, and clearness, if he would not disgrace his sacred functions. Every theme within the legitimate province of the preacher has various sides from which it can be viewed, and here is full scope for him to exercise his liberty; but then again every theme presents certain *indispensable* views which must not be lost sight of. To take a simple illustration: if we are preaching on the "love of our enemies," and fail to set forth clearly what we mean by such a love, developing the idea fairly with proper limitations and explanations, we shall do little but beat the air in searching for motives to lead our hearers to practice a duty which they do not understand; and wind up, perhaps, at last, with empty exclamations,—an O! here, and

an Ah! there. True, a momentary edification may result from a mere grouping of the principal thoughts of a text, made up by the arbitrary choice of the preacher, without any strict analysis of the parts; but certainly such preaching can never be permanently useful, can never promote a clear and distinct *knowledge of the truth*, which, after all, is the only trustworthy basis of genuine Christian edification. It may cause a transient glow of feeling; it may produce an evanescent religious sentiment; but it cannot "root and ground" the hearer in the "truth as it is in Christ Jesus!" We generally come to the conclusion, on hearing a preacher who indulges in this way of treating sacred themes, that he himself is not well grounded in the principles of the gospel, and seeks, by this wavering and vacillating presentation of his subject, to escape the necessity of bringing out his views in clear and sharp outlines.

The *introduction*, or *exordium*, falls also within the sphere of arrangement. On this point we can concede little to Palmer's "ecclesiastical usage." Usage may decide whether the sermon shall begin with a prayer, or an exordium, or both; or whether the transition from the text to the theme shall be regarded as an introduction. Yet, after all, usage cannot settle the whole matter; for, in general, the necessity for an exordium is unconditional: you cannot plunge your audience at once *in medias res*.* PALMER opposes introductions energetically. A passage occurs in our treatise, before cited,† to the following effect: "Whatever matter the preacher may select must be foreign, if taken apart from the context, and the exordium only brings it back to its proper connection. We use the exordium, not merely, as Cicero and Quintilian express it, *auditorem attentum, docilem, benevolum reddere*; but to reveal the circle of thought, within which we intend to discuss the matter proposed." On this PALMER asks, "Why not refer to the text?"—and then continues: "No,—on the contrary, when we choose a text, we always bear in mind its connection with the context:‡ the text itself reveals the circle of thought within which we intend to move; and the matter is *not* foreign, for the text makes us acquainted with it." But does the text of itself reveal the view which the preacher intends to take of it? Has not every text, as we have before said, various sides on which it may be examined? And how

* Reinhard was by no means the originator of introductions: the older homileticians attached great importance to them. Cf. *J. J. Rambach, Præcepta Homiletica*, 1736.

† Wesen und Beruf, &c.

‡ True, but do the *hearers* always bear it in mind?

is the hearer to follow or comprehend you, when, without disclosing the stand-point from which you contemplate the subject, you leap at once from text to theme, without so much as a transition to supply the place of exordium?

As for the question whether the introduction should precede or follow the text, usage may have some weight: our own preference, however, is strongly in favor of the former. A well-managed introduction, before the announcement of the text, excites the audience to interest, and even anxiety, to listen for the text itself, and fixes their attention upon it far more forcibly than its bare announcement can ever do.

We turn now to the *development* of the discourse and its *delivery*. PALMER objects to the usual doctrine of disposition, that it consists only in a scheme of divisions and subdivisions, which the development is to complete into a whole. Especially (and with distinct reference to the author of this article) does he object to the *topic*; although he soon finds that he cannot carry out his objection. On page 522 he asks, "Are we wholly to reject such categories as *origin, character, results, &c.*?" Nay,—but we still stand in need of the categories, both in cases where the text is so short and simple that it offers no variety, and in cases where it is desirable to dilate upon the ideas of the text according to the form which they have assumed in the theme." Consequently, (we may add,) *always*. It is useless, then, to contend against the use of *topics*. We adhere to our old view of the nature of the sermon and its elementary parts; viz.—*invention* brings out the theme synthetically from the text, and thus provides the materials for the sermon; *disposition* (arrangement) gives to these materials their necessary organic connection; and *development* (by the aid of style) fills up the outline and completes the work. Let us illustrate our thought by the work of a painter. He selects as his subject a landscape or a figure,—that is his *theme*: he forms first his outlines,—the *arrangement*; and lastly, throws in light and shade, life and expression, into his composition,—the *development*. Can he omit either of these and yet produce a perfect picture? Just so we require matter, outline, and finish, to produce a perfect sermon.

In regard to *style*, ecclesiastical usage is silent, but science is not. Style is nothing but the peculiar form which we give to our expression; the plastic representation of our thoughts and feelings. Science demands correctness and purity of language, perspicuity, brevity, simplicity, dignity, and finally beauty, in the expression of the speaker. We say science demands these,—the style of the preacher must be cultivated, not that he may shine as an orator,

but that he may give the most appropriate and worthy garb to the great thoughts and emotions with which he is charged as the ambassador of God, not for *his own* sake, but for the sake of the congregation. It is sad, indeed, to find the great truths of the gospel made repulsive by rude and unworthy language in the preacher; yet how often is this done of late? At the present rate of downward progress it will not be long before we get back to the times of Geiler of Kaisersburg, who, in a certain sermon, having compared the body to an old ass, and the soul to a young one, exclaimed, "Now saddle both body and soul for the Lord, that he may ride upon them." Some, too, may be captivated by another of his elegant figures. "There be three geese that bite us; the first is *pride*; big, gray, and coarse: the second is *lust*; black, filthy, &c." In the mean time we think that PALMER's opposition to style is not very hearty, for he himself quotes a passage from Hofacker as very happy, though it is nearly all made up of tropes. "O sweet sleep on the bed of earth, and under a covering of stone,—if it be a sleep in the arms of Jesus! O happy death! when Jesus, the conqueror of death, stands by the couch and covers the departing soul with the wings of his mercy! O glorious victory of life over death, when the worn pilgrim hears, with his spirit-sense, the rustling palms of the conquerors that have gone before!"

Finally, we have to speak of the *delivery* of the sermon. It is true, as PALMER says, that ecclesiastical usage has decided that the discourse shall be spoken freely, and not read from the desk; but there is a deeper reason for this than mere traditional usage. Although, as a mere matter of taste, we might prefer a good sermon read from the manuscript, to the stupid balderdash which is so often thrown out in extemporaneous preaching, yet nothing can be more certain than that a free discourse, unfettered by notes or reading, seems more obviously to offer the genuine outpourings of the heart, and is therefore more effective than a written discourse can be. Moreover, the delivery can never be easy and natural, when the speaker must cast occasional anxious glances at his half-concealed manuscript; and every such glance is an annoyance to his auditors. Not merely usage, then, but nature and necessity, dictate free-speech in the pulpit in preference to read discourses. So, too, with gesture,—the ground of its employment lies far deeper than ecclesiastical usage, whose only real influence indeed is, by confining the preacher to a pulpit, to restrict his action to the upper part of the body, especially the arms and hands. Some gesture there must be, whatever usage may say, if the speaker would be natural and truthful: every heartfelt emotion will seek for some

outward expression in the countenance and gesture. It is folly, indeed, to refrain from this natural and effective expression, simply because some men fall into bad habits.

In conclusion, we sum up what has been said in a few words. We preach in the Christian church, because the WORD OF GOD exists and SPEECH exists. The Word of God is to be kept before the people, that they may "be built up on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief cornerstone." And, as speech is the fittest means of keeping this word before the people, speech must be used, according to its own laws, in the fittest way to accomplish the great end of edification. A truly scientific homiletics can occupy itself only about these two great points—the Word and its utterance; and will remember that ecclesiastical usage can alter or remove nothing that is essential to these. We hope that PALMER, to whom we cordially extend the right hand of fellowship, will elevate his mind to a greater unity of conception, and will employ the valuable materials which he has collected in the preparation of a new and scientific Homiletics,—a work to which he evidently has a decided calling.

ART. V.—*Reply to Rev. T. M. Hopkins on Jasher.*

WE took occasion, in a former number of the Review, (October, 1845,) to consider a series of arguments which had been adduced in the Biblical Repository of January, 1845, purporting to demonstrate that the passage in Joshua, which declares that *the sun and moon stood still*, is an interpolation. Our object was to seek and embrace the truth; to defend the integrity of our sacred Scriptures where they are not manifestly corrupted; and to rebuke the rashness that would yield, for slight reasons, to reject a portion of what is written therein.

The writer in the Repository, Rev. T. M. Hopkins, has seen fit to reply in a way which demands from us a brief notice.

We are sorry Mr. Hopkins chose to use, on such a subject, only vituperation and smart sayings, that might be considered discourteous if it liked us so to take them. We should have preferred his arguments. For by this means, calmly and candidly used, we may gain a clearer knowledge of Scripture; by the former, we shall mend neither head nor heart.

We are willing he should call himself Homer's frog, for the sake of calling us the snail; we only object to his trying to make

us *hop*. As snail, we like it best to crawl; and claim no *kin* to the *hop*-ping race. But we pass such dainties. Though they constitute the favorite dish of some, we presume the readers of the Review will not greatly relish them.

We propose to give simply a synopsis of Mr. Hopkins' reply, and show, in part, where he has misunderstood us; we will not say *misrepresented*, for that would imply a moral obliquity that we cannot lightly charge on a man and a Christian minister; and we are sorry, again, that he should have felt disposed so to charge us, because, in one place, we omitted a word, the use of which we probably did not perceive. But "the readers of the Methodist Quarterly Review, who may have read the statement" as we made it, shall have the full benefit of the author's own corrections.

He complains of us as "representing the writer [Mr. H.] to have said, that 'not a single expression in Habakkuk, chapter iii, can be, for a moment, supposed to have had reference to an act that ever transpired.' By omitting the word '*literally*' in this sentence," Mr. H. adds, "he has put into the writer's *mouth* what the writer never said."—*Bib. Rep.*, April, 1846, p. 293. Mr. H. will permit us to place by the side of this complaint what we *did* represent. We quoted his language, first, as follows: The expression in Hab. iii, 11, "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation," "should *not* be thought to have had a reference to an event which actually took place." And a few lines below: "No one supposes for a moment that a single one of the remaining declarations [of this chapter] ever referred to a transaction which at any time *literally* occurred." And when, a few lines after, we said in our own language, not using quotation—*reference to any act that ever transpired*—we thought, in the simplicity of our understanding, we embraced all his *meaning*; but if we did not, it was there in his own words. Of course, we would not write as our own language—*literally* transpired—though we did twice quote his expression, "*literally* occurred." We hope our works without words will show that we did not intend to represent unfairly; and we frankly say now to "the readers of the Methodist Quarterly Review" that Mr. H. wishes to say, "Not a single expression in Hab. iii can be, for a moment, supposed to have had reference to an act that ever *literally* transpired."*

* It may not be improper to append here a few of the expressions of which it is so dogmatically asserted that "no one supposes for a moment that a single one of them referred to an event that ever *literally* occurred." Verse 5. "Before Him went the pestilence; and burning coals (margin, *burning diseases*) went forth at his feet." Now we read in Numbers xi, 33, "The wrath of

Our readers will now see our whole error. We acknowledge it. When quoting his language, we adhered scrupulously to his words—"actually took place"—which is good English—and "*literally* occurred"—a phrase which we could never consent to use in our own name. And because we chose not to imitate an unenglishism, which could add nothing to the sense, we are honored profusely with the charge of "misrepresentation," and *unfairness*, and want of "*veracity*."

We have been thus particular in exhibiting fully, and confessing the whole "head and front of our offending;" and we wish it distinctly noted and remembered, that this is the only instance in which even our lynx-eyed defender of literalities has found any unfairness in our presentation of his views and arguments. We wish it further noted, that he has not pointed out in our arguments a single sophistry, or a fallacy, or attempted a refutation. It will be remembered that in our former article our object was mainly to test the validity of the arguments for this new notion of his. In only three places did we present a proposition, which we argued

the Lord was *kindled* against the people"—(one of the commonest figures to express strong emotion or sensation, that of *heat, fire, burning, ardent, &c.*)—"and the Lord smote the people with a very great plague." Indeed, so great was the destruction, by plague, and the *fiery* flying serpents, and by various calamities, that two only of all that came out from Egypt entered the promised land. The carcasses of a nation fell in the wilderness. We are reminded, too, of the *three days of pestilence* in the time of David, not to mention other so frequent and heavy strokes of public calamity, by pestilence and burning disease, as well as the cutting sword. Was there nothing to which one might *suppose* this to *refer*? These awful judgments are frequently referred to in the other prophets and in the Psalms, in language similar to this of Habakkuk.

Verse 6. "He beheld, and drove asunder the nations." *Drive out*, is the expression commonly used respecting the Canaanites, Jebusites, &c., who were displaced to make room for the children of Israel in the promised land. Who can prevent the association if he would? The mind *will* "*refer*," whether the prophet intended it or not.

Verse 9. "Thou didst cleave the rivers of the earth." Was Jordan parted?

Verse 10. "The mountains saw thee and trembled." Did Sinai quake under the thunderings of the Almighty?

Verse 15. "Thou didst walk through the sea with thy horses; through the heap of great waters." Ay; but which essaying to do, Pharaoh and his host perished.

Verse 11. "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation—thine arrows walked in the light," &c. Not so, says this purifier of holy writ—this is but the prophet's phrensy, and means nothing.

directly. The first was,—That in the course of human events it is not only possible, but probable, that after a glorious battle the rhapsodist should sing his song of victory before a history of the event should be written and published; and, in particular, that the history of Joshua was not written till after his day. Mr. Hopkins contents himself with calling it absurd; nay, the sublimity of absurdities, to suppose there could be a space of time sufficient even to wedge in the tiniest ode between the act acted and the history published. And upon this position of his hung his vitalest argument. The second was, to sustain our denial that Josephus refers to Jasher. This entire position of Mr. H., which, if made good, was, in our judgment, his weightiest one, he now abandons, and agrees with us on this point. The third was, that profane tradition *does* attest the miracle. He is evidently in doubt whether to receive the story of Phaëton as veritable tradition, hence originated, or not. For the rest, he has generally misunderstood us.

But we proceed to give the synopsis.

The first argument against the genuineness of the passage that records the miracle, was,—“It is evidently an interruption of the narrative; an interruption which, when considered with reference to its own statement at the close, destroys the credibility of the passage.”

On this Mr. H. says we “*admitted* the first argument in all its force.” If he means such force as would bring us to *his* conclusions, he *misunderstood* us. We admitted his first *premise*, to wit, “It interrupts the narrative;” that is, of the battle, while the writer pauses to insert in its own place an account of the miracle. But from this premise we *denied* that any argument could proceed till this problem is first solved, to wit:—*If* the passage were genuine—for that is the question—how would it the less interrupt the narrative? Our conclusion was stated in these words, which we will do Mr. H. the charity to believe he overlooked:—“It would seem, therefore, that before we could argue this passage to be spurious, from the fact that it interrupts the narrative, it were incumbent to show how it would not interrupt the narrative if admitted to be genuine.”

The other assertion, to wit, that verse *fifteenth* (which says that Joshua and the army returned to Gilgal) is not reconcilable with the context, we admitted in a qualified sense; not as he *understands* us to have done. But if admitted positively, we denied—that which Mr. H. has not yet attempted to prove—that there is any connection, natural or logical, between the fact of so stupendous a miracle and the question—where the army encamped the

night after the battle. And we stated our conclusion, that "if there be argument here, it certainly resolves itself into this: because the context, and the nature of things, seem to forbid the supposition that Joshua returned to Gilgal as stated in verse fifteenth; therefore, the Almighty did not put forth his power to arrest the sun and moon, as stated in verses twelfth and thirteenth."

If, then, this reviser of the sacred canon claims that as his argument, it is very true we admitted it "in all its force."

But Mr. H. *misunderstood* us again just here. We did not propose to reject verse 15. We only intimated that it seemed to us more rash in him to reject four verses than in Dr. Horne to reject one. We distinctly stated, that we think the whole difficulty of this verse is in the word *Gilgal*; and suggested two ways by which the difficulty might be relieved; one of which Mr. H. afterward attempted to quote, for a special object. He should have remembered this fact in connection with the gratuitous charge of excision. We are sorry again, now that his memory is so short; for certainly he could not have intended wrong.

We are next taken by an actual surprise. We confess it. Our critic has turned antiquary. He says he has got the book of Jasher—the real Jasher. He says it is as big as a Pentateuch. He says he can give "an extract" from it; and "a larger one than the disputed passage, *yet one that embraces it!*" How Euclidian! And this he utters apparently with the air as if he fancied himself the repository of the mighty secret of the existence of such a book. For, after a complacent pause, he leniently proceeds:—"The reader will, of course, allow himself to smile at the idea just advanced; yet it is most true. 'The Book of Jasher is now'* lying before me; the veritable 'Sepher Hajasher,' (literally 'correct record,') with its chapters and verses, [!] and with the passage in dispute, is at hand.† . . . Presuming the reviewer [that's ourself] will be satisfied with the assurance that it claims to have been," &c. We certainly should be very ungrateful not to make our acknowledgments for such information thus *assured* to us. But he goes on to increase the obligation, thus:—"The reader, it is presumed, and possibly the reviewer, [that's ourself again,] will be glad to see the entire passage from which the verses in dispute are thought to have been taken."

Our astonishment in all this is not at the modest *presumption* and the proffered "assurance," but that a man, and a divine, should

* Does that word *now* imply anything? Perhaps there is another secret.

† *Is at hand* (!) We know what "*is at hand*" means, in the phrase commercial, and the phrase epistolary.

adduce, in such connection, the authority of a book which we thought the learned had long agreed to pronounce a *modern forgery*; in which opinion, it appears, Mr. H. coincides, after giving an extract, at considerable length, which is probably well known to most of "the readers of the Methodist Quarterly Review," of whom he affects or enjoys a complacent ignorance.

We have here to say, that Mr. H. *misunderstood* us again, (for surely he "is an *honorable* man,") in supposing that we claimed for the book of Jasher "authentic antiquity."—P. 272. We affirmed nothing on this point. We said, (p. 510,) "We do not propose to say who was Jasher, or what the book of Jasher, but only to examine what has been said to us." Mr. H. *assumed* that it was *ancient*, and testified of by Josephus. We denied that Josephus said anything about it; and in this he now agrees with us. He assumed that it "was probably a collection of sacred songs, composed on various occasions; and one of its pieces *undoubtedly* was that recorded in 2 Samuel i," (p. 112,) which certainly makes it synchronous with David. From this opinion we expressly dissented. Though we cannot demonstrate our opinion, we have reasons for it, stronger than any we have seen for regarding it a book of poems. Having assumed the fact, that the book was a compilation of poems, he wishes to argue that its date must have been subsequent to that of the book of Joshua, *because there was no intervening time between the acts and the writing of the history*. At this point we took issue with him, and claimed that *if there was* a national ode to celebrate the victory of Joshua and the miracle, "it was more reasonable to suppose that the poetic effusion should have been antecedent to the prose record; that the flight of the winged Pegasus should have outstripped the tardier movements of the pedestrian muse." We further gave arguments, for which we challenge refutation, that the book of Joshua was not written till some time subsequent to the man Joshua.

"The readers of the Methodist Quarterly Review" shall have the benefit, in full, of his reply to these two positions. It is this: "The man whose credulity can overcome such obstacles will never find anything in the way of a position he may wish to establish." The "obstacles" he means are, the "absurdity" of supposing the ode could be written before the history, and that the history could be written some little time after the deeds of it were done! So absurd! he redoubles upon the track, and finds it the "ultimatum in absurdity" to suppose the poet could compose an ode, or (to conform our ideas to the customs of the age) that the

rhapsodist could utter his *impromptu song* before the historian had accomplished his task! Why, the strains might have been caught by the daughters of Israel, and sent echoing round all the hills of Palestine, ere the general was sufficiently refreshed from battle to withdraw the stylus from his belt, or unrol his parchments. And if our sires and grandams tell us truly, the victories of our revolution were sung all over the land long before men thought of history, save the living history in the conversation of the people.

We are sorry he should have written so rashly—we might be justified in saying, *absurdly*—'twere more just to the fact, however, to say *stupidly*—but we dislike either word.

One other thing, *en passant*. We hope Mr. H. "will be satisfied with the assurance" that we did not intend to unsettle his nerves so sadly by the sight of a Pegasus. We "*presumed*" that a man who could do and undo the writings of antiquity, was too familiar with the whole classical menagery to take fright at the commonest of the herd. Poor Peg! he's a harmless beast in these days. That he did not comprehend the common phrase—not to say trite—*pedestrian muse*, we are satisfied did not result from any will to pervert or misunderstand, but simply from having forgotten the use of it in our standards, and from lack of a dictionary. His error here is no doubt from his memory. A pity for its shortness! If he has forgotten his Quintilian, and his Horace, and our English classics, any good dictionary would have served as a prompter; and would have taught him, that though "professing to know a little of almost everything," (we had judged as much,) he has guessed totally wrong this time.

But perhaps it were as well to stop. These misconceptions and misstatements—unintentional we hope, for the man abhors to misrepresent—yet utter and unjustifiable misstatements—fall frequenter than the pages. A pity for its shortness, we said—his memory's. See how it serves him in a quotation; or better to say, *sub-serves*.

He had said that Josephus gave a full account of Jasher, and recites that account item by item, (p. 110.) We denied that Josephus even so much as intimates that he ever heard of such a book. And, respecting the passage in that author, where he speaks of "the *books* laid up in the temple," from which Dr. Horne deduces a detailed opinion about Jasher, we said this:—

"The inquiry, then, is, What were the *books* laid up in the temple? We can easily conceive that it is not among the wildest of conjectures that have been made, to suppose that the *book* of Jasher was intended; and that point *assumed*, the *further con-*

jecture, that the *other items* above named must also have been of Josephus's opinion, gains a strength of probability, amounting, perhaps, to inference. But remove this substratum, and the fabric it supports goes with it. And we claim that such a conjecture is entirely independent of the *data* which might have guided it."—P. 512.

Mr. Hopkins quotes us thus: (he means to do it "*literally*," of course:)

"'Now we can easily conceive,' adds this reviewer, 'that it is not among the wildest of conjectures to suppose that the book of Jasher was intended.' Nay; he admits that '*this opinion* gains a strength of probability, amounting, *perhaps*, to inference.'"—P. 282.

That we call pitiable, *literally* pitiable.

We then showed that, by the *books*, Josephus could have meant no other than the sacred Scriptures. This Mr. H. now admits, abandons his former opinion, and again reiterates that we "admit that it is altogether probable Josephus *did* refer to this book." A *literal* man, no doubt, and an honorable, and who abhors to misrepresent.

Another. On the question, whether the passage is poetry, he quotes us to have said:—"The characteristics by which we are accustomed to distinguish poetry *are these*, to wit: the determination of the verse by a certain number and fixed order of feet, ascertained by the number and quantity of syllables in each." Here he stops; and upon these disjointed fragments of our sentence he remarks:—"Will the learned professor deny that the book of Job (excepting, &c.) is poetry? And can he find here his 'determination of the verse?' &c., &c. Let him look also at the book of Psalms and that of Proverbs," &c. Now the simple thing we said was, that the characteristics above named *are wanting in Hebrew* poetry. We said it thus:—"That all the *obvious* characteristics by which we are accustomed to distinguish poetry, to wit: the determination of the verse by a certain number and fixed order of feet, ascertained by the number and quantity of syllables in each; *in fine*, the entire subject of *prosody* as it exhibits itself from the ancient Greek hitherward, was wholly unknown to the Hebrew: at least we have no knowledge that it was recognized by them at all." We then noticed the characteristics of Hebrew verse, as defined by all the grammarians, and referred to Nordheimer for a more full exhibition of what we received as the true doctrine. If he dislikes our views, the question is with Nordheimer and Stuart, and the German philologists. But we in-

roduced this to show how *literally* he quotes. He does not attack our argument.*

He next makes us say,—“That which follows the question in verse 13, (‘is it not written?’ &c.) is a little *more* poetical than that which precedes it;” and adds, “There are degrees, then, it seems, in poetry, according to his own standard, and that, too, where there is no poetry at all!” Our sentence was *literally* this. After having noticed the characteristics of Hebrew poetry, and having said, “They had poetic thoughts, poetic diction, we might even say, a poetic style, but no verse;” that is, in the Greek and Latin, and modern sense of the word *verse*; we said,—“The latter clause of the thirteenth verse may be said to be, *in its phraseology, poetic*.” It is surely time to refer this *literal* man, who “professes to know a *little* of almost everything,” to Noah Webster, to renew his extinct memory of the *use* (not *ab-use*) of the “marks of quotation.”

The argument about tradition rests where we left it. He does not attempt to refute it. He quotes a part of it; so as not to exhibit its force, however; but does not misquote under this head, only to make us say something about the flood *which we never said*. If he would not put his constant misstatements in quotation marks, as if we had said so, it would not have been quite so *guilty*. We have not said the half that he has thus marked for us.

We *must* give one more. “The writer of the *Examination*” had found a difficulty in the passage, from the relative position of Gibeon to Joshua; and this difficulty he had invented by *mis-reading* the text—*over* Gibeon, for *upon* Gibeon. We felt, indeed, that it was childish in us to stoop to illustrate the fact, that

* It will be remembered that we did not deny the quotation in verse thirteenth to be poetry. That it exhibits the rhetorical figure of *parallelism* is evident to any one; and so far we said its *phraseology was poetic*; but we reaffirm that this figure is one of the common ornaments of prose, and, therefore, does not sustain the unqualified assertion that the clause is poetry. But if we are to admit any sentence to be absolutely *poetry* on such slight evidence, and then agree with Mr. H. that a poetic clause cannot legitimately stand in connection in prose, we have done a sad work. The knife of excision must at once go through the Gospel histories, cutting them piecemeal from beginning to end. Many of the most pointed and instructive of our Saviour’s parables, and other portions of his discourses, suddenly become, in the hands of such *critics*, modern interpolations from smutty monks’ books! Nay, go through the masters of literature in all languages, and you reduce their symmetry to utter deformity, and annihilate the very idea of art or refinement in prose composition.

if one would look, at evening, to see the sunlight rest *upon* a mountain, he must, of course, look toward the east; and that when the sun is near the horizon, whether east or west, and we say the *sun is upon the mountain*, we always imply that the two objects are in opposite directions from us. Having done this, however, with due gravity, the spirit of burlesque got the better of us for a moment. We said,—“We have read that this preposition, *upon*, once gave rise to an elaborate discussion by all the learned jurists that attend on the two highest courts in the British empire, to determine whether it meant *before* or *after*; and it gained a different decision from each of the august benches. It was not argued at that time whether it might also signify *over*.”—P. 521.

Listen, now, to the man who proffers, and quite urges us to accept, his *emendations* of the sacred text. After complaining that we think so little of his argument, we have *literally* this:—“He has read, as he informs us, somewhere in the course of his researches after wisdom and knowledge, ‘that the preposition *upon* once gave rise to an elaborate discussion in the British *Parliament*,* to determine whether it meant *before* or *after*.’ This, as it would seem, is sufficient to satisfy him, that when Joshua, standing at Makkedah, near the close of the day, gave command that the sun and moon should halt ‘upon Gibeon,’ a city lying directly east of him, he meant only that the sun should stand still either ‘before’ or ‘after’ Gibeon.”—P. 290.

Now we will not call this *absurd*; for we are convinced, from his use of it, that Mr. H. has forgotten the meaning of that word; nor *misrepresentation*, for that he abhors; nor lack of *veracity*, for he must have but vague notions of that virtue who can question the veracity of another for choosing not to imitate his *bad grammar*, by inserting a word which could add nothing to the sense, in a place where it could not properly stand, though when *quoting his language*, he did it *literally—verbatim et grammaticam*—we will call it none of these; in fine, we will not name it. A friend at our elbow suggests that it simply looks to him like—*hopeless stupidity*, or *willful perversion*; that he either could not understand simple language, or has deliberately falsified. We affirm not, lest we should not be literally correct.

On page 280, he says we have not noticed a single one of the

* He evidently quotes from memory—and that a very short one, which is as good as *mismemory*. A pity for such a memory! If he will look into the Reports of the Courts of Queen’s Bench and the Exchequer for 1839, he will find the arguments in full.

considerations on pages 110, 111 of the Examination. We are at a loss to know what to make of this, unless it be that the numbers are misprinted. He could not have meant pages 110, 111, for those are the pages in which he treats of the book of Jasher—a topic to which we gave more space than to any other one in the Examination, as may be seen—about four pages. At least we should have believed the error to have been of the printer, had we not had so many similar specimens of his *literal reference*.

In another passage we are happy to do justice to this writer, so fond of literal accuracy. Now it happened that our printer marred us sadly. He has promised to do better, and we forgive him. We caused a copy of our article to be sent to Mr. Hopkins, with the typographical errors corrected on the margin. In citing one of these unfortunate sentences, Mr. H. has amused us by copying the *type literally*, and then suspending the marginal correction as a conjectural emendation of his own. We had hope now, when we saw him following both the text and margin, that he would for once get through the sentence correctly. But, alas! the next three or four lines, simple as they are, are garbled and deformed, till we cannot own them. The sense is not changed, it is true, as is so often done in other places, but the phraseology is not ours. We ask Mr. H., in the name of common sense and common honesty, by what law, whether of usage or literary courtesy, or honor or *morality*, he thus continually marks as quotation from us language that we never used.

But we cease from the bootless task of such exposition. Save the three or four pages occupied with the extract, and description of his new-found book of Jasher, there is barely one page of his twenty-seven (we are thankful for *one*) in which he has not misunderstood, or misstated, or misquoted, or perverted, or falsified (which, we pretend not to say) our words and sentiments. So thick, indeed, do these gems of *literalness* and *veracity* cluster, that sometimes not less than half a dozen on the same page have occurred. We should have preferred his arguments.

We regret exceedingly that it has seemed necessary to dwell so long on matters so ungrateful. We would wish, rather, to look at the merits of the question. Is the passage referred to in Joshua, genuine? Did “the sun and moon stand still in their habitations?”

Recapitulation of the Argument.

Against the reception of that passage, Mr. Hopkins had offered nine several reasons; the sufficiency whereof we did not see, and

accordingly sought to show their invalidity. Our arguments he has not once analyzed or attempted to answer. Let that be remembered. And this also:—In but one instance has he found even a pretext to complain that we failed to present his positions and arguments fairly. We are gratified at this; for we would study, first of all, to be candid and impartial, especially in a discussion concerning the word of God. Yet once we sinned. We confess it. Though we caused the writer's own words to appear distinguished by proper marks—"literally occurred"—we did not choose to say in our own language—*literally transpired*—because we did not understand what quality may inhere in an *act of transpiration*, which should be denominated *literalness*.

Of his nine propositions, we showed that all, except three, *if admitted*, are, in their bearing on this question, merely negative—they would consist equally with either the rejection or retainment of the passage. Of these three, two were founded on a *misapprehension*—this seems to be a favorite figure of the man, and it certainly makes us not a little charitable toward his misknowledges of our meaning—of the text. In one, he supposed the text to mean, that the Lord *had never before heard and answered prayer, and never would again*, in any respect whatever; or that he had never before fought for Israel, and *never would again*! We hope he sees clearer now. The other is in trying to get the sun *over* Gibeon. Our readers have had enough on that point; and from some symptoms of progression in his last article, we do not despair but even Mr. Hopkins may yet learn the meaning of *upon*. We have known wonders accomplished in that way. There is yet one of a positive character; and Mr. H. claims that we admitted it "in all its force." Verse fifteenth says that Joshua returned to Gilgal; but the distance seems too great for the army to have marched after the battle, and immediately subsequent we find them again near the site of the battle; *therefore the sun and moon did not stand still*! The connection between these events necessary to render the syllogism quite Aristotlean, the author of it has not shown us. He has said, indeed, "there is such a marked family likeness in all the parts as to force us to the belief that they belong together."—P. 271. A family likeness! It may be; but not surely

"qualem decet esse sororum;"

else, does the Jasherean sire demean him toward the twain with a very unfatherly partiality; for while one is mounted on a "winged Pegasus," to take its "flight, hap-hazard, through the

heavens," the other is doomed to trudge *cum* "*musa pedestri*." "A plain English translation of which is"—we insert it for Mr. H.'s *understanding*—(see his last article, p. 286)—in the Jasher, by which he now abides, one part is poetry; while the other, separated by a long intervening passage, is "the gravest prose." But as he has not hinted to us in what this family likeness consists, perhaps he sees it in some feature where common observers would not expect it.

Here, then, is the sum total of all the argument he has brought against the genuineness of this passage. It happens, further, that two of his negative propositions have a *positive* side, either one of which outweighs books full of mere negatives. 1. We presume there are few readers who will not feel the conviction that Habakkuk referred to this event when he says, "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation; thine arrows did walk in the light," &c. 2. We referred to a *tradition* of this event, which was current among some of the ancient nations, and of which the verisimilitude scarcely suffers us to entertain a doubt of its origin. This we showed in detail. Mr. Hopkins has *not attempted* to place *argument* against this *in one particular*. We must understand him, then, as admitting it. And, according to his own declaration, either of these two points made good settles the question.

Though the conclusion from these two arguments cannot be evaded, we yet notice one other consideration which Mr. H. has urged in his last article. He says,—

"Let the supposition, then, be made, that Joshua x, 12-15, is to be retained, because the thing it states is true. Wherefore this citation, then, of another writer? Is it to command belief? Where, in all the word of God, do we find another case like it?" &c.—P. 279.

Why, in the name of truth, does he write thus? Divine though he be, one of common intelligence, and who does *not* "profess to know a little of almost everything," would be tempted to believe that one of the things of which he knows *little*, is—the contents of his Bible. But we bethink us of that sad memory of his. "Where do we find?" In many places. In the historic books of the Old Testament, the so frequently recurring reference for additional facts on the same subject, to "the book of kings of Judah" and Israel; and to "the book of the Chronicles of the kings," &c. That these references were not to the books bearing those titles as they now stand in the sacred canon is evident—first, from the fact that in the book to which, on that supposition,

the reference is made, there are, in some cases, no additional facts given; and, second, there *could not* be this reciprocal reference from one book to the other, *unless each were written before the other*. Of necessity, therefore, we believe Biblical scholars agree that the compilers of these books referred to the same original documents, which were probably the official records of the government.

But, secondly, there is another class of books referred to by their various titles, to wit: a biography of Solomon. 1 Kings xi, 41. In 1 Chron. xxix, 29, we are referred to the histories of Samuel, and Nathan, and Gad, for "the rest of the acts of David." In 2 Chron. ix, 29, "the book of Nathan the prophet, and the prophecy of Ahijah, the Shilonite, and the visions of Iddo the seer." Also 2 Chron. xii, 15, "the book of Shemaiah the prophet, and of Iddo the seer, *concerning genealogies*;" a different work, it appears, from his "visions." Chap. xiii, 22, "the commentary of the prophet Iddo"—still another, by the same author. Chap. xx, 34, "the book of Jehu the son of Hanani;" and so on in other places. "Where, in all the word of God, do we find another case like it?" is the question of the man who "professes to know," &c.

Again, in Num. xxi, 14, we are cited to "the book of the wars of the Lord."

The New Testament writers also. Jude, verse 14, quotes a prophecy of Enoch, known to be from an apocryphal book, called "the book of Enoch," which was known to the Christian fathers; and, though believed for a long time to be lost to the world, has been recovered, and was published a few years ago.

The author of the same epistle, in verse 9, also cites a current tradition, or some book that has since perished. St. Paul does the same thing in 2 Tim. iii, 8.

But more than all this. St. Paul quotes heathen writers in not less than three several places; and this he does precisely as an ordinary man would invoke to his support an acknowledged authority: not that he needed human authority to sustain the truth of his assertions to those who understood his sacred mission and his inspiration, but we think it would naturally tend, under the circumstances, to carry a fuller conviction to the minds of those he addressed.

Mr. Hopkins' present Position.

The "writer of the Examination" takes entirely new ground in his last article respecting the book of Jasher, from that which he

occupied in his first. In that he claimed that the book of Jasher was an *ancient* writing, known to Josephus, and spoken of by him in copious detail, (p. 110.) 2. He claimed that its precise date, at least of some of its contents, was the time of David; and that "one of its pieces was *undoubtedly* that recorded in 2 Sam., chap. i."—P. 112. All this is as clear as language can make it. But what now?

The whole reading world will remember that there was published, a few years ago, a work assuming the title, and claiming to be the "veritable book of Jasher" referred to in the sacred Scriptures.* This novelty excited the attention of the learned; and, of course, its high pretensions were canvassed; and the general judgment, as we have all along understood it, was, that it was a spurious production of the middle ages. This opinion is also adopted by Mr. H. He thinks the book "first saw the light about the commencement of the dark ages."—P. 283. He has justly characterized it as "replete with absurdities, vain and inconsistent surmises—deeply imbued throughout with the smut and moonshine of monkish superstition and folly."—P. 276. But what was our surprise to discover that this thing of absurdities; this, as one has fitly styled it, "illegitimate spawn of an idle monk," Mr. H. now claims as the "veritable book of Jasher," referred to in Joshua and Samuel! That, from such a source, and within these later times, the passage in dispute has been foisted into the sacred text.

Surely it is time to have done with arguments. We will only say that, if Mr. H. was candidly seeking for the truth on this question, the road to it was very short compared to that which he chose to take. We will indicate it.

The process is this:—1. Here is the book of Jasher. 2. It was composed "about the commencement of the dark ages." 3. Was the passage in Joshua taken from *this book*, as a quotation? This is a simple question, easily answered by historic evidence. Let him, then, write to some of his learned friends, and propound this question: Was this passage in Joshua, or the reference to Jasher in the Second Book of Samuel, in the sacred text before the dark ages? The whole problem lies in that nutshell. The question would indeed "be narrowed down to a very small compass;" and notwithstanding he objects to any compres-

* New-York, 1840—edited by M. M. Noah, with a flourish of prefaces, not unprofitable to read for a dyspeptic of a rainy day. It is seldom seen in the book-stores, more for that it is not marketable, than that it is not in market.

sion or restriction of the rambling latitude he had given it, we can assure him it is always safest when inquiring after truth. Or if he does not wish to trouble his friends who are competent to such investigation, a few books, that are in every reader's way, may throw sufficient light on it; as, first, Josephus, in the passage to which Mr. H. himself before referred, says, that "in the books laid up in the temple," from which he takes all his history, and which he calls, in another place, "the Jewish Scriptures," he finds this account of the sun and moon standing still, &c. Aha! was it there in the time of Josephus? and received by the Jewish nation as a part of their sacred Scriptures, which were kept by them with such peculiar care as to render it almost impossible that they should have become adulterated?* Poor monk's book! it must forego the honor of originality!

Another: it appears that he sometimes reads Dr. Clarke. Let him turn to 2 Samuel, chap. i, and he will see, on the authority of that commentator, that Jasher was in the text in that place when the Targum of Jonathan was written—which was probably about the time of Christ. But we have said enough. He would hardly need to call for further light on such a question.

We have, then, these conclusions:—

1. The *fact* of such a miracle is attested by profane tradition; and, that fact admitted, Mr. H. admits the passage.

2. That Habakkuk did refer to this act of the Almighty, we think but one man doubts; and he, because he *has* doubted.

3. This passage was in the text in the time of Josephus; but our objector's basis, and only support to his theory is, that the idea of such a miracle was first invented, and the words first written, by some vagrant monk some time in the dark ages.

If he had stated that proposition in the first place, we should never have lifted a pen to expose an absurdity so puerile. But he

* It will be remembered that the school of the Masorites arose several centuries before Christ—a body of men who devoted their lives to the labor of examining and guarding the purity of the sacred text; descending to the painful *minutiæ* of testing the correctness of every new manuscript, by counting the divisions, and even the letters, and marking the slightest variation in a vowel point or accent, or the form or size of a letter: whence it has been justly concluded to be *impossible* that any material corruption could have crept into the Hebrew text after they commenced their labors. In the sixth century after Christ, the doctors of this school published a complete body of the notes that had accumulated by the study of these men so superstitiously scrupulous for a period of about a thousand years. It was in the midst of this period that Josephus lived, and the Targums were written; and before the close of it, copies and versions were everywhere multiplied.

had evidently no such idea when he wrote his first article ; and we hugely suspect that the same big Jasher, "with its chapters and verses," which, he says, *is now at hand*, is as much a novelty to him as he modestly (!) fancied it would be to his readers.

What was the Book of Jasher ?

This "Sepher Hajasher"—"Correct Record," as Mr. Hopkins translates it—what was it? We cannot tell. We are frank, notwithstanding Mr. H. thinks it "somewhat amusing"—these are his words—"and instructive to see our antagonist taking refuge in the obscurity, which he says [we say] hangs over the whole subject of said book." To him it seems clear. He asserted, first, that it was an ancient book of miscellaneous poems. This we doubted; and he now abandons. He now claims it to be nothing more or less than this thing of absurdities, born of monkish folly during the dark ages. Very clear! He further concludes, by a logic peculiar to himself, that inasmuch as this smutty monk's book is now extant, and *called* Jasher's Book, there could not have been an ancient writing bearing the same title. If he had reasoned thus: had there been no ancient, genuine Jasher, there would have been no modern spurious Jasher—that were more probable.

But what *was* the book of Jasher? We have already seen that there were certain documents referred to by the men appointed and inspired of God to write out such portions of the known history of his people, as he chose to preserve as sacred for the instruction of future ages, by the title of "the Chronicles of the Kings;" which documents, we suppose, to be the official records of the transactions of the government. We also learn from many passages, that, under the regal government, there was an officer appointed to the special charge of making such records. See 2 Sam. viii, 16; 2 Kings xviii, 18; 1 Chron. xviii, 15; 2 Chron. xxxiv, 8. That the term *chronicles*, or, as the Hebrew is, "the words of the days," that is, *journals*, designates documents of the character we have supposed, seems placed beyond a doubt by the use of it elsewhere in the Hebrew writers. Thus, when the conspiracy against the life of Ahasuerus was detected, and the conspirators executed, the sacred historian says, "It was written in the book of the chronicles before the king." Esther ii, 23. And some time after, during that sleepless night of his, the king "commanded to bring the book of records of the chronicles; and they were read before the king." Esther vi, 1.

Further: we have never known, and can hardly conceive of, a

regular government carried on without such records. Did the Jews have such during the rule of the Judges? They *must* have had. And do the historians of those times ever refer to them as the subsequent ones do to the regal state documents? and by what title? We think they do; and that this is the very thing meant by the "book of the Just," or, as Mr. H. translates the *Sepher Hajasher*, "Correct Record."

In this view of the subject, then, inasmuch as the book of Joshua was not composed till some time subsequent to the events, it is in nowise marvelous that the author should refer to this *record*, acknowledged by the Jews to be authentic and *correct*, or the work of a *just* and true man. Nay, it is one of the most natural things we have seen. Far more so than that St. Paul when setting forth to the Athenians that God is the common father of us all, should add, for their better persuasion, "as certain also of your own poets have said, 'For we are also his offspring.'"

In this opinion we are not peculiar. We think it is the more common view of the subject, certainly of scholars. Such is Dr. Robinson's*—a man whose authority, we hope, has some weight with Mr. H. Dr. Horne, in one place, albeit quite contrary to what he says in another, teaches the same thing.† Dr. Glassius, in his *Philologia Sacra*, gives a compilation of various opinions, and decides in favor of this same.‡

Let it suffice to have said thus much respecting the miracle and the author quoted. Quite distinct from this, and will ever remain distinct, is the historical, or rather geographical, difficulty in verse fifteenth. We recur to it to show another specimen of the *accuracy* of this rectifier of the Bible for us. He says (p. 294) that we have put forth a *conjecture*, "that verse 15 should read, 'And Joshua returned, and all Israel with him, to the camp at *Makkedah*,' instead of *Gilgal*." And continues, "The Hebrew letters in '*Hagilgalah*,' he thinks, are so nearly like those which are combined to form the name '*Makkedah*,' that some early, careless transcriber mistook the one for the other."

And, on the next page, he puts in quotation marks as being said by us—*Hagilgalah*, "in the Hebrew character, 'is formed of letters so nearly resembling those in *Makkedah*, as to be easily mistaken, the one for the other.'" Listen, thou reverend man, to our reply. We have not written one syllable of all that. We have never made such a conjecture. We have never uttered such

* See in Calmet, art. *Bible*.

† Vol. iv, p. 1, chap. ii, sec. 2.

‡ Lib. v, tract 1, cap. xiv, pp. 1906, 1907.

a thought. We have said nothing, in any way, like it. We did not write that which could, by any possibility of *mistake*, (adept as he is in the art,) be understood to mean that. It is sheer fabrication or *conjecture*, every word of it. Other and great men have entertained that conjecture, and we do not see but it is about as probable as any; but we did not refer to that opinion at all. Our conjectures—they are two—are recorded on page 523 of the *Methodist Quarterly Review* for October, 1845.

We have been not a little affected with pity to see the miserable work of one whom we at first supposed to be candidly seeking the truth, and to whom we kindly proffered our aid; but we confess that, at the present moment, our pity is mingled with a stronger feeling of disgust than we love to harbor—that a *man* should dare to use, in the presence of a just God, such utter disregard of truth and common honesty! His quibblings, and distortions, and perversions, and evasions throughout, (for we have not noticed the half of them,) we call petty beyond ordinary pettiness. But such things as these are fearful. We did not intend to urge him to desperation. We supposed him to be inquiring after truth, and that he would be thankful to have his errors corrected. And we did not wish to do that in an unkind spirit. We certainly did not. Nor in an unkind manner. If we did so, we were wrong; and ask his forgiveness of our weakness. We exhort him to review with candor the whole subject, and see if he does not find reason to abandon his notion as a chimera.

We have done. We have submitted to notice the strange rejoinder of Mr. H., because of the highly respectable character of the *Review* in which it appeared.

Errata to Art. II. in the Meth. Quart. Review, for Oct., 1845.

Page 504, line 21, for *Joshua*, read *Jasher*.

504, last line, for *Jasher*, read *Joshua*.

505, line 14, for *or*, read *and*.

508, line 9, for *these*, read *three*.

508, line 10, for *by*, read *into*.

509, line 20, for *any*, read *none*.

513, line 13, for *warfare*, read *carnage*.

513, line 11, from bottom, omit *own*.

513, line 5, from bottom, before *passage*, insert *other*.

514, line 22, for *forms*, read *poems*.

515, note, for *Theol. Soc.*, read *Phil. Sac.*

Page 516, line 10 from bottom, before *the text*, insert *in*.

518, line 5, for *Homer*, read *Horne*.

518, line 9, for *strongest*, read *strangest*.

521, line 9, from bottom, for *unpardonable*, read *unpronounceable*.

522, line 3, from bottom, before *verse*, insert *in*.

523, line 2, after *which*, insert *we*.

523, line 5, for *Mannedah*, read *Makkedah*.

523, line 19, for *sense*, read *verse*.

523, last line, before *ten*, insert *these*.

ART. VI.—1. *Philosophical Essays and Correspondence of BENJAMIN FRANKLIN*. Philadelphia: 1808.

2. *Eloge Historique D'Alexandre Volta, par M. ARAGO*, Secrétaire Perpetuel de l'Académie des Sciences, lu à la séance publique du 26 Juillet, 1831.

3. *History of the Inductive Sciences, from the earliest to the present Times*. By the Rev. WM. WHEWELL, M. A. 3 vols., 8vo. London. 1837.

4. *Popular Lectures on Science and Art; delivered in the principal Cities and Towns in the United States, by DIONYSIUS LARDNER*. 2 vols. 8vo. New-York: Greeley & M'Elrath. 1846.

THE literary and scientific fame of its children is part of a nation's glory; and if the renown obtained by martial achievements be regarded as a common inheritance, which a people is bound to preserve and transmit, so should the more fruitful renown which genius confers upon the land of its birth be guarded with an eye no less vigilant, and defended with a spirit no less determined. To say that America has gleaned but a few slender sheaves in the harvest-field of scientific discovery is a poor reason for robbing her of those few; and to assert that her genius is practical and utilitarian, prompt to appropriate the labors of others, skillful in imitative arts, ingenious in applying new discoveries by new inventions, is a still poorer reason for denying her the ability to comprehend the scientific principles on which those arts and inventions are founded. We believe that America can point to her philosophical, as well as to her economical, industrial, and political heroes; and the life and deeds of Benjamin Franklin will attest that all these species of heroism have been combined

in a single individual. This celebrated man—self-instructed, self-made, and self-sustained—left the seal of his wisdom and sagacity on every subject to which he applied his powers. So amiable were his private virtues, so eminent his public services, and so brilliant his philosophical discoveries, that he lived the delight of his friends, and died the idol of his countrymen. Next to the father of his country, the memory of no one of the mighty men among whom he moved, and with whom he acted, is cherished by the American people with more enthusiasm than his.

It is not our purpose, in the present paper, to enter into a general discussion of Franklin's political acts or scientific theories. After a brief summary of the progress of electrical discovery anterior to his time, we propose to vindicate his claim to the honor of discovering the identity of electricity and lightning, and shall review the books whose titles stand at the head of this article no further than they touch upon that question. As Dr. Lardner has examined this subject at considerable length, and with much candor, we shall follow the course of his argument whenever it suits our object, and coincides with the opinions which a careful study of the authorities has led us to adopt.

As a science, electricity dates back but little more than a century. The Greeks had indeed noticed the shocks of the torpedo; but they satisfied themselves with the supposition, that the power of giving these shocks was merely that animal's peculiar mode of attack and defense; and they inquired no further. They had also observed the attractive force of amber excited by friction; but they dreamed not that the fancied soul of the amber was a universal soul. A Roman legion, standing under arms during a thunder-storm at night, had observed a luminous appearance upon the points of their spears;* and they hailed the phenomenon as an auspicious omen from the gods. Seamen had observed flame playing upon the tops of their masts; and they offered thanks to Castor and Pollux, the guardian deities of mariners, for their divine protection. A Gothic chieftain had seen sparks and flashes of fire upon his garments; but he either regarded them as scintillations of his own fierce and fiery spirit, or as harbingers of his approaching apotheosis. All these facts were disconnected and misunderstood. They took no root in the human intelligence, and therefore produced no fruit. They were the lights which science hung out upon the portico of her temple, to show the way to the inner sanctuary of her truths; and though men saw her signals, they misconstrued their import, and refused to enter.

* *Cæsar de Bello Africano, cap. vi.*

But after Francis Bacon had taught the right method of interrogating nature in order to extort her secrets, men began to question her more closely and earnestly, to seek the true meaning of the language of her phenomena, and to arrange and classify the results of observation and experiment, so as to discover the hidden laws of her action. In the enthusiastic cultivation of physical studies, which was the immediate fruit of Bacon's method, electricity could not be long neglected. As early as the beginning of the seventeenth century, a step was made in the generalization of electrical facts, by William Gilbert of Colchester. This distinguished physician discovered that the attractive power, which had been long observed in amber, could be excited in a great variety of bodies,—such as sealing-wax, resin, sulphur, jet, opal, amethyst, sapphire, diamond, and many others. He was unable to excite the force in metals, bones, wood, and some other substances; and thus established the distinction between what were afterward called *electrics per se*, and *non-electrics*. Robert Boyle extended the list of electrics, and discovered that the attraction is mutual between excited bodies and non-electrics placed near them. He also observed that the attractive power continues for some time after the friction has ceased. Otto Guericke constructed a rude electrical machine, which was nothing more than a sphere of sulphur, mounted on an axis, turned by a crank, and rubbed with the hand. He discovered that a body, after contact with an excited electric, is repelled; and that after repulsion, if it touches another body, it is again attracted. He was the first who observed the light which accompanies the electric spark, and that bodies, placed within the sphere of influence of an excited body, are themselves excited without contact with it. Newton substituted a globe of glass for the sulphur one of Otto Guericke, and observed that if one of the surfaces of a glass disc be rubbed, the opposite surface will attract. Francis Hawksbee contributed numerous facts to the science, among which were the illumination of rarefied air by electrical light, and the power of electricity to render certain opaque bodies translucent.

But of all the earlier cultivators of electricity, none pursued the subject with more industry and enthusiasm than Stephen Gray. He performed some experiments as early as the year 1720; but his principal discoveries were made between 1729 and 1736. Of these, the most important in the progress of the science was the fact that the bodies usually called non-electrics are *conductors* of electricity; while those which are excitable by friction obstruct its passage along their substance, and are therefore *non-conductors*.

Accounts of his experiments were published, from time to time, in the Transactions of the Royal Society, of which he was a fellow. In reading these papers, an electrician cannot fail to remark how frequently he placed himself on the very threshold of nature's choicest arcana, and then stumbled away without perceiving the treasures by which he was surrounded. Had he possessed the acuteness and sagacity of Franklin, he might have anticipated the discoveries of the latter; and, like him, have disarmed the clouds. But with all Gray's zeal and ardor, he was deficient in the highest trait of philosophical genius—the power of generalization. He multiplied experiments and accumulated facts, but failed to deduce the formulæ which are expressions of their laws, and to follow them out in their consequences. He propounded his questions to nature in sufficient number, and with adequate skill; but knew not how to translate the language of her answers. Cotemporary with Gray was the distinguished French philosopher, Dufay, member of the Academy of Sciences, and superintendent of the Royal Botanic Garden at Paris. He applied the non-conductors, discovered by Gray, to insulate all sorts of bodies, (himself among the rest,) and found that every substance, when suspended or supported in dry air by such non-conductors, was capable of being electrified by contact with an excited electric. He also informs us that he “discovered a very simple principle, which accounts for a great part of the irregularities, and, if he may use the term, of the caprices, which seem to accompany most of the experiments on electricity. This principle is, that electric bodies attract all those that are not so, and repel them as soon as they are become electric, by the vicinity or contact of the electric body. Thus leaf-gold is first attracted by the tube, and acquires an electricity by approaching it; and of consequence is immediately repelled by it. Nor is it re-attracted while it retains its electric quality. But if it chance to light on some other body, it presently loses its electricity; and consequently is re-attracted by the tube, which, after having given it a new electricity, repels it a second time. On applying this principle to the various experiments of electricity, one is surprised at the number of obscure and puzzling facts it clears up.”* This is a generalization of the discovery of Otto Guericke.

“Chance threw in M. Dufay's way another principle, more universal and remarkable than the preceding, and which casts a new light upon the subject of electricity. This principle is, that there are two distinct electricities very different from each other; one of which

* Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society, vol. vii, p. 640; see also Lardner's Lectures, p. 108.

he calls vitreous, and the other resinous electricity. . . . The characteristic of these two electricities is, that a body of the vitreous electricity repels all such as are of the same electricity, and attracts all those of the resinous; while a body of the resinous electricity will repel those which are resinous, and attract all such as are vitreous. From this principle we may deduce the explanation of a great number of phenomena; and it is probable that this truth will lead to the further discovery of many other things."*

Such was the first conception of a theory which has since been greatly modified, but which still bears the name of its author. Dufay did not perceive that one of these kinds of electricity could not be excited without at the same time exciting the other. It was not till twenty-five years afterward, that Robert Symmer distinctly conceived that bodies, in their natural state, remain unelectrified from an equal balance of those two powers within them;† and that the excitement of two bodies, by the friction of one upon the other, does not consist in adding anything to their natural electricities, but in the destruction of the equal balance of these electricities by the accumulation of one of them on one body, and the other on the other. It is only by the modification of Symmer that the theory of two electricities becomes capable of explaining the facts of the science; and this will sufficiently account for the neglect of Dufay's theory by electricians, till it was molded into its present form by the labors of the English philosopher.

Several improvements were next made in electrical machines. The prime conductor was added by Prof. Boze of Wittemberg; a cushion was substituted for the hand, as a rubber, by Prof. Winkler of Leipsic; and a glass cylinder was first used instead of a sphere by Prof. Gordon of Erfurt. But in the year 1745 a new impulse was given to the science by the invention of the Leyden jar. Dr. Lardner attributes this invention to Prof. Muschenbroeck and his associates in 1746; and Franklin, in one of his letters, calls the jar "Muschenbroeck's wonderful bottle." There is, however, in the Transactions of the Royal Society of London for 1746, a letter from Mr. Trembley, F. R. S., dated at the Hague, Feb. 4th, 1745, in which an account is given of the experiments of M. l'Allamand, one of which is as follows: M. l'Allamand electrified a tin tube by means of a glass globe; he then took in his left hand a glass full of water, in which was dipped the end of a wire; the

* Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society, vol. vii, p. 640; see also Lardner's Lectures, p. 108.

† Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society, vol. xi, p. 414.

other end of this wire touched the tube. He then touched the tube with his right hand, and drew a spark from it. At the same instant he felt a most violent shock all over his body, so that he lost the use of his breath for some moments. The same experiment was repeated by Muschenbroeck with similar effect.*

L'Allamand's glass of water was the Leyden jar in embryo; the water being the inner coating, and the hand which held the glass the outer. Dr. Bevis soon after placed a metallic coating upon the outside of the jar to increase the conducting surface, and found that the shock was thus rendered more powerful. Sir William Watson dispensed with the water, and placed a metallic coating on the inner surface. The jar was then complete.

In 1747, Franklin, having received some apparatus from England, applied himself to the study of electricity at Philadelphia. In the space of a few months he repeated most of the experiments of his predecessors, and contrived many of an ingenious and novel character. He sent an account of these experiments to his friend and correspondent, Peter Collinson, F. R. S., of London, in a series of letters, which are equally remarkable for perspicuity and vivacity, and for philosophical acuteness. These letters were at first treated rather cavalierly by the Royal Society, but were soon afterward published in London, translated into most of the continental languages, and read with avidity and admiration by all the electricians of Europe. The ardor with which Franklin engaged in his new career may be inferred from a passage in his first letter to Collinson:—

“For my own part, I never was before engaged in any study that so totally engrossed my attention and my time; for what with making experiments when I can be alone, and repeating them to my friends and acquaintance, who, from the novelty of the thing, come continually in crowds to see them, I have, during some months past, had little leisure for anything else.”—*Essays and Correspondence*, p. 2.

This letter is dated March 28, 1747. In July following, Franklin describes “the wonderful effect of pointed bodies, both in drawing off and throwing off the electrical fire.” Here we find the germ of the splendid discovery which he soon after made, and the guide which pointed to the application of it for the benefit of mankind. He also states his opinion that electricity is not created by friction, as some had supposed, but that it is “an element diffused among, and attracted by, other matter, particularly by water and metals;” and that it is collected by friction, so that more than the natural quantity is accumulated upon electrics, and

* Abridged Transactions, vol. ix, p. 200.

upon insulated conductors in contact with excited electrics. The experiment on which he founded his reasonings may be briefly stated as follows :—A. and B. are insulated by standing upon wax. A. rubs a tube of glass, and B. draws the electricity from it without touching A. C., standing upon the floor, applies his knuckle to B., and a spark passes. He next applies his knuckle to A., and a spark passes. Now, says Franklin, the tube has collected electricity from A., and communicated it to B.; B., then, has more than his natural quantity, and A. less. When C., who is in communication with the floor, touches B., B.'s excess passes through C. to the earth, which is a common reservoir of electricity. But when C. touches A., electricity passes through C. to B., and by thus supplying his deficiency, restores the electrical equilibrium. B. was electrified *positively*, or *plus*, and A. *negatively*, or *minus*.

Such was the origin of the Franklinian theory—a theory remarkable for its simplicity and beauty, and which appeared to offer an easy explanation of most of the phenomena of this subtil and mysterious force. It had, however, a weak point, which did not escape the sagacity of its author; for in a subsequent letter he admitted that the repulsion of two negatively electrified bodies sadly puzzled him. We shall enter into no discussion of the comparative merits of the theories of one, and of two fluids, because there is now hardly any probability that either of them can stand in the light of future science. The opinion, that electricity consists of lines of force, in which action and reaction are equal and opposite, seems to be gaining strength among electricians, and may, at no distant day, receive full confirmation.

In his letter of September 1st, of the same year, Franklin applies his theory to explain the action of the Leyden jar. He proves that the outer surface is negative, and the inner surface positive, when the wire communicates with the prime conductor of the machine; and that the glass confines the fluid accumulated in the interior. He shows that the bottle cannot be charged if the outer coating is insulated, and concludes that as much as enters the interior, so much is driven away from the exterior surface, and that the jar actually contains no more electricity after it is charged than before. The equilibrium between the inner and outer surface is destroyed, but may be restored by making a communication between the two surfaces by means of a conductor. The elastic fluid will then rush violently from the surface on which the fluid is plus, to that on which it is minus, just as air, expelled from one vessel, and condensed in another, will rush from the plenum

to the vacuum as soon as an aperture is made from one to the other.

A paper, which Franklin informs us was written first in 1747, enlarged, and sent to England in 1749, contains a conjecture that the sea is the grand source of electricity, and that the electric fire is carried up into the air with the ocean vapors, the condensation of which forms electrified clouds. These clouds discharge their electricity into the mountains against which they are driven, and into the land clouds with which they come in contact, thus producing the phenomena of thunder and lightning. In the same paper he mentions several analogies in support of his opinion that electricity is the same thing as lightning. Among these, are the crooked form of the spark; the striking of prominent and pointed bodies; the ignition of combustibles; the fusion of metals; and the rending of imperfect conductors. Here is an example of a false hypothesis leading to the discovery of a great physical truth. Franklin afterward retracted his opinion that the sea is the great laboratory in which electricity is generated; but the truth, which that erroneous conjecture suggested, he soon demonstrated.

There is, indeed, no department of physical science in which the benefits arising from adventurous speculation have not been seen and felt. On this subject Dr. Roget has made some remarks, which are not more eloquent than true. "The human mind is so constituted as to refuse being restrained within the boundaries of a rigid inductive philosophy. Incited by an irresistible desire of exploring the secrets of nature, it scruples not as to the means of forcing her to disclose them; and, borne on the wings of imagination and conjecture, presses forward with an eagerness which often betrays it into courses widely deviating from the truth. Yet good is often found to result from these erratic excursions of our faculties: they infuse fresh interest into the pursuit of knowledge; they inspire with the hope of success; they invigorate those powers which must be exerted to attain it. The spark which kindles a train of light is sometimes struck out in the conflict of discordant speculation; and amid a multitude of attempts, some effort, more happy than the rest, elicits an important discovery. No great or comprehensive fact in science was ever established without being preceded by a bold, though sagacious conjecture. Hypothesis of some kind or other is invariably the precursor of truth."*

In July, 1750, Franklin's ideas had assumed a more definite shape. He found that electricity is distributed uniformly over the surface of a sphere; but that, in an angular body, it may be drawn

* *Treatise on Magnetism*, p. 32.

off with greater facility from the angles, and most easily from the angle which is most acute. When a body terminates in a sharp point, it is incapable of retaining electricity, and throws it off, through the point, into the surrounding air. He also repeated and varied the experiment, which he had first made in 1747, on the power of a pointed conductor to draw off the fire from an electrified body more rapidly than a blunt one. He suspended a scale-beam by a pack-thread from the ceiling of a room, and to the ends of the beam he attached a pair of large brass scales by silk cords. One of the scales was electrified, and an iron punch was set on the end upon the floor. The scales moved round in a circle by the untwisting of the pack-thread; and when the charged scale came over the punch, it dipped toward it, and discharged its electricity in the form of a spark. But when a needle was fastened to the end of the punch, the electricity was discharged silently, without the scale dipping toward the point.

Now, says Franklin, if the fire of electricity, and that of lightning, be the same, as I have endeavored to show at large in a former paper, these scales may represent electrified clouds. The horizontal motion of the scales over the floor may represent the motion of the clouds over the earth; and the erect iron punch, a hill or high building; and then we see how electrified clouds, passing over hills or high buildings at too great a height to strike, may be attracted lower, till within their striking distance. And if a needle, fixed on the punch with its point upright, will draw the fire from the scale silently, at a much greater than the striking distance, may not the knowledge of this power of points be of some use to mankind in preserving houses, churches, and ships from lightning? Would not pointed rods of metal, extending from the highest parts of those edifices to the earth or water, probably draw the electrical fire silently out of a cloud before it came near enough to strike, and thereby secure us from that most sudden and terrible mischief?*

So fully is this sagacious man possessed of the idea that lightning is electricity, that he immediately proceeds to describe the experiment by which their identity may be demonstrated. His directions are as follows:—

“On the top of some high tower, or steeple, place a kind of sentry-box, big enough to contain a man and an electrical stand. From the middle of the stand let an iron rod rise and pass, bending out of the door, and then upright, twenty or thirty feet, pointed very sharp at the end. If the electrical stand be kept clean and dry, a man standing on

* *Essays and Correspondence*, p. 48; see also *Lardner's Lectures*, p. 131.

it, when such clouds are passing low, might be electrified, and afford sparks, the rod drawing fire to him from a cloud."—*Essays and Correspondence*, p. 49.

Franklin also brings forward in this paper some new analogies between the effects of electricity and lightning. Lightning had been known to strike people blind; he made a chicken blind by an electric shock. Lightning melts metals; he melted gold leaf by the electrical discharge. In a subsequent paper, written in 1751, he notices the power of electricity to reverse the poles of a magnetic needle, and to give polarity to needles that had none. Lightning had been long before known to do the same.

The reason that Franklin did not immediately put his hypothesis to the test of experiment, was his belief that the pointed rod should be erected upon a very high edifice. While he was waiting for the completion of such a building in Philadelphia, he lost the opportunity of being the first to draw electricity from the clouds. M. D'Alibard, desirous to satisfy himself of the truth of Franklin's views, erected a pointed iron rod, forty feet high, in a garden at Marli-la-Ville, in strict accordance with Franklin's directions. He left the apparatus in charge of a carpenter, named Coiffier, with instructions to try whether he could draw sparks from the rod whenever a thunder-cloud should pass over the place. On the 10th of May, 1752, a thunder-storm occurred, and the carpenter succeeded in obtaining numerous sparks from the rod. He immediately hastened to Paris to inform his employer of the result, and three days after, D'Alibard read a memoir to the Royal Academy of Sciences, in which he gave a full description of the apparatus and the experiment. In this memoir he ascribes the honor of the discovery entirely to Franklin; and probably never dreamed that the next generation of his countrymen would claim it for himself. On the 18th of May, M. De Lor repeated the same experiment at his own house in Paris, by means of a rod, ninety-nine feet high, standing on a cake of resin.*

About a month afterward, ignorant of what had been done in France, Franklin made his well-known experiment with the kite, and thus demonstrated the truth which he had proclaimed three years before—the identity of electricity and lightning.

We shall pursue no further the history of Franklin's experiments, but proceed to the question which we proposed at the outset, and which we are now prepared to discuss—whether or not

* Franklin's *Essays and Correspondence*, pp. 82, 87; *Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society*, vol. x, p. 290; *Lardner's Lectures*, p. 123.

the credit of the splendid discovery, usually attributed to Franklin, actually belongs to him. Dr. Lardner sums up his argument in the following manner :--

"In 1708, Dr. Wall mentions a *resemblance* of electricity to thunder and lightning.

"In 1735, Mr. Gray *conjectures* their *identity*, and that they differ only in *degree*.

"In 1748, the abbé Nollet reproduced the conjecture of Gray, attended with more circumstantial reasons.

"In 1749, Franklin strongly maintains their *identity*, and accurately describes two ways of experimentally testing it; and sends his instructions to Europe, to enable others, with better local opportunities than he possessed, to try it.

"In 1752, M. M. D'Alibard and De Lor, in France, make the preparations prescribed according to one of Franklin's methods; and Franklin makes in Philadelphia preparations according to the other method.

"On the 10th of May, 1752, Coiffier and the curate make the experiment as directed by Franklin, and obtain the results foretold by Franklin.

"In June, 1752, Franklin makes the same experiment in Philadelphia, according to the other method, with like results.

"If the credit of the discovery is due to him who first *conjectured* the identity of lightning and electricity, then it is due to Mr. Stephen Gray.

"If it be due to him who showed the method of making the capital experiment by which the identity must be either established or refuted, it belongs to Franklin.

"If it be due to the persons at whose expense Franklin's apparatus was first constructed, then it must be shared between Franklin, D'Alibard, and De Lor.

"If it be due to him who first, in person, *performed* the experiment proposed by Franklin, then it must be accorded to the carpenter and dragoon, Coiffier."

The conclusion which Dr. Lardner draws, ascribing the credit of the discovery to him who first clearly and distinctly pointed out the means of making it, is just and impartial; but we think that his summary of the case is in some respects erroneous. Dr. Wall, describing the snap and light produced by rubbing amber, says, "The crackling is full as loud as that of charcoal on fire; and it seems, in some degree, to represent thunder and lightning."* Stephen Gray, speaking of the effect produced by placing the finger near the surface of electrified water in an insulated metallic dish, says, "By these experiments we see, that an actual flame of fire, with an explosion, and an ebullition of cold water, may be

* Transactions of the Royal Society, No. 314, p. 69.

produced by communicative electricity; and though these effects are at present in minimis, it is probable that in time there may be found out a way to collect a greater quantity of it; and consequently to increase the force of this electric fire, which, by several of these experiments, *si licet magnis componere parva*, seems to be of the same nature with that of thunder and lightning.”*

It has generally been supposed that these passages were intended as mere comparisons; and it is certain that they were so understood at the time of their publication. Wall and Gray perceived a single point of resemblance between the *effects* of electricity and lightning; but they probably did not conjecture that the *causes* which produced these effects were themselves *identical*.† Franklin, on the contrary, not only perceived many points of resemblance between the two classes of phenomena, but also reasoned from *similarity* of effects to *identity* of cause. At all events, it is obvious that neither Wall, in 1708, nor Gray, in 1735, had any firm grasp of the idea, of which their language was so faint a foreshadowing, that it did not even attract sufficient attention to excite the public ridicule. If such indefinite expressions as theirs are to be taken for proofs of the discovery of truth, the philosophers of modern times have established hardly a principle in physics in which they were not forestalled by the ancient Greeks.

The claim of the abbé Nollet to the honor of having first clearly conceived the identity of electricity and lightning is more plausible, and we shall consider it on a subsequent page. Dr. Lardner has, we believe, fallen into an error, when he alledges that, in 1749, Franklin accurately describes *two ways* of making the proposed experiment. We have not been able to find any proof that he thought of using a kite for this purpose till 1752; nor that he revealed the thought to any one, except his son, till after the experiment had been successfully performed. He had been too heartily laughed at, by the members of the Royal Society and others, for making what seemed to them so wild a conjecture, to expose himself to public ridicule by recommending what would be considered, in case of failure, so whimsical a scheme to test it.

We next hasten to notice the extraordinary allegations and reasonings of M. Arago, which Dr. Lardner has examined and refuted with much ability. The perpetual secretary of the French Academy of Sciences claims all the credit of the first conjecture, that electricity and lightning are the same, for his countryman, the

* Transactions of the Royal Society, No. 436, p. 16.

† Arago. 'Eloge de Volta, p. 11.

abbé Nollet; and all the honor of the verification of that conjecture for his countryman, D'Alibard. After remarking upon the uncertainty which attaches to the language of Wall and Gray, and which we have alluded to above, he proceeds as follows:—

“This doubt, however, could not apply to the remarks inserted by Nollet, in 1746, in his *Leçons de Physique*. In that work the author represents a thunder-cloud, over terrestrial objects, as nothing else than an electrified body placed near bodies which are not electrified. Thunder, in the hands of nature, is electricity in the hands of philosophers. Many resemblances in their action are pointed out; nothing, in a word, is wanting to this ingenious theory except the only thing which a theory cannot dispense with, in order to take a place definitively in science,—the sanction of direct experiments.

“The first views of Franklin upon the analogy of electricity and lightning were, like the earlier ideas of Nollet, mere conjectures. Then, all the difference between the two philosophers is reduced to a method of experiments, (*un projet d'expérience*,) of which Nollet had not spoken, and which seemed to promise conclusive arguments for or against the hypothesis. This experiment consisted in observing, during a thunder-storm, whether a metallic rod, insulated and terminated by a point, would give sparks similar to those which are drawn from the conductor of a common electrical machine.

“Without aiming a blow (*sans porter atteinte*) at the glory of Franklin, I may remark, that the proposed experiment was almost useless. The soldiers of the fifth Roman legion had already performed it during the African war, when, as Cesar relates, the points of all the javelins seemed on fire in consequence of a storm. Castor and Pollux had also been seen by many navigators, either upon the metallic extremities of the masts, or of the yards, or upon other prominent parts of their ships. In fine, in certain districts of country, in Frioul, for example, at the chateau of Duino, the sentinel executed precisely what Franklin desired, when, according to orders, and for the purpose of deciding when he ought to ring a bell in order to apprise the country people of the approach of a tempest, he went to examine with his halberd whether the iron of a pike, placed vertically upon the rampart, would give sparks. Nevertheless, whether these circumstances were unknown, or were not looked upon as conclusive, some direct trials seemed necessary; and for these, science is indebted to our countryman, D'Alibard. On the 10th of May, 1752, during a thunder-storm, the large rod of pointed metal, which he had erected in a garden at Marli-la-Ville, gave small sparks, as does the conductor of an electrical machine when an iron wire is brought near it. Franklin did not realize this same experiment in the United States, by means of a kite, till a month later. Lightning rods were the immediate consequence of the discovery. The illustrious American philosopher hastened to proclaim it.”—*Eloge de Volta*, pp. 11–13.

Does M. Arago imagine that the courteous epithet, which, in the last sentence, he applies to the American philosopher, will make

amends for robbing him of whatever could impart to that epithet any appropriate significance? Does he expect thus to disarm the indignation of those friends of science who cherish the memory of Franklin, and to heal a mortal stab with a honeyed phrase? M. Arago, a lover and distinguished cultivator of science, is not deficient in knowledge of the history of its progress. We will, therefore, put the most favorable construction upon these remarkable paragraphs, and presume that his partiality for France made him partial to French philosophers, and led him to do unintentional injustice to the foreign competitor of one of his own countrymen.

M. Arago asserts that Nollet's conjecture was made in 1746. To this we answer, that the passage on which the claim is founded is contained in the fourth volume of his *Leçons de Physique*, which was not published till 1748. On this point we have the testimony of the abbé himself. On June 6th, 1752, after the experiments of D'Alibard and De Lor, he claims the honor of the new discovery by referring to the opinions "which he had conceived, and which he ventured to publish more than four years before."* It would be puerile to reply that, as six is more than four, Arago's date may be correct. Had it been so, the abbé would certainly have asserted that his views were published six, or nearly six, or more than five years before. The paper which contains Franklin's first conjecture was written, as we have seen above, in 1747, enlarged and published in 1749. It is a rule among scientific men, in questions of priority, to take, for the date of a discovery or theory, the date of its publication; and as we have no direct proof that Franklin distinctly conceived the idea in question till 1749, we admit Nollet's claim to priority in making the conjecture, so far as the passage on which he founds it is worthy to be called a conjecture. That the reader may form his own estimate of this celebrated passage, we take the liberty, not having the original work at hand, to transcribe Dr. Lardner's translation of it, (*Lectures*, p. 118,) which strikes us as being more accurate than a translation given in the *Transactions of the Royal Society* for 1752.

"If any one should undertake to prove, as a clear consequence of the phenomenon, that thunder is, in the hands of nature, what electricity is in ours,—that those wonders which we dispose at our pleasure are only imitations on a small scale of those grand effects which terrify us, and that both depend upon the same mechanical agents;—if it were made manifest that a cloud prepared by the effects of the wind, by heat, by a mixture of exhalations, &c., is, in relation to a terrestrial object, what an electrified body is in relation to a body near it not

* *Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society*, vol. x, p. 295.

electrified, I confess that this idea, well supported, would please me much ; and to support it, how numerous and specious are the reasons which present themselves to a mind conversant with electricity ! The universality of the electric matter, the readiness of its action, its instrumentality, and its activity in giving fire to other bodies ; its property of striking bodies externally and internally, even to their smallest parts, (the remarkable example we have of this effect even in the Leyden jar experiment, the idea which we might truly adopt in supposing a greater degree of electric power ;) all these points of analogy which I have been for some time meditating, begin to make me believe that one might, by taking electricity for the model, form to oneself, in regard to thunder and lightning, more perfect and more probable ideas than any hitherto proposed."—*Leçons de Physique*, tom. iv, p. 315.

If Franklin's experiment had been unsuccessful, would this passage ever have been cited to prove that the abbé Nollet had entertained so chimerical an idea as the identity of electricity and lightning ? He does not, as Arago alledges, tell us that "lightning in the hands of nature is electricity in ours ;" but that if any one would undertake to prove this, he himself would—what ? find his own opinions confirmed ? hail the demonstration of a truth of which he is already confident ? Nothing of this : but the abbé would be much pleased ! Do the analogies which he mentions enable him to take hold of the truth with a firm and steady grasp, and induce him to express it in the direct terms of honest conviction ? Or do they rather give him an obscure glimmering of something which assumes no definite shape or hue, the existence of which he is equally prepared to believe or disbelieve, and which he describes, or rather shrouds and mystifies, in the language of oblique hints and hesitating suggestions ? They have only taken sufficient root in his understanding to make him *begin* to believe that one *might*, by taking electricity for the model, form to oneself, in regard to thunder and lightning,—not a demonstration of their identity with electricity—but, more perfect and more probable ideas than any hitherto proposed.

How different from these Jesuitical inuendos is the bold, simple, straightforward language of Franklin one year afterward !

"Electric fluid agrees with lightning in these particulars : 1. Giving light. 2. Color of the light. 3. Crooked direction. 4. Swift motion. 5. Being conducted by metals. 6. Crack or noise in exploding. 7. Subsisting in water or ice. 8. Rending bodies it passes through. 9. Destroying animals. 10. Melting metals. 11. Firing inflammable substances. 12. Sulphureous smell.—The electric fluid is attracted by points. We do not know whether this property is in lightning. But since they agree in all the particulars wherein we can already compare them, is it not probable they agree likewise in this ? Let the experiment be made."—*Essays and Correspondence*, p. 138.

There is no proof or probability that when Franklin sent his paper of 1749 to Peter Collinson, he had seen Nollet's book, or heard of his conjecture. While, therefore, we concede to Nollet the credit of having first published a suggestion that electricity and lightning might be the same, we claim for Franklin the honor of having, by independent experiments and reasonings, and by an array of analogies that, in moral questions, would have been regarded as conclusive, first proclaimed this truth to the world in a clear and distinct form.

But even if the conjecture of Nollet had been not only anterior to that of Franklin, but also equally authoritative, there was still a wide difference between the two philosophers in another respect. Franklin's hypothesis suggested to him the means of its own demonstration; Nollet's conjecture remained an undeveloped germ, and brought forth no fruit. Franklin, as we have seen, had described with great precision the way of conducting the experiment which D'Alibard subsequently, and in strict accordance with his directions, executed with success; and if, as Arago pretends, this was the only difference between Franklin and Nollet, still the difference is so great as to confer on Franklin all the honor of the discovery, except a priority in conjecturing that the discovery might be possible. To assert that a thing may be done, and to show how to do it, are two very different matters. Was the astronomer who first conceived the possibility of ascertaining the distance of the sun entitled to the same distinction as he who showed that observations on a transit of Venus would furnish data for the solution of the problem? To conjecture, from the irregularities of the motions of Uranus, that another and more distant planet revolves around the sun, was highly creditable to its author, and implied correct notions of physical astronomy; but did that conjecture render the calculations of Le Verrier unnecessary, or detract the tithe of a hair from the merit of his wonderful discovery?

But, says Arago, the experiment was almost useless, for it had been already several times performed; as, for example, by Cesar's fifth legion. This, to say the least, is a most singular and extraordinary allegation for a man of science to make. We are bold to say that it is based on a principle which never has been, and never will be, admitted by the pioneers of science, and which M. Arago would himself repudiate. Was the man who first noticed the double images formed by Iceland spar the discoverer of the polarization of light? Perhaps Eve saw an apple fall from the tree of knowledge; did Eve, therefore, anticipate the discoveries of Newton, and render his labors useless? In a word, can the

accidental notice of a fact, without any attempt to comprehend it in its scientific relations, ever constitute a discovery in philosophy?

But, finally, if the experiment were necessary, the credit of having first made it belongs to D'Alibard, and not to Franklin. This assertion is a conclusion from the principle, assumed for the occasion, that the honor of a work belongs not to the head that devised it, but to the hand that executed it. Let us apply this principle in some other cases, and show its absurdity. A geologist, reasoning from observation and analogy, assures a miner that by digging through certain strata of rocks he will find coal; the miner follows the instructions of the geologist, and the coal is found. The miner is the discoverer of the coal-bed! A chemist, from his knowledge of the effect of small metallic tubes in preventing the communication of flame, instructs an artisan to cover a lamp with wire-gauze, and see if it may not be placed in explosive gases without setting them on fire. The artisan is the inventor of the safety-lamp! A mathematician concludes, from a laborious and complicated analysis, that a planet, hitherto undiscovered, must be in a particular place in the heavens, and he requests a star-gazer to turn his telescope in that direction, and forthwith a star is seen which is not found in any of the catalogues. The star-gazer is the discoverer of the new planet of 1846! But it is useless to dwell longer upon this point. If Arago denies the honor of the discovery to Franklin, he must, for the same reason, if he would be consistent, deny it to D'Alibard, for neither Franklin nor D'Alibard was the first actually to perform the experiment. He must accord it to the poor discharged dragoon, Coiffier, who probably never had a philosophical idea in his life, but who obeyed the instructions of Franklin, received at second-hand from D'Alibard, and drew down, with his own hand, the first spark from the fiery magazine of the clouds!

That we may not seem to do injustice to D'Alibard, it is proper to state, that, in his *Memoir to the Academy*, he attributes the honor of the discovery entirely to Franklin. He commences the paper thus:—"Following the direction which Franklin has marked out for us, I have been completely successful." He concludes the paper by saying,—“The idea which Franklin has entertained, ceases to be a conjecture. Behold it a reality; and I dare believe that the more attentively any one will examine what he has published upon electricity, the more one will perceive how much physical science is indebted to him for that part.”*

* *Memoire de M. D'Alibard; Lu à l'Academie Royale des Sciences, le xiii, Mai, 1752.*

We might here submit the case to the judgment of impartial men; but we are unwilling to pass by the characteristic remarks of Professor Whewell on the same question without a brief notice:—

“Franklin, about 1750, had offered a few somewhat vague conjectures respecting the existence of electricity in the clouds; but it was not till Wilke and Æpinus had obtained clear notions of the effect of electric matter at a distance, that the real condition of the clouds could be well understood. In 1752, however, D’Alibard, and other French philosophers, were desirous of verifying Franklin’s conjecture of the analogy of thunder and electricity. This they did by erecting a pointed iron rod at Marli; the rod was found capable of giving out electrical sparks when a thunder-cloud passed over the place. This was repeated in various parts of Europe, and Franklin suggested, that a communication with the clouds might be formed by means of a kite.”
—*History of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. iii, p. 18.

Is this all that a cultivator of science, and a man of learning, who undertakes to write a history of the progress of the inductive sciences, can tell us of one of the most brilliant discoveries of modern times, and of the philosopher who made it? If his purpose had been, under the semblance of historical impartiality, to “damn with faint praise,” while he kept Franklin’s real merits out of sight, he could hardly have framed a paragraph better suited to his aim. The passage is erroneous in several particulars, and conveys erroneous impressions in others. What with its sins of omission and of commission, it is about as sinful as anything, claiming to be history, that we have ever seen. The conjectures were published, as we have shown, in 1749. They were not vague as to the existence of electricity in the clouds, but as to its *origin*, and the *mode* of its existence. Franklin’s letter of 1750 is remarkable for definiteness and precision. It is not a “conjecture of the *analogy* of thunder and electricity,” but an *argument* to prove their *identity*, sustained by a multitude of analogies, not hypothetical, but well established. Professor Whewell informs us that D’Alibard verified Franklin’s conjecture; why does he not tell us that Franklin devised the apparatus by which D’Alibard did this, and described the manner of using it? Professor Whewell knows that Franklin *suggested* the kite, does he not know that Franklin did somewhat more?

In the following extract the historian instructs his own, and future ages, what estimate to place upon the American philosopher:—

“Franklin’s real merit as a discoverer was, that he was one of the first who distinctly conceived the electrical charge as a *derangement*

of equilibrium. The great fame which, in his day, he enjoyed, arose from the clearness and spirit with which he narrated his discoveries; from his dealing with electricity in the imposing form of thunder and lightning; and partly, perhaps, from his character as an American and a politician; for he was already, in 1736, engaged in public affairs as clerk to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, though it was not till a later period of his life that his admirers had the occasion of saving of him,—

‘Eripuit cœlis fulmen, sceptrumque tyrannis.’”

History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. iii, p. 33.

Had Franklin lived somewhat nearer to Cambridge, and had he not “wrested the sceptre from tyrants,” as well as “the lightning from the heavens,” perhaps he might have made a different figure in Professor Whewell’s octavos. Without mentioning the discovery on which Franklin’s reputation as a philosopher chiefly rests, Mr. Whewell makes his merit to consist in being *one* of the first to propose a mechanical theory of electricity, which, in a subsequent part of his *History*, he attempts to overthrow.* In plain terms, he concedes to Franklin a share with some others in the honor of conceiving a false theory of electricity! Now whether Franklin’s theory be true or false, it is his own. In 1748, Sir William Watson did indeed claim that he had suggested the idea of a plus and minus state of electricity in a paper which he read to the Royal Society about the time that Franklin’s paper of July, 1747, was written.† In that paper he conjectures that there is a simultaneous afflux and efflux to and from an electrified conductor, and that the afflux causes attraction, and the efflux repulsion. He also suggests that a quantity of electricity, equal to that accumulated in excited bodies, is furnished by the nearest unexcited non-electrics; so that electricity, or what he calls the elastic electrical ether, may be more dense in one body, and less dense in another. But that he did not comprehend the disturbance of the electrical equilibrium, in the Franklinian sense, is plain from the application which he makes of his hypothesis to explain the action of the Leyden jar. He says that when a man holds in one hand a Leyden jar, whose wire communicates with the prime conductor of an electrical machine, and touches the conductor with the other hand, a part of the electricity of his body goes through one arm to the conductor, and through the other arm to the jar. He also supposes that the electricity which the man’s body thus parts with, is instantly replaced from the floor; and he ought, therefore, to

* *History of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. iii, pp. 40, 41.

† *Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society*, vol. ix, p. 454.

*receive no shock if he stands upon any insulating substance.** Franklin's theory never could have led to a statement so preposterous as this.

Professor Whewell is sorely puzzled to account for the great fame which, *in his day*, Franklin enjoyed, and taxes his ingenuity to ascribe it to anything rather than to his philosophical discoveries. It is certainly a novel idea that a man's political success is likely to add much to his scientific reputation; and the time seems to have gone by, when being an American citizen could give prestige to a philosopher's name in England. Professor Whewell is determined that Franklin's fame shall extend as little as possible beyond "his day," and therefore attributes it, not to his having matters of importance to *narrate*, but to his *manner of narration*! The History of the Inductive Sciences was designed to go down to posterity as a standard book of reference on all questions relating to the progress of physical discovery; but we quest on strongly whether posterity, with no other source of information than this book, would ever learn that Franklin had contributed anything to the advancement of science, more than to make a lucky guess, and to play a skillful game at the politician's trick of telling more than he knew.

ART. VII.—*Biblical Exegesis*.—*St. Paul's Doctrine of the Law*.

VARIOUS definitions have been given of *law*. According to Blackstone, "law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we say, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey." The law with which we have to do at present is the *moral law*, or that rule of action which God has given to his intelligent creatures, and which is founded in the relations which they sustain to him. When man came from the hands of his Creator, he was necessarily indebted to him for all his powers, and responsible to him for their exercise and improvement. God could not require of him less than he had invested him with ability to perform, and his justice and goodness would preclude his requiring more.

* Transactions of the Royal Society, No. 484, p. 704.

This law must necessarily be permanent and unchangeable in its nature. For no circumstance could possibly occur to remove the foundation upon which it is based. Man's relation to God as a dependent creature, and as his offspring, must of necessity remain the same to all eternity, unless we suppose the possibility of his annihilation. And, by consequence, the law of God founded upon and growing out of this relation, must remain in full force while man continues in being. No change in the character or circumstances of man, effected by the exercise of his own free agency, could possibly alter his relations to God as his creature; and, consequently, no such change could release him from the obligations of that perfect obedience which the law requires. And hence the original law of God, which he first gave to man, and which he had previously given to angels, still remains, and will continue eternally in all its integrity.

But by this we do not mean to deny that the divine law has been imbodyed in various formularies, and combined in different systems. It took one form of outward expression in the garden of paradise, another on Mount Sinai, and still another upon the mount of Olives. These varying forms of expression involve the same great principles of love and obedience to God. The diversity of outward development was designed to suit the different periods in the history of the race and in the great plan of divine government.

There is one essential element of law which is uniform and invariable, and that is, that it furnishes no remedy for past offenses against its requirements, or for the ruined or vitiated character of the offender. It shows no mercy—it knows not to forgive or restore. The terrible penalties of the divine law lie in full force against all offenders, pronouncing upon them the sentence of death for the least departure. It is inexorable and impartial, hurling its thunderbolts against every violator, high and low, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, strong and feeble—all, all transgressors are under its withering *curse*.

St. Paul has treated the subject of the divine law specifically, and of set purpose, in his Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians. It shall be our object in this paper to endeavor to ascertain the views which he has presented upon this important topic in these two epistles.

The purpose which the apostle has in view in discussing this subject, is to exhibit the true ground of salvation, and to explode and refute the vain notion of justification and sanctification upon the principles of legal obedience. He first meets and refutes the

position of the Gentiles—showing that their philosophy had wholly failed to conform them to the requirements of the law. (See Rom. i.) He then proceeds to prove that the Jews are equally far from standing fair with the law; but while they “judge,” the Gentiles “do the same thing,” and are equally cut short from all hope upon the principles of law. (See chapters ii and iii.) He next proceeds to contrast the impracticable mode of *salvation by the law* with the easy and efficient plan of the gospel—that of *salvation by faith*. We now invite the attention of the reader to the following passage:—

“19. Now we know, that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law; that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. 20. Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin. 21. But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; 22. Even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe; for there is no difference: 23. For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; 24. Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: 25. Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; 26. To declare, I say, at this time his righteousness; that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus. 27. Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? of works? Nay; but by the law of faith. 28. Therefore we conclude, that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law. 29. Is he the God of the Jews only? is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also: 30. Seeing it is one God which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith. 31. Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law.” Rom. iii.

We understand the term *νομος law*, as it stands in this passage opposed to *πίστις faith*, to refer to the *great moral rule of duty which binds universal man to the love and service of God to the utmost of his capacity*. Indeed, this is the sense in which this term is most generally employed by the great apostle. When used in a specific sense, it is qualified by some epithet, or by the connections in which it is found. That the apostle, in the above passage, is not discussing the *ceremonial law*, is obvious from the general offices which he assigns to it. He speaks of a law that addresses itself to “all the world,” and by its sentence of just condemnation stops “every mouth”—a law which “all” have violated: “for,” says he, “all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God.” The sense is varied in two instances in the section

under consideration. The first is in verse 21, where "the law and the prophets" means the Old Testament scriptures; and the second is in verse 27, where "the law of faith" refers to the gospel method of salvation. In both these instances, the sense is perfectly plain. But let us more closely analyze the language of the passage in question, and see what are its obvious doctrines.

1. The law justly condemns the whole world. Ver. 19. Consequently all men are cut off from all grounds of hope upon the provisions of law.

2. None can be justified in the sight of God "by the deeds of the law," as the law only gives "the knowledge of sin," without providing any remedy for it. Ver. 20.

3. "The righteousness of God"—or God's method of saving sinners—"is manifested" without that obedience which the law requires, making another condition. Ver. 21.

4. Righteousness, or justification, is only attainable "by faith of Jesus Christ." Ver. 22.

5. This condition is equally applicable to all men: "for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." Ver. 23.

6. This justification is so far from being conferred upon principles of law, that it is bestowed "freely by his [God's] grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." Ver. 24.

7. This redemption was achieved by the "blood" of "Christ Jesus," who is "a propitiation," and *εἰς ἐνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*, for a demonstration of his righteousness. Verses 25, 26.

8. And that through this "propitiation" men are "justified by faith without the deeds of the law." Ver. 28.

9. That the blessings of justification are extended equally to "the Jews" and to "the Gentiles"—to "the circumcision" and to "the uncircumcision." Verses 29, 30.

10. And, finally, that though men are to expect justification by faith alone, without the deeds of the law, still the law is not made "void." Ver. 31.

The position taken in verse 31, that we do not "make void," but really do "establish the law, through faith," is one of great importance. It is a negative to the most weighty and most natural objection of the legalist to the apostle's doctrine of justification by faith alone. And of so much importance does the apostle think it to refute the slander, that the system of justification which he maintained was of a licentious tendency, that he resumes it from time to time, and sustains the opposite position by arguments strong and numerous. Indeed, the great truth which the apostle labors

through the subsequent part of this epistle to establish is, that the tendency of the gospel is to holiness of life.

The apostle next proceeds (chap. iv) to an illustration of his doctrine of justification by faith alone, by the case of *Abraham*. He had discarded "the works of the law" (chap. iii, 20) as a condition of justification; and he now proceeds to show that Abraham was justified by "*faith*" without "*works*." "For if Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God." For, "to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt." So that if we could claim perfect obedience to the law, our salvation would be a matter of sheer justice—a debt that would be due to us, and no affair of *grace* at all. But he urges, in carrying out this argument, that, instead of offering pardon, "the law worketh wrath." As all have become involved in sin, as he had previously proved, and the office of the law is only to prescribe the rule, and to condemn those who fail of its requirements, it lays no rational ground of hope for any fallen son or daughter of Adam, but thunders against all its just penalties.

In the *fifth* chapter we have a further statement and illustration of the doctrine of justification by faith; and in the *sixth* a discussion, or rather the opening of a discussion, of the doctrine of sanctification, or holiness of heart and life. The apostle introduces this latter topic by calling up the objection which he had previously noticed, namely, that the doctrine of salvation by grace through faith, without the works of the law, makes void the law, and makes Christ the minister of sin. He even proves his doctrine, of the holy tendency of the gospel, from the very fact that the legalist would make the ground of the opposite conclusion, namely, deliverance from the law. "For," says he, "sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace. What then? shall we sin, because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid." Verses 14, 15. As much as to say,—If you were under the law, having failed to keep it, and having lost your power perfectly to meet its requirements, you would then, indeed, be under the "dominion" of "sin;" but being "under grace," you are delivered from its power. By this argument the apostle dexterously turns the objection of the legalist against himself. The law provides no remedy for sin; but the gospel does provide such a remedy: therefore it is the legal system which "genders to bondage," while the gospel, or the gracious economy, tends to spiritual liberty and holiness. Having pursued this argument to its legitimate results,

the apostle next proceeds (chap. vii) to a further illustration and enforcement of his position against the efficacy of the law as the instrument or the condition of life; and, at the same time, giving it its true office and work. We will quote and analyze his language:—

“ 1. Know ye not, brethren, (for I speak to them that know the law,) how that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? 2. For the woman which hath a husband is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. 3. So then if, while her husband liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress: but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man. 4. Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ; that ye should be married to another, even to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God. 5. For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death: 6. But now we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held; that we should serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter. 7. What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. 8. But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead. 9. For I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. 10. And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death. 11. For sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me. 12. Wherefore the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. 13. Was then that which is good made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good; that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful. 14. For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin.” Rom. vii.

The apostle's position here is, that we “are become dead to the law by the body of Christ.” He had prepared the way for this distinct proposition by an illustration taken from the law of marriage. The death of one of the parties puts a period to the conditions of the union; so that the survivor is at liberty to contract another matrimonial engagement. “Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ; that ye should be married to another, even to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God.” Here we have the application of his illustration, showing the effects of the atonement—“the body of Christ”—upon the condition and prospects of true believers. The believer has become dead to the law as a

condition of life, and is affianced to Christ; not that he may live after the flesh, and remain under the dominion of sin, but that he may "bring forth fruit unto God."

Next the apostle proceeds to show, from facts and experience, the inefficacy of the law as an instrument of life. "For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sins, *which were by the law*, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Verse 5. Being "in the flesh" here means, being in a carnal or unrenewed state. (See chap. viii, 8.) When they were in their unregenerate state "the motions"—*παθηματα* *passions*—"of sins, *which were by the law*"—which were awakened and irritated by the law—"did work in their members to bring forth fruit unto death." So far, then, was the law from sanctifying and saving those who were under its power, that it only aroused their inward corruptions to fiercer opposition to its claims.

After this statement, the apostle very naturally and advantageously resumes his position upon the superior advantages of the gospel as a means of sanctification, and shows the strong contrast there is between those who are "delivered from the law," that they may "serve God in newness of the spirit," and those who are under its power, striving for sanctification "in the oldness of the letter." Ver. 6.

Naturally anticipating an objection to what he had said (ver. 5) of the operations of the law upon an unrenewed mind, that if the law were the means of arousing the corruptions of the human heart, it must be an instrument of sin, he now proceeds to vindicate it from such a charge, and to show its true nature, design, and use, under the gospel dispensation.

1. As to the nature of the law, it is *holy, just, good, and spiritual*. Verses 12, 14. So far then is the apostle from depreciating the law, that he confers upon it epithets expressive of the highest sense of its true dignity and divine origin.

2. The original design of the law was to preserve the subjects of it in a state of spiritual life. "The commandment which [*was ordained—or intended*] for life I found [*to be*] unto death." Ver. 10. "Doubtless," says Mr. Wesley, "it was originally intended by God as a grand means of preserving and increasing spiritual life, and leading to life everlasting."—*Notes*.

3. The application and uses of the law. And,

First. It gives the knowledge of sin. "I had not known sin but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." Verses 7, 8.

Secondly. It shows the strength of sin. "For without the law

sin was dead." Ver. 8. The strength of the current is not felt until we attempt to stem it. So the power of our corruptions is not appreciated until the law brings us to a discovery of their deadly nature, and, alarmed by its denunciations, we begin to struggle against them.

Thirdly. It shows us our utter helplessness and ruin, and induces despair of relief on the ground of our own merit or works. "For I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died." Ver. 9. When God's law, in all its breadth, is applied to the sinner's heart and life, he feels himself helpless within the coils of sin, and hope expires.

Fourthly. The law shows the monstrous evil of sin. "That sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful." Ver. 13. Sin takes its character or magnitude from the holiness of the law it violates. And when the sinner sees that the law is *holy, just, good*, and *spiritual*—that sin is a violation of such a law—that it is a wide departure from the straight line therein drawn, he sees its *exceeding sinfulness*.

Such, then, according to St. Paul, are the offices of the law. To prove that we are right in supposing that the law referred to by the apostle, in the passage under consideration, is the unchangeable rule of moral obligation—in other words, the *moral law*, properly so called—it is only necessary to direct attention to its attributes and offices. What law is it that is *holy, just, and good—spiritual*—ordained to life—which gives the knowledge of sin—shows its strength—our utter helplessness and ruin—and displays the exceeding sinfulness of sin? Can it be any other than that great moral rule which prescribes the duties which man owes to God—or, in other words, the *moral law*? Again: it may be observed that the apostle refers, in his account of the offices of the law, to a specific precept of the decalogue. Says he, "I had not known sin but by the law; for I had not known lust, except *the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.*" This surely is no part of the ceremonial law, or any other law wholly, and in every sense, abrogated. It is a portion of the ten commandments, "written and engraven on stone," and which, though not the condition of life under the gospel, are of universal and perpetual obligation, and will always be necessary to convict sinners of sin, and show them their need of a Saviour.

Now is there any inconsistency between these views of the offices and uses of the law, and what the apostle had said before of our being "dead to the law by the body of Christ?" The two positions taken by the apostle will appear perfectly consistent with

each other when we advert to what we have seen to be the scope of his argument. His object is to explode the law *as an instrument or a condition of justification or sanctification*. Of course we must take what he says as extending no further than the limits of the proposition which he argues. In attempting to prove that the law cannot justify or sanctify, he says we are dead to the law by the body of Christ. Now we can understand no more by this, taken in its connections, than that the law has ceased to be the rule or condition of justification, or the instrument or condition of sanctification. We cannot make him mean more without perverting his sense and making him contradict himself. To cut off all such constructions of his language as would imply that the law is wholly abrogated, the apostle proceeds immediately to exalt it, and to show its perpetual necessity as an exhibition of God's holiness, and the instrument of the sinner's conviction of the evil of sin. The result from the whole is, that though the law is still in full force as an exhibition of our duty as the creatures of God, it is "*dead*," and "we are delivered from" it, as *a covenant of works or a condition of life*.

A fallacy is sometimes practiced by the use of the qualifying word *moral* in connection with the law. As this term is not found in the Bible, but has been used merely for the sake of distinction, men take the liberty to affix to it their own signification; some using it with a greater, others with a less latitude of meaning. Some apply it to the decalogue; others, to all the moral rules of the Bible, embracing both Testaments; and others use it in a general sense *for the great rule of the divine government which binds all moral agents to love and obey God to the extent of their powers*. We do not say that the ten commandments are not moral laws, nor that the law of love, given by our Saviour, is not moral; on the other hand, we would explicitly concede that these are particular formularies which express, in a comprehensive form, the requirements of the moral law. And, moreover, we equally maintain that there are a multitude of particular precepts scattered through the Scriptures which are of a purely moral character. Restricting the origin of the moral law to the Mosaic code seems to us unauthorized and little less than absurd. For then it would have had no existence before Moses. Our first parents in paradise, and the long line of patriarchs from Adam to Moses, would have been without it, which would be too absurd a supposition to be entertained for a moment. Again: St. Paul evidently supposes the moral law to be known, to some extent, where the Mosaic code was not known. "For," says he,

“when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.” Romans ii, 14, 15. According to this view, the great moral code is not confined to the Biblical formularies, but is, in its spirit at least, inscribed upon the conscience of dark and degraded heathen, “accusing or else excusing” them, according as their conduct is conformed or not conformed to its claims. The light of the heathen, we know, is exceedingly dim; but still if St. Paul is right, they have at least enough to make them responsible.

And in this view we have the sanction of Mr. Wesley. His sermon on the Law, already quoted, is founded upon a portion of the section now under discussion, (Rom. vii, 12;) and in relation to the law spoken of, he says,—

“The nature of that law which was originally given to angels in heaven and man in paradise, and which God has so mercifully promised to write afresh in the hearts of all true believers, was the second thing I proposed to show. In order to which I would first observe, that although the ‘law’ and the ‘commandment’ are sometimes differently taken, (the commandment meaning but a part of the law,) yet, in the text, they are used as equivalent terms, implying one and the same thing. But we cannot understand here, either by one or the other, the ceremonial law. . . . It remains, that the law, eminently so termed, is no other than the moral law.”

By *ὁ νομος* the law—and which we take the liberty to call the *moral law*—we mean the great rule of moral obligation binding all dependent intelligences to perfect obedience. Mr. Wesley says,—“The law, eminently so termed, *is no other than the moral law*.” and then proceeds to give us a most graphic view of its character. “Now,” says he, “this law is an incorruptible picture of the high and holy ONE that inhabiteth eternity. It is he, whom, in his essence, no man hath seen or can see, made visible to men and angels. It is the face of God unveiled; God manifested to his creatures as they are able to bear it; manifested to give, and not to destroy, life—that they may see God and live. It is the heart of God disclosed to man. Yea, in some sense, we may apply to this law what the apostle says of his Son, it is *ἀνὰγχα της δοξης, και χαρακτηρ της υποστασεως αυτου*—the streaming forth [or out-beaming] of his glory, the express image of his person.”—*Sermon on the Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law.*

As to the origin of this law, this great divine tells us it "is not, as some may have possibly imagined, of so late an institution as the time of Moses. Noah declared it to men long before that time, and Enoch before him. But we may trace its original higher still, even beyond the foundation of the world, to that period, unknown indeed to men, but doubtless enrolled in the annals of eternity, when 'the morning stars [first] sang together,' being newly called into existence."—*Ibid.* And that this is the law—the law which we, with the sanction of our venerable founder, call "the moral law"—of which the apostle speaks in the passage under discussion, we have already given sufficient reasons abundantly and beyond all controversy to prove. As we shall have occasion to call up this point again, we wish the reader to bear in mind the explicit language of Mr. Wesley in relation to it, and the incontrovertible reasons by which his views are supported.

Having exhibited the ineffectual struggles of a convicted sinner under the law, in the latter verses of the seventh chapter of Romans, the apostle proceeds, on the opening of the eighth, to another declaration of the true source of deliverance.

"1. There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. 2. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death. 3. For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh: 4. That the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." Rom. viii.

Here is a strong contrast drawn between the weakness and inefficacy of the law for the purposes of sanctification, and the strength and efficiency of the gospel system.

1. "There is no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus"—those who are "married" or united to Christ by faith are *justified*. The law, as we have seen, cannot justify, but the gospel can.

2. "For the law of the Spirit of life"—the gospel—"hath made me free from the law of sin and death"—hath taken me from under the power and bondage of the law, which, as it gives the sinner no relief, but leaves him under the power of sin, and condemns him to death on account of it, is called "the law of sin and death."

3. "For what the law could not do"—toward justifying and sanctifying the sinner—"in that it was weak through the flesh,

God" hath done,—“sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for”—a sacrifice for—“sin condemned sin in the flesh:”—showing its evil, and providing for its destruction—“that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.” Through the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, made known by the gospel, God has achieved the complete emancipation, from the condemnation and the power of sin, of all those who so believe and receive the atonement as to bring forth the fruits of holiness—a thing which the law, in its weakness, “could not do.”

It is a question of some importance to determine in what sense “the righteousness of the law” is “fulfilled in us who walk,” &c. There are two classes of views upon this point, between which commentators are divided. One class refers the fulfillment of the righteousness of the law to Christ—condemning sin in the flesh; and the other, to the practical obedience of the sanctified. Those who take the latter view, suppose a *qualified* fulfillment of the righteousness of the law to be intended; such as is implied in loving God with all the heart—the same sense in which “love is the fulfilling of the law.” Among these we rank many of the Arminian commentators, and some of the Calvinistic. But several of these—such as Locke, Benson, Turner, Pyle, and others—take special care to guard against the supposition that a perfect satisfaction of the claims of the law is to be understood; asserting that only the degree of obedience which a fallen being in a sanctified state is able to render, and which God, through Christ, will graciously condescend to accept, instead of such perfect righteousness as the law requires, is intended. This is a safe construction, and there seems some reason for it; but it has its difficulties: *δικαίωμα του νομου*, *the righteousness of the law*, in the proper sense, must imply a *perfect righteousness*. Nothing less than this could possibly meet the claims of the law, and no one who has ever sinned can attain such righteousness. For the law requires sinless perfection,—making no allowance for the smallest departure from its high and holy requirements, and extending no mercy to past failures. Who, then, can ever, in himself and by his own works, practically meet the claims of God’s holy law? “The righteousness of the law” not only requires that we should not sin in future, but that we *should never have sinned in days past*—it must imply Adamic perfection, and nothing less. But it may be said that the atonement of Christ meets the demands of the law, so far as the past is concerned, pardoning our trespasses and washing away our stains; and it is only for the future—*subsequent* to our entire sanc-

tification—that we are expected to fulfill the righteousness of the law. To this it may be answered, that it does not agree with the position maintained. That position is, that the righteousness of the law is fulfilled *by us*,—as they render *εν ημίν*,—who walk, &c.; making the fulfilment of the righteousness of the law *personal—the result of our own works*. If the righteousness of the law is in a proper sense fulfilled *by us*, there is nothing left to be done by Christ. The difficulty of this interpretation is, that, while it makes the atonement of Christ in some unexplained, and, to us, inconceivable, way, to render it possible that we should fulfill the righteousness of the law, it gives the atonement no part in the work of fulfilling that righteousness. Now, we learn from the Scriptures that CHRIST “magnified the law and made it honorable,” and “brought in everlasting righteousness;” that he is “the Lord our righteousness,”—that he is “our wisdom, *righteousness*, sanctification, and redemption.” But that the righteousness of the law can, in any proper sense, be fulfilled *by* a fallen being, is what we must, at least for the present, hold as doubtful.

We have no doubt but that obedience to the requirements of the gospel, and a perfect fulfillment of its conditions, are practicable. But then the question is, whether this is the meaning of the text under consideration. Nor have we any doubt but that the righteousness of the law is fulfilled, or completely vindicated, in the final salvation of the believer; but then we suppose this is done by the divine atonement, and not by his *perfect* obedience to its requirements.

Could we suppose a man at any time in a condition to fulfill the righteousness of the law, we would scarcely suppose him any longer to stand in need of the atonement. For what though the atonement put him in the condition—pardoned his sins and renovated his nature—if he meets the entire claims of the law for ever after, though he may have cause of gratitude and praise for his being raised to his present elevated position, what need will he have for a constant application of the blood of Christ? While perfectly meeting the highest claims of the divine law, he could scarcely

“Every moment, Lord, I need
The merit of thy death.”

From these considerations we are not prepared to adopt the construction of the passage under consideration, which attributes the fulfillment of the righteousness of the law to men who “have sinned and come short of the glory of God.” The reader will not understand us as objecting to the *orthodoxy* of those commentators and divines who adopt the construction of the text from which we dissent.

We are aware that men have adopted this construction whose shoe-latchets we are not worthy to loose. But we cannot follow commentators implicitly in their criticisms and paraphrases. We must see with our own eyes that the sense they give the divine Word is sustained by the language and scope of the sacred penmen, or we cannot follow any of them. At the same time we wish it distinctly understood, that with the *doctrinal views* which some of our own commentators suppose to be involved in the text in question, we most perfectly harmonize. Our only question is, whether these views can be legitimately deduced from the text. A doubtful argument never should be relied upon in proof of a doctrine—a text never should be employed as a *proof-text* which fairly admits of a construction which would render it wholly inapplicable to our purpose. And above all, should we avoid a construction of a text of Scripture given for the proof of a disputed doctrine, which, if it can be made to bear at all, will make it prove *too much*,—and so by a dexterous opponent can be run into the grossest absurdity. By such ill-advised methods of defending the truth, a decided advantage is often given to its adversaries.

In the latter part of the *ninth* chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, the apostle concludes from the premises which he had previously laid down, that the Gentiles had attained to the law of righteousness, even the righteousness of faith: "But Israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness, because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law." The converted Gentiles had obtained justification because they sought it by faith alone; but the unbelieving Jews had not obtained justification, because they sought it by the impracticable method of legal obedience.

Naturally concluding that this position would be supposed by the Jews to imply some want of regard for his brethren of the house of Israel, he opens the *tenth* chapter with a strong declaration of his steady attachment to his "brethren," his "kinsmen according to the flesh." He thus proceeds:—

"2. For I bear them record, that they have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge. 3. For they being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God. 4. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth. 5. For Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, That the man which doeth those things shall live by them. 6. But the righteousness which is of faith speaketh on this wise, Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down from above :) 7. Or, Who shall descend into the deep?

(that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead.) 8. But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart: that is, the word of faith which we preach: 9. That if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. 10. For with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. 11. For the Scripture saith, Whosoever believeth on him shall not be ashamed." Rom. x.

Here he first declares that their great error was, that "being ignorant of God's righteousness"—God's method of justification and sanctification—"and going about to establish their own righteousness"—their own plan of salvation by the law—they had "not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God." Their *doctrinal* error had become *practical*, and so they were still unsaved. He next proceeds to another statement and illustration of "God's righteousness,"—or the gospel method of salvation.

"For," saith he, "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." Ver. 4. Two points of inquiry naturally arise upon this position. *First*, what law does the apostle refer to? And *secondly*, in what sense is Christ the end of that law? Mr. Wesley is so explicit upon these points, that we shall introduce his language as the best exposition of the whole subject which we have to offer.

"QUEST. 1. How is 'Christ the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth?' Rom. x, 4.

"ANS. In order to understand this, you must understand what law is here spoken of; and this, I apprehend, is, 1. The Mosaic law, the whole Mosaic dispensation; which St. Paul continually speaks of as one, though containing three parts, the political, moral, and ceremonial. 2. The Adamic law, that given to Adam in innocence, properly called 'the law of works.' This is in substance the same with the angelic law, being common to angels and men. It required that man should use, to the glory of God, all the powers with which he was created. Now, he was created free from any defect, either in his understanding or his affections. His body was then no clog to the mind; it did not hinder his apprehending all things clearly, judging truly concerning them, and reasoning justly, if he reasoned at all. I say, *if he reasoned*; for possibly he did not. Perhaps he had no need of reasoning, till his corruptible body pressed down the mind, and impaired its native faculties. Perhaps, till then, the mind saw every truth that offered, as directly as the eye now sees the light.

"Consequently, this law, proportioned to his original powers, required that he should always think, always speak, and always act

precisely right, in every point whatever. He was well able so to do: and God could not but require the service he was able to pay.

“But Adam fell, and his incorruptible body became corruptible; and ever since, it is a clog to the soul, and hinders its operations. Hence, at present, no child of man can at all times apprehend clearly, or judge truly. And where either the judgment or apprehension is wrong, it is impossible to reason justly. Therefore it is as natural for a man to mistake as to breathe; and he can no more live without the one than without the other: consequently no man is able to perform the service which the Adamic law requires.

“And no man is obliged to perform it; God does not require it of any man: for Christ is the end of the Adamic, as well as the Mosaic, law. By his death he hath put an end to both; he hath abolished both the one and the other, with regard to man; and the obligation to observe either the one or the other is vanished away. Nor is any man living bound to observe the Adamic, more than the Mosaic, law. (I mean it is not the condition either of present or future salvation.)

“In the room of this, Christ hath established another, viz., the law of faith. Not every one that doeth, but every one that believeth, now receiveth righteousness, in the full sense of the word; that is, he is justified, sanctified, and glorified.”—*Plain Account*.

Now, if it should be questioned whether Mr. Wesley intends to embrace *the moral law* in his statements, it is very easy to prove the fact beyond the possibility of a rational doubt. Under his first head he embraces “the Mosaic law,” which, he says, “St. Paul continually speaks of as one, though containing three parts, the political, *moral*, and ceremonial.” Here he explicitly embraces *the moral law* as combined in the “Mosaic dispensation.” And under the second head he embraces “the Adamic law—that given to Adam in innocence, properly called the law of works—in substance the same with the angelic law, being common to angels and men.” Compare this language with a passage we have already quoted from Mr. Wesley, and the fact that he refers to the moral law is clearly made out.

“I shall endeavor to show the original of the moral law, often called ‘the law,’ by way of eminence. Now this is not, as some may have possibly imagined, of so late an institution as the time of Moses. Noah declared it to men long before that time, and Enoch before him. But we may trace its original higher still, even beyond the foundation of the world, to that period, unknown indeed to men, but doubtless enrolled in the annals of eternity, when ‘the

morning stars [first] sang together,' being newly called into existence."—*Wesley's Sermons*, vol. i, p. 307.

Who does not see that what he calls "the Adamic law" in the Plain Account, he calls "the moral law" in the sermon? In one instance he says it is the law which is "common to angels and men;" and in the other he traces "its original" to the period when the morning stars sang together, being early "called into being;" and explicitly calls it "the moral law." There is no confusion here. *The moral law* generically embraces both the Adamic and the *moral* part of the Mosaic law. By the Adamic law, he means one specific form and manifestation of the moral law; and by the part of the "Mosaic law" which partakes of the nature of *moral law*, he refers to another; and when speaking generally, he embraces the law which is not only common to Jews and Gentiles—the patriarchal, the Mosaic, and the Christian dispensation—but, also, "common to angels and men."

Let us next look at what this great divine says of the *abolition* of this law. He says, "Christ is the end of the Adamic, as well as the Mosaic, law. . . . Nor is any man living bound to observe the Adamic more than the Mosaic law. (I mean, it is not the condition either of present or future salvation.)" This is precisely what we understand to be the doctrine of Paul, and to be aimed at directly throughout his whole argument upon the law in his Epistle to the Romans. *The law*, in any form, in all forms, is "abolished" "as a condition of present or future salvation. . . . In the room of this, Christ hath established another, namely, the law of faith."

St. Paul proceeds immediately from the position upon which we have presented the commentary of Mr. Wesley, to draw a contrast between the way of salvation by the law, and that of salvation by faith. He says, "Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, that the man which doeth those things shall live by them. But the righteousness of faith speaketh on this wise." Or, as Mr. Wesley says, "Not every one that *doeth*, but every one that *believeth*, now receiveth righteousness, in the full sense of the word; that is, he is justified, sanctified, and glorified." *The law of faith*, as "the condition either of present or future salvation," is directly opposed to the *law of works*, both by St. Paul and Mr. Wesley; and, according to them, while the one is perfectly practicable, the other is so far above or below us that we cannot attain unto it, and we are not to direct our attention toward it for a moment. "Say not in thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? or who shall descend into the deep? the word is nigh

thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart: that is, the word of faith which we preach—for with the heart man believeth unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." Salvation upon the condition of law is fairly beyond our reach, but on the condition of faith it is near—brought down to our helplessness and ruin.

A similar train of reasoning upon the law is pursued by the apostle in his Epistle to the Galatians; a few passages from which we shall next proceed to quote and expound:—

"16. Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified. 17. But if, while we seek to be justified by Christ, we ourselves also are found sinners, is therefore Christ the minister of sin? God forbid. 18. For if I build again the things which I destroyed, I make myself a transgressor. 19. For I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God. 20. I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me. 21. I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain." Gal. ii.

1. The apostle first states the doctrine of justification by faith, and the utter *impossibility* of justification by the works of the law. Ver. 16.

2. That if the Galatians, seeking justification by faith, were found deficient in their moral and religious character, the gospel would not be to blame, but the fault would lie upon them. Verses 17, 18.

3. That through the application of the law to his life he had been brought to so full a conviction of the impracticability of salvation upon the ground of legal obedience, that he had wholly renounced it as the condition of present or future salvation, and had embraced Christ as his only remedy. "For I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God." Ver. 19.

4. He is so effectually united with Christ that he is "crucified with" him, and he so holds his connection with him as to derive from him spiritual "life," only "by the faith of the Son of God." Ver. 20. Observe here, that the apostle himself, though justified and sanctified, does not consider it practicable for him to stand in this grace on the condition of perfect obedience to the law. But he says, "I *am* dead to the law—I *am* crucified with Christ—and *the life which I now live*—I live by the faith of the Son of God." So that his *continued*-justification, and the *perpetuity* of his spiritual life, were by *faith*, and not by *legal obedience*.

5. Lastly, he affirms that if righteousness could come by the law, the death of Christ would be in vain, and he would "frustrate," or make void, "the grace of God."

In the opening of the *third* chapter, the Galatians are charged with having foolishly left Christ and gone back to the law. And after demanding of them (ver. 2) whether they had "received the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith," and offered some illustrations, he proceeds:—

"10. For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse: for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them. 11. But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident: for, The just shall live by faith. 12. And the law is not of faith: but, The man that doeth them shall live in them." Gal. iii.

1. He asserts that those who depend upon the law for salvation are under its curse—and this he proves by a quotation from Moses, (Deut. xxvii, 26,) which will as effectually cut off from the hope of salvation those who are now justified as those who are not, unless they can hope never to offend against *any* of "the things which are written in the book of the law." For if they trespass in the smallest matter they come under the curse.

2. He next proves, by another scripture, that present and continued justification is by faith. His proof is, "The just shall live by faith." Hab. ii, 4. He cannot mean here, only to say that sinners are at first justified by faith. This is a doctrine which he had repeatedly asserted, as we have seen elsewhere. But now he evidently speaks more especially of continued justification: for his proof would not be applicable to any other view, nor would it well agree with the scope of his argument. He is chiding the Galatians for going back from faith to the law, and laboring to show that there is no point where they can safely put themselves upon the condition of law: "for," says he, "the just shall live by faith. And the law is not of faith: but, The man that doeth them shall live in them." Verses 11, 12. You cannot expect to retain your justification on the condition of law, for the just enjoy their spiritual life by faith. "That is," says Mr. Wesley, "the man who is accounted just or righteous before God, shall continue in a state of acceptance, life, and salvation, *by faith*."—*Notes*.

"The interpretation of Macknight and others, 'The just by faith shall live'—[i. e., those who are justified by faith shall live]—is very properly rejected by Bishop Middleton, who observes that thus we should have had *ὁδίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως*, or else *ὁ ἐκ πίστεως δίκαιος*. Besides, continues he, to say that he who is just,

or justified by faith, shall live, amounts to very little; but to affirm that the good man, he whose obedience, though imperfect, is sincere, shall reap life everlasting from faith, (as opposed to a law of works,) and from faith alone, is a most important declaration; and it agrees exactly with the context: that no man, says the apostle, is justified under the law, is evident; for one of the prophets hath said, 'The just shall live by faith.'—*Bloomfield's Critical Digest*.

Our apostle next proceeds to anticipate and answer an objection:—

"21. Is the law then against the promises of God? God forbid: for if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. 22. But the Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe. 23. But before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterward be revealed. 24. Wherefore the law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith. 25. But after that faith is come, we are no longer under a schoolmaster. 26. For ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus." Gal. iii.

1. First, he says "the law" is not "against the promise of God." They perform wholly different offices. The promise gives "life," which could the law have done, it would supersede the promise, and then "verily righteousness should have been by the law."

2. All are "under sin," and consequently under the condemnation of the law, and can only be saved by "faith."

3. "Before faith came"—that is, before the promise of a Saviour—"we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith," &c.—held in duress by the law until faith brought relief.

4. But the law is not hence to be considered useless. For "the law was our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ, that we might be justified by faith." Ver. 24. The law teaches the need of justification, but does not confer it. It can only be received "by faith."

5. But after we have passed through the law-work—the law has awakened and convicted us, and thus shown us our utter helplessness, and we have been brought to Christ for justification—we are no longer either under the bondage of this "schoolmaster," nor under the necessity for those offices which are superseded by a faith that works by love and purifies the heart.

Having passed through the particular examination of the principal passages upon the subject of *the law*, found in the two

epistles in which St. Paul treats the subject of set purpose, we shall now proceed to draw several conclusions which seem to us to result from his positions.

1. We have seen that *the law*, of which the apostle treats, is *the moral law*—the great rule of human duty given, in various forms and at various periods, by God to man. It is not exclusively the Adamic law nor the Mosaic law, but it embraces the former, and portions of the latter, and even includes the law written upon the hearts of heathen.

But it must be remembered that in all this the law is to be understood separately from the mediatorial system. It was by the law without the atonement, that the Jews sought to be justified, and this was the system which it was the special object of the apostle to show was utterly impracticable. "The law," says *Flavel*, "in Scripture is taken strictly for the moral law only, considered abstractedly from the promises of grace, as the legal justiciaries understood it. These are two different senses and acceptations of the law." After quoting these words, *Mr. Fletcher* adds:—"Apply this excellent distinction to the refinements with which the doctrine of the law has been perplexed; and you will easily answer the objections of those who, availing themselves of St. Paul's laconic style, lay their own farrago at his door. For instance, when he says, 'As many as are of the works of the law, are under the curse; for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things,' &c., he means (to use *Flavel's* words) the law 'considered abstractedly from the promises of grace;' for, in that case, the law immediately becomes the Adamic covenant of works, which knows nothing of justification by faith in a merciful God, through an atoning Mediator; and, in this point of view, the apostle says with great truth, 'The law is not of faith, but the man that doeth these things shall live in them,' without being under any obligation to a Saviour."—*Equal Check*.

2. We have found that this law *no longer exists* AS A COVENANT OF WORKS—that it is *not the condition of justification or sanctification*. No truth, it seems to us, is taught more explicitly than this. It was important to the apostle's argument, in the epistles above named, fully to show this truth. He is urging the perfect fitness and the exclusive claims of the gospel; and when he meets the objections of those who set up the claims of *the law* in opposition to those of *the gospel*, it seems necessary that he should show, in a clear light, the utter inefficacy of the law for the purposes of human salvation. It was necessary to show not only that we cannot obtain justification and sanctification by the law, but that it

would be equally impossible for us to *retain* these blessings by perfect obedience to its claims. Hence his argument is addressed not merely to unconverted sinners, but to justified and sanctified believers. He consequently quotes with emphasis the words of the prophet: "The just shall live by faith." The same doctrine is most explicitly taught in a passage not yet quoted. "Therefore," says he, "being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ: by whom also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God." Rom. v, 1, 2. Here we are taught that "we have access into this grace"—the grace of justification—"wherein we stand," "by faith." Justification is a *state* as well as a *change*. And we have constant "access into this grace *wherein we stand*," "through our Lord Jesus Christ," and "by faith" in him. Faith in Christ is as really the condition of our continued justification as it is of the commencement of this blessed state; in other words, as much the condition of the *state* as of the *change*. But there is this difference between the faith by which the sinner is justified and that by which the justified *stand in this grace*: the first instance of faith is that which produces submission to Christ, and reliance upon him for the pardon of all past sins; and the faith which follows adds to these, *practical obedience to the precepts of the gospel*. Good works follow, and evince the existence of *justifying faith*.

It has been erroneously supposed by some that because we are required to do God's commandments—to be doers of the word, &c.—we are therefore, subsequently to our justification, put upon the condition of obedience to the moral law. The precepts of the moral law are obligatory upon all Christians; but then it must be borne in mind that they are incorporated into the mediatorial system. *First*, that this system furnishes them with many helps to aid them in their duties; and, *secondly*, that it supplies them with an atoning sacrifice to make amends for their involuntary shortcomings. Without these, who could stand for a moment upon the ground of obedience to the law? The law requires un-sinful obedience—it can accept nothing short of *perfect conformity* to all its claims. If we have no atonement to rely upon we must fail of heaven. For who can, in all things, meet the claims of God's holy law? Our errors in judgment and involuntary mistakes, as we are taught by our venerated fathers to believe, need the atoning blood of Christ. But how do they need an atonement if they are not offenses in the eyes of the law still in force as a rule of duty? If the law even makes allowance for

these infirmities, and requires no more than our enfeebled powers are adequate perfectly to perform, why then it is possible for us to live in such strict conformity to its demands as not constantly to need the blood of atonement. For if a man perfectly meets the high claims of the law for any given period, he will stand, for that period, legally, and upon the ground of justice, clear from all charge, and cannot be supposed dependent upon atoning merit for his continued justification.

Should it be urged that, upon the ground that the moral law is now impracticable, it is unjust to require perfect conformity to its claims, and that the enforcement, even in the gospel, is wholly useless, if not absurd; it may be answered, that the constant exhibition and enforcement of the law show to all, even to the most perfect Christian—for even such must be conscious of many shortcomings—the constant necessity of the atoning merit of the Lord Jesus. For, as has been urged, if the law were wholly abrogated, or should bring down its claims to a level with our present fallen condition, we should have no standing monument before us of the inflexible and unchangeable holiness of God; nor do we see how we could feel the present constant need of the merits of Jesus Christ to sustain our hopes, and finally to grant us eternal life.

But before we leave this branch of the subject we would say that *the good works*, commandments, &c., of the gospel, embrace and principally refer to the exercise and fruits of *faith*. As St. John says, "And this is his commandment: that we should believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ, and love one another." 1 John iii, 23. It is "a loving, obedient faith" which constitutes the condition of our continued acceptance and final salvation—a faith that begets love to God and man, and which, when *perfected*, is accompanied by that "*perfect love*" which "casteth out fear." This is the position of our standards, as, had we space, we might abundantly prove. Though they go strongly against *solifidianism*—from *sola fide*, sole faith—they still hold faith as the basis of all the Christian graces, and hold to obedience and holiness of life in a way not to be implicated in *legalism*. It is the Antinomian doctrine of continued justification and final salvation by a dead, inoperative faith that they make the butt of their most decided assaults. But when they, against the Antinomians of the day, plead for the practicability of the evangelical law, the necessity of obedience, and of good works, &c., we are not to suppose that they maintain that *perfect* obedience to the moral law is the condition of continued justification, or that it is at all practicable to a fallen being.

Mr. Wesley says, "Faith working, or animated by love, is all that God now requires of man [that is, as "the condition of present or future salvation;"] he has substituted (not sincerity, but) love in the room of angelic perfection."—*Plain Account*.

Mr. Fletcher says, "Nor yet under a Christless law with Adam, but under a law to Christ, that is, under the law of our royal Priest, the evangelical law of liberty: a more gracious law this, which allows of sincere repentance, and is fulfilled by loving faith."—*Last Check*.

"And that Christians shall be eternally saved or damned according to their keeping or breaking this mediatorial law of Christian perfection; this law of Christ, this royal law of Jesus the king of the Jews, we prove," &c.—*Ib*.

So that, according to these great divines, it is not the law, properly so called, but the Mediator's law—the evangelical law, or law of liberty—which contains the conditions of both present and future salvation, and is practicable by fallen humanity.

In this view is embraced the provision for "sincere repentance" through a Mediator. The "mediatorial law of Christian perfection" includes all the redeeming merit and all the restoring influences of the new and better covenant. Consequently, the term *law*, when used by our divines, as above, means something more than *a mere rule of duty enforced by penal and promissory sanctions*. It embraces *a plan of salvation*—something which the moral law proper does not embrace or contemplate.

We do not deny but these authors frequently urge the claims of *the law*, and the necessity of obedience to it, without applying to it the qualifying epithets above referred to. But it is an "*evangelically* sinless" obedience which they mean. This we are warranted in inferring from two facts. *First*, they most generally qualify their meaning as above—especially when pressed with the objection that man, in his fallen state, cannot perfectly keep God's holy law; and, *secondly*, because they can in no other way be at all consistent with themselves. For they constantly declare that the most perfect Christians sin against "the perfect law," and consequently have need, every moment, of the atoning blood of Christ. We will here give a clear and most decisive paragraph from Mr. Wesley. Speaking of those who "love God with all their hearts," he says,—“Yet as, even in this case, there is not a full conformity to the perfect law, so the most perfect do, on this very account, need the blood of atonement, and may properly for themselves, as well as for their brethren, say, ‘Forgive us our trespasses.’”—*Plain Account*. This is entirely conclusive. The

fact, or the possibility of perfect obedience to "the perfect law," cannot be inferred from anything he has said elsewhere without making him contradict himself.

But here it may be inquired whether Messrs. Wesley and Fletcher do not embrace the whole moral law in their views of the gospel? Certainly they do. But they give to the law a distinct work to perform. It convicts men of sin, and shows them their need of Christ—it is "our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ." The law proper, and the gospel proper, have each their distinctive work to perform; though they perfectly harmonize, the latter only doing what the former cannot do. They do not conflict with each other, nor should they be confounded together. The following extract, from *Dr. Fisk's* sermon on "the properties of the law and the gospel distinguished," sets the subject in a clear light.

"The gospel implies the law, and acknowledges its claims—they harmonize together in their general design, but are altogether distinct in their character and offices."

"That the gospel presupposes the law, is evident from the fact already established—that it is an expedient to meet both its penal and preceptive claims. But for the law, therefore, there would have been no gospel. Hence, when the gospel comes proclaiming salvation, it always directs the sinner to the purity and rigor of the law; it clears his spiritual vision, that he may see his danger, and quickens his moral sensibilities, that he may feel his guilt. The gospel detracts nothing from the extent of these claims, and pleads nothing in extenuation of the sinner's criminality. But while it gives full credit to the demands of the law, it spreads open its own appropriate provisions to meet these demands. It points the sinner, first to his poverty, and then to the 'riches of grace, in Christ Jesus;' first to his moral defilement, and then to the blood that 'cleanseth from all sin.' Both, therefore, have the same object in view, viz., holiness of heart and life. The difference is in the manner of accomplishing this object. And this grows out of the different conditions of man. The law is suited not only as a rule of conduct, but as a condition of life for the holy; but the gospel is designed, as we have seen, as a provision of life for the unholy. While the law, therefore, curses sinners, the gospel blesses them. If the law could bless sinners, there would be no need of the gospel; and if the gospel could curse sinners, then indeed we might dispense with the law. But as the law preceded the gospel, and contains in itself all that was necessary as a rule of life, and all the penalty necessary to punish the transgressor; and, as has been shown, is unrepealed and unrepealable, there was no need of ad-

ditional penalties and new moral codes in the gospel. Therefore the gospel, strictly speaking, is not law. It may indeed be objected to this, that the gospel is sometimes called law in the Scriptures. Our text calls it 'the law of the spirit of life.' St. James speaks of 'the perfect law of liberty.' St. Paul calls it 'the law of faith'—and declares, (Rom. ii, 12, 16,) that 'as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men, according to my gospel,' and that 'the Lord Jesus shall be revealed in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that *obey not the gospel* of our Lord Jesus Christ.' 1 Thess. i, 8. In reference to these and similar passages, it may be remarked, that so far as the gospel is used as a term to convey the idea of the whole divine administration under the new covenant, it may very properly be said to include both the precepts and sanctions of law. And so the Scriptures sometimes use the term. But this is a mode of speech in which a part is put for the whole: the whole system is spoken of under the name of one of its prominent features. So the biography of Christ, and all the incidents recorded by the evangelists, go under the general name of *gospel*, because their leading object is to proclaim the '*good news* of great joy, which shall be unto all people,' viz.; that 'unto them is born a SAVIOUR, who is Christ the Lord.' It should also be recollected that the gospel, as has been already shown, implies the law; and to preach it, therefore, with effect, it is necessary to proclaim the law in all its terrors, and describe it in all its claims. Hence, the apostolic commission runs thus,—'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; he that believeth not, shall be damned.' The gospel is as active in pressing the sinner's danger upon him as it is in holding up its own provisions. Because, by this, the sinner is convinced of the nature of his wants and of his need of the gospel. But this no more proves that the gospel curses the sinner, and will finally damn him if he continues impenitent, than the representation which the physician makes to the sick man of his disease and danger, is the cause of that danger. If, in this case, the physician should say,—'Unless you submit yourself to my care and receive my medicine, you must die;' would any man of a sound mind say it was the remedy which sentenced him to death? So neither is it the gospel that condemns the sinner, though it proclaims, 'he that believeth not shall be damned,'—and though it makes known most explicitly, that 'God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ.' And indeed in this passage, (chap. ii, 16,) where the apostle states, that 'God shall judge the secrets of men

according to the gospel,' he is careful to tell us that this judgment is by the law, ver. 12; and it was according to his preaching, when he exhibited to them the necessity and advantages of embracing the gospel. This view of the subject will show what St. James means by the 'perfect law of liberty.' He is speaking of the word preached, embracing, doubtless, the whole range of truth implied in the gospel scheme. Now, whosoever looketh into this exhibition of divine truth and giveth heed thereto, &c., that man shall be blessed in his deed. There is not even an intimation in the text or context, that the 'perfect law of liberty,' here spoken of, is the gospel, properly so called. The gospel is, doubtless, implied in it, because all the word preached is implied in it. As it respects the clause in our text, in which the gospel is called 'the law of the spirit of life,' this no more means that the gospel is law, properly so called, than the phrase, *law of sin and death*, in the other clause of the sentence, means law, properly so called. In both cases, probably, the term, law, is used in an accommodated sense, to represent a *strong controlling influence*. Such are the habits of sin when once formed, and such the energetic operations of the gospel upon the heart. This accommodated use of the term, law, in the text, may, in a good degree, explain other passages where the gospel is called law. For that it is not used for the divine law, in a proper definition of the term, is evident from the fact, that it is set in contrast with the law, and performs a distinct work, which the law cannot do. And it is here contrasted with the very law, too, under which man is placed, the guilt of which he feels when convicted of sin, and from which the gospel alone frees him when he is *justified* and born again. If, therefore, the law of the spirit of life in the text means the gospel, (as who can doubt but it does?) then, indeed, is the gospel distinguished from the law by all those strong marks of difference and striking traits of contrast hinted at in the preceding discourse."

3. The next deduction which we make from St. Paul's language is, that the law which is superseded as a condition of justification and sanctification, is still in being as a rule of action.

Let the reader here revert to the language of the apostle in the *seventh* of *Romans*. Here he declares we "are become dead to the law by the body of Christ." And after proceeding to show the workings of the law upon the unrenewed, and making out that "the motions of sin were by the law," that is, the law excited evil *passions* without curing them, he brings in an objector, asking, "What shall we say then? Is the law sin?" And in answer to this he proceeds to eulogize *this very law*, and to attribute to it

attributes absolutely inconsistent, as we have already seen, with the idea that it is wholly abrogated. He clearly asserts its divine origin and perpetual utility. Now there is no harmony or truth in the apostle's reasoning in all this upon the hypothesis that he here speaks of two different laws. Upon the supposition that he, in the first instance, declared that we are dead to the *ceremonial* law or any other law that has been wholly done away, and, in answer to an objection made to his positions, proceeded to assert the continued existence and great practical utility of the moral law, or some other law that is not abrogated, would he reason logically? Would he not stand convicted of playing upon an equivocal term? We can never concur in a construction of St. Paul's language which will make him play the part of a sophist. We must believe that he prosecutes his argument logically, and that he meets all objections fairly, and can never consent to the construction which makes him answer the objection that he depreciates one law by showing that he honors another.

If, then, the apostle here speaks of the same law in both instances, the only consistent conclusion is, that he views it in the two instances in two different respects. In the *first* he finds the law ineffectual, and superseded as a covenant of works—as a condition of salvation; and in the *second*, he recognizes in it an indestructible principle of righteousness—a rule of moral conduct to moral beings.

If it should be urged here, that man, having lost his ability to keep the law, God cannot now hold him under obligation to do so without gross injustice; we answer, that obligation does not always imply an ability to perform. A debtor may not be able to pay a just debt, but this want of ability does not cancel the obligation, nor would it be proper to say in such a case that the debtor does not owe the creditor. The account, or his bond, stands against him as an evidence of indebtedness, though he may never be able to make payment. But should the creditor offer to compound the matter, or to discharge the debt on certain conditions, he would be morally bound to make such conditions as he considered within the limits of the debtor's means. So that, though the gospel, which is a restoring system, must be presumed to make no conditions not within the scope of our assisted powers, the same cannot be inferred of the law. The gospel is a covenant of grace—proffers pardon to ignorant and guilty sinners upon terms which it furnishes them with the means to understand and strength to perform. If Christ, as a great restorer, had not adapted the plan of salvation to our fallen condition, but required of us, as

the condition of acceptance, the performance of works which could only be performed by unfallen beings, the offer of salvation, upon such terms, would be characterized by a want of sincerity and moral justice. Upon this principle man could not justly be condemned finally for the want of what the gospel requires. The result of this reasoning is, that *although obligation does not in all cases imply an ability to perform, yet a covenant of promise does imply such an ability.*

Some suppose the law changes and relaxes its claims as moral agents lose their power to obey—that as men pervert their moral nature and become morally enfeebled, the law abates its demands. Now we object wholly to this view, for the following reasons:—

(1.) It frees the sinner from all obligations to the law the moment he shall have proceeded in the way of sin beyond the possibility of recovery.

(2.) It does away with the necessity of an atonement in all possible or supposable cases. For if, after transgression, the law immediately brings down its claims to a level with the sinner's fallen nature, all that it requires is such future obedience as he can render. The law making no claims that the sinner cannot meet by future obedience, where the necessity of the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ? This may be Deism or Socinianism, but it is not Christianity.

(3.) This view destroys the force of the law as an instrument of conviction. It has no claims upon the sinner for his past transgressions—only demanding what he is now able to do—and fully releasing him from all its former demands and the consequences of all his failures. There is, upon this system, no thunder, or lightning, or wrath in the law. It comes to the sinner at every step he takes in his downward course, with claims diminished in the exact ratio of his loss of moral power, saying, *Do this—that is, just as much as you can now do of what I originally required, for I now demand no more—and you shall live.*

(4.) This notion would bring the law into contempt, and indeed turn it into a solemn farce. What respect or attention could a law command which has no claim upon the transgressor for his buried talent—for the obedience which he once had power to render, but which, by his own fault, he has lost the power to perform? Such a law would be unworthy of the name of a law—it would be a universal license to sin. The following paragraph from *Mr. Fletcher's Appeal* is a clear and indubitable expression of his views upon this subject:—

“Some indeed flatter themselves that ‘the law, since the gospel

dispensation, abates much of its demands of perfect love.' But their hope is equally unsupported by reason and Scripture. The law is the eternal rule of right, the moral picture of the God of holiness and love. It can no more vary than its eternal, unchangeable Original. The Lord 'will not alter the thing that is gone out of his mouth.' He must cease to be what he is, before his law can lose its power to bind either men or angels; and all creatures shall break sooner than it shall bend; for if it commands us only to 'love God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves,' what just abatement can be made in so equitable a precept? Therefore man, who breaks the righteous law of God as naturally as he breathes, is, and must continue, under its fearful curse, till he has secured the pardon and help offered him in the gospel."

I must now hasten to my last conclusion from the apostle's teaching upon the law.

4. I infer, from all the foregoing, that the standard of Christian perfection is not the law, but the gospel of God our Saviour.

We understand *perfect* obedience to the law to amount to *Adamic perfection*. It is not material whether we suppose man never to have sinned and fallen from original purity, or that he has been raised up to that state by the restoring power of the new covenant. If he, by any means, reaches the *perfect obedience* of the law, he is, of course, as perfectly exempt from all kinds of offenses and short comings as Adam was before his fall. This state we say, with our fathers, is not attainable in this world. The law makes no allowance for infirmities and short comings, either voluntary or *involuntary*. But we may not expect to be exempt from infirmities while we tabernacle in clay. Consequently, we never can stand perfectly acquitted in the eyes of the law.

We call the perfection which the law requires—that is, the present practical fulfillment of all its requirements—*legal perfection*. Others may not use the epithet *legal* in the same sense. Let them take their course, and we will take ours. We do not wish, if we can possibly avoid it, to contend about words. If others, by *legal perfection*, mean the perfection of beings who have never sinned—perfect obedience to the law from the beginning—we have no quarrel with them. But we still claim the right to call that perfection which implies perfect obedience to the law, no matter how attained, or how short its duration, *legal perfection*. We so denominate it in opposition to *evangelical perfection*, which implies, loving God with all the heart—understanding by this simply, rendering to God our little all—*just what we, with all our infirmities, are capable of doing, and no more.*

And this is what we understand the apostle to urge in the *sixth* of *Romans*. The whole is embraced in these few words: "Reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord." Rom. vi, 11. It is the death of sin, and the life and freedom of faith and holiness, according to the gospel, that are held up as our privilege by the great apostle. And all this is within the reach of the poorest and the feeblest child of God.

The following propositions I have received from a worthy correspondent whose name I am not permitted to use. They will constitute a very appropriate conclusion to this article, although they were not originally designed by the author for publication.

"1. God never has had but one moral law, and that law is necessarily immutable.

"2. Anything less than *perfect obedience* to that law, upon the part of man, is necessarily a *moral failure*, which, without the atonement, brings upon him its condemnation.

"3. This perfect obedience has become impracticable by the fall; hence salvation, without the application of the atonement, is impossible.

"4. The atonement has made no provisions to *supersede* or *dispense with any part of the law*, but to *pardon offenders*, and purify the depraved by faith in Christ.

"5. The unconditional demands of the gospel cover *exactly* the grounds of man's *gracious ability*, which is less than his legal or natural ability would have been. (See prop. 3.) Violations of these demands are *conditionally* pardoned.

"6. The moral failures which grow out of man's fallen state necessarily, and which are unavoidable, are provided for in the atonement, and thus lose their power to condemn.

"7. Man's gracious ability is the true standard of Christian perfection. Conformity to this standard makes a *perfect Christian*; whereas, perfect conformity to the moral law, according to man's original natural ability, would make a *perfect man*. In the absence of this natural ability there are no *perfect men*. In the presence of this gracious ability there are many *perfect Christians*."

ART. VIII.—(*Authorized*) *Abstract of the Proceedings and Final Resolutions of the Conference, held in Freemasons' Hall, London, on August 19, 1846, and following Days.*

THE London Conference is now matter of history; and whatever may be its final results, no movement since the great Reformation has called forth so much interest, and been matter of so much commentary. That an alliance of evangelical Christians should be formed, without serious difficulties, no rational mind could ever have imagined; and that, when formed, it would meet with opposition from many quarters, must have been anticipated by the most sanguine of its friends. The difficulties with which the conference was beset were not small, but were overcome by patience, perseverance, charity, and prayer.

The above tract is the first "authorized" publication of the doings of the conference, and the only one which has as yet reached us. We took full notes of the acts of the conference, and of many of the speeches, but shall make little public use of them at present. When we shall receive the full account of the proceedings and speeches, we may resume the subject. For the present our readers must be satisfied with a meagre sketch. The "authorized abstract" commences thus:—

"The conference for the formation of THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE was opened in Freemasons' Hall, London, on Wednesday morning, August 19, 1846, at ten o'clock, and continued its sittings till the evening of Wednesday, September 2.

"The conference consisted of nine hundred and twenty persons, of whom about seven hundred and eighty-six came from Great Britain and Ireland; eighty-seven from the American continent and islands; and forty-seven from the continent of Europe and other parts of the world.

"Each sitting was commenced with devotional exercises, over which the following members of the conference presided."

Here follow nineteen names, which we shall not copy. We next have the names of *seventy* members who "took part in the devotional exercises."

"Sir Culling Eardly Smith, Bart., was requested to preside over the deliberations of the conference. During the brief seasons of his unavoidable absence, the chair was occupied successively by the Hon. Justice Crampton, Sir T. W. Bloomfield, Bart., Thomas Farmer, Esq., James S. Blackwood, Esq., LL. D., R. C. L. Bevan, Esq., Frederick Wills, Esq., John Henderson, Esq., J. M. Strachan, Esq."

At the first session the standing committees were appointed, namely, "the general arrangement committee—the business com-

mittee—the public meeting committee—the finance committee—and the nomination committee.” The business committee matured and proposed the order of business for each day. And the whole organization assumed a truly business character.

The history of the proceedings of the conference is marked by three crises. The first was when the act of formation was passed. The great problem had been before the world for more than a year, and had been differently regarded. Even the friends of the measure had many doubts with regard to its feasibility. Committees had labored with much painful anxiety, and the elements of which the Alliance was to be composed had come together. Animated discussions had taken place in the aggregate committee, and it was perceived that there would be great difficulties to surmount. But in view of all that had passed, and all that might occur, “the Evangelical Alliance” was formed without any one dissenting. All now felt that they were committed for everything within the bounds of reason and Christian consistency that might be necessary to the complete accomplishment of the work for which they had assembled. They had *dared to do the deed* which must be succeeded by much more that would require concession, forbearance, and mutual toleration in matters about which perfect agreement in judgment could not be anticipated. We call this a *crisis*: and such it was, because it was a bold and manly entrance upon the first of a series of new and advance positions, all of which had their uncertainties and their perils; and it was also a development of moral courage to proceed and grapple with them in the true Christian spirit. Light seemed then to break in upon the future. All could see that such a body of men would be likely to accomplish what they felt a desire and purpose to do. The moment was an interesting one, and the scene which followed was inspiring and heavenly. The members shook hands, sung praise to God, and united in prayer; and none who were present could feel the least restraint or reserve. All seemed to be brethren. Pure Christian sympathy pervaded the body, and every eye sparkled with hope. The members now seemed to be more sensible than ever of the sublimity of the object, and more confident that it was truly of God. A deep religious feeling pervaded the assembly—tears flowed—prayers ascended—praises were uttered in tremulous and subdued tones—and all felt truly that it was good for them to be there. These remarks refer to the passage of the first section of the “authorized abstract,” which is as follows:—

"I.—The Formation of the Evangelical Alliance.

"*Resolved*, I. That this conference, composed of professing Christians of many different denominations, all exercising the right of private judgment, and, through common infirmity, differing among themselves in the views they severally entertain on some points, both of Christian doctrine and ecclesiastical polity, and gathered together from many and remote parts of the world, for the purpose of promoting Christian union, rejoice in making their unanimous avowal of the glorious truth that the church of the living God, while it admits of growth, is one church, never having lost, and being incapable of losing, its essential unity. Not, therefore, to create that unity, but to confess it, is the design of their assembling together. One in reality, they desire also, as far as they may be able to attain it, to be visibly one; and thus, both to realize in themselves, and to exhibit to others, that a living and everlasting union binds all true believers together in the fellowship of the church of Christ, 'which is his body, the fullness of him that filleth all in all.'

"II. That this conference, while recognizing the essential unity of the Christian church, feel constrained to deplore its existing divisions, and to express their deep sense of the sinfulness involved in the alienation of affection by which they have been attended, and of the manifold evils which have resulted therefrom; and to avow their solemn conviction of the necessity and duty of taking measures, in humble dependence on the divine blessing, toward attaining a state of mind and feeling more in accordance with the word and spirit of Christ Jesus.

"III. That, therefore, the members of this conference are deeply convinced of the desirableness of forming a confederation on the basis of great evangelical principles held in common by them, which may afford opportunity to members of the church of Christ of cultivating brotherly love, enjoying Christian intercourse, and promoting such other objects as they may hereafter agree to prosecute together; and they hereby proceed to form such a confederation, under the name of 'THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE.'"

The next crisis which was attended with much anxiety was the passing of "the basis." Upon this there were several classes of opinions. Some thought there should be no basis but the naked word of God, every man being left to his own construction of it. Others wished one article, namely, that of the right of private judgment in matters of religion. Others were in favor of several of the proposed articles, but opposed to the rest. Others were pleased with the eight articles which were proposed, and wanted no more; while there were others who proposed a ninth (now the eighth) article. How all these discordant opinions were to be harmonized was with many a problem of difficult solution. But a temperate and kind discussion of all the articles of the basis resulted finally in their unanimous adoption. The eighth article, which was moved by Dr. Cox, of Brooklyn, and seconded by the

venerable Dr. Beecher, of Cincinnati, occasioned more discussion than all the rest; but was finally concurred in with only one exception, and the dissentient, we believe, left the convention, no more to return, and has since published his reasons for doing so.

After the explanations which follow the basis were fully discussed, the whole came up for action in the gross. *Rev. Edward Bickersteth*, a pious clergyman of the Church of England, moved that the conference now adopt the basis, with the explanations which follow. The manner of this devoted man at this moment, and a few sentiments to which he gave utterance, were remarkable. He arose with a smiling countenance, though with moist eyes, and, after a moment's hesitation, exclaimed, "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost!" and then continued: "I am happy that the whole basis has been so thoroughly and patiently considered. I thought the original articles were enough, and needed no alterations; but I approve of all the amendments—we owe much to our American brethren for the aid they have afforded us in this interesting and critical discussion. Well, then, now we are about to pass this part of our plan, and after so free an interchange of sentiments, and so harmonious an action on the several articles, I hope we shall have grace to pass the whole in the gross unanimously."

Dr. Cox, of Brooklyn, arose, and seconded the motion, after which he remarked, "We are about to pass the basis of this *holy Alliance*—I say *holy Alliance*. There has been one *un-holy Alliance* in Europe; when this passes—and I hope it will unanimously, by rising—there will be a *holy Alliance*, and we shall prove to the world that Protestantism has a *unity*—that there is one community which has a unity deep and high"—and closed with some Latin poetry. The motion passed *nem. con.*

The president gave out, and the conference devoutly sung,—

"All hail the power of Jesus' name."

Now, for the second time, the members indulged in mutual congratulations and warm expressions of gratitude to God; hoping that all perils were now passed, and that they had before them a clear sea. The following is the doctrinal basis and explanations, of the history of which we have above given an imperfect sketch:—

"II.—*The Basis of the Evangelical Alliance.*

"*Resolved*, I. That the parties composing the Alliance shall be such persons only as hold and maintain what are usually understood to be evangelical views, in regard to the matters of doctrine understood, namely,—

"1. The divine inspiration, authority, and sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures.

"2. The right and duty of private judgment in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures.

"3. The unity of the Godhead, and the trinity of persons therein.

"4. The utter depravity of human nature in consequence of the fall.

"5. The incarnation of the Son of God, his work of atonement for sinners of mankind, and his mediatorial intercession and reign.

"6. The justification of the sinner by faith alone.

"7. The work of the Holy Spirit in the conversion and sanctification of the sinner.

"8. The immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, the judgment of the world by our Lord Jesus Christ, with the eternal blessedness of the righteous, and the eternal punishment of the wicked.

"9. The divine institution of the Christian ministry, and the obligation and perpetuity of the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's supper.

"It being, however, distinctly declared: first, that this brief summary is not to be regarded, in any formal or ecclesiastical sense, as a creed or confession, nor the adoption of it as involving an assumption of the right authoritatively to define the limits of Christian brotherhood, but simply as an indication of the class of persons whom it is desirable to embrace within the Alliance; secondly, that the selection of certain tenets, with the omission of others, is not to be held as implying that the former constitute the whole body of important truth, or that the latter are unimportant.

"II. That this Alliance is not to be considered as an alliance of denominations, or branches of the church, but of individual Christians, each acting on his own responsibility.

"III. That in this Alliance, it is also distinctly declared, that no compromise of the views of any member, or sanction of those of others, on the points wherein they differ, is either required or expected; but that all are held as free as before to maintain and advocate their religious conviction with due forbearance and brotherly love.

"IV. That it is not contemplated that this Alliance should assume or aim at the character of a new ecclesiastical organization, claiming and exercising the functions of a Christian church. Its simple and comprehensive object, it is strongly felt, may be successfully promoted without interfering with, or disturbing the order of, any branch of the Christian church to which its members may respectively belong.

"V. That while the formation of this Alliance is regarded as an important step toward the increase of Christian union, it is acknowledged as a duty incumbent on all its members carefully to abstain from pronouncing any uncharitable judgment upon those who do not feel themselves in a condition to give it their sanction."

But the conference was destined to pass another *crisis* still more perplexing and dangerous than any which had preceded. The question of *slavery* was introduced by an English member. It was proposed to make non-slaveholding a term of membership in the Alliance. After a somewhat earnest discussion, the subject was

referred to a large committee. This committee deliberated upon it nearly the whole day, while the brethren of the convention were engaged in prayer for the blessing of God upon their labors. A compromise article was agreed upon and adopted by the conference, which did not in reality suit either party. The question was raised again the next day, and another committee appointed. After anxious deliberation for several hours, it was agreed to dismiss the subject, and to do everything necessary to the completion of the organization, except making arrangements for another general conference, which was to be left to the several branches, after they should be fully organized. The plan proposed by the committee was adopted, and there terminated the final difficulty. The following is the plan of organization adopted:—

“III.—*The Organization of the Evangelical Alliance.*

“*Resolved*, I. That whereas brethren from the continents of Europe and America, as well as in this country, are unable, without consultation with their countrymen, to settle all the arrangements for their respective countries, it is expedient to defer the final and complete arrangement of the details of the Evangelical Alliance, of which the foundation has now been laid, till another general conference.

“II. That the Alliance consist of all such members of this conference, and members and corresponding members of the divisions of the provisional committee, as shall adhere to the principles and objects of the Alliance. Persons may be admitted to membership of the Alliance by consent of all the district organizations, or by a vote of a general conference, and to membership of any district organization by such mode as each district organization may determine.

“III. That the members of the Alliance be recommended to form district organizations in such manner as shall be most in accordance with the peculiar circumstances of each district. Provided, however, first, that neither the Alliance, nor the respective district organization, shall be held responsible for the proceedings of any district organization; secondly, that no member of any district organization shall, as such, be a member of the Alliance; and, thirdly, that whenever a district organization shall be formed, the members of the Alliance, within that district, shall act collectively in its formation. That, in furtherance of the above plan, it be recommended, for the present, that a district organization be formed in each of the following districts, viz.:— 1. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 2. The United States of America. 3. France, Belgium, and French Switzerland. 4. The North of Germany. 5. The South of Germany, and German Switzerland. 6. British North America. 7. The West Indies.

“IV. And that additional district organizations be from time to time recognized as such by the concurrence of any three previously existing organizations.

“V. That an official correspondence be maintained between the several district organizations, and that reports of their proceedings be

interchanged, with a view to co-operation and encouragement in their common object.

"VI. That a general conference be held at such time and place, and consist of such members of the Alliance, as, by correspondence between the district organizations and under the guidance of divine Providence, shall hereafter be determined by their unanimous concurrence. Provided, first, that any member of the Alliance who was entitled to attend this conference, and shall retain his membership, shall be entitled to attend the next also; and, secondly, that all questions relating to the convening of it shall be determined by such members only of the district organizations as shall also be members of the Alliance. A conference of any two or more of the district organizations may be held by mutual agreement."

We have no space for further commentaries and explanations. We now give the fourth division of the official report.

"IV.—*The Objects of the Evangelical Alliance.*

"Resolved, I. That inasmuch as this proposal for union originated, in a great degree, in the sense very generally entertained among Christians of their grievous practical neglect of our Lord's 'new commandment' to his disciples, to 'love one another,' in which offense the members of the Alliance desire, with godly sorrow, to acknowledge their full participation; it ought to form one chief object of the Alliance to deepen in the minds of its own members, and, through their influence, to extend among the disciples of our Lord Jesus Christ generally, that conviction of sin and short-coming in this respect, which the blessed Spirit of God seems to be awakening throughout his church; in order that, humbling themselves more and more before the Lord, they may be stirred up to make full confession of their guilt at all suitable times, and to implore, through the merits and intercession of their merciful Head and Saviour, forgiveness of their past offenses, and divine grace to lead them to the better cultivation of that brotherly affection which is enjoined upon all who, loving the Lord Jesus Christ, are bound also to love one another, for the truth's sake which dwelleth in them.

"II. That the great object of the Evangelical Alliance be, to aid in manifesting, as far as practicable, the unity which exists among the true disciples of Christ; to promote their union by fraternal and devotional intercourse; to discourage all envyings, strifes, and divisions; to impress upon Christians a deeper sense of the great duty of obeying their Lord's command, to 'love one another;' and to seek the full accomplishment of his prayer: 'That they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee; that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.'

"III. That, in furtherance of this object, the Alliance shall receive such information respecting the progress of vital religion in all parts of the world as Christian brethren may be disposed to communicate; and that a correspondence be opened and maintained with Christian brethren in different parts of the world, especially with those who may be engaged, amidst peculiar difficulties and opposition, in the cause of

the gospel, in order to afford them all suitable encouragement and sympathy, and to diffuse an interest in their welfare.

"IV. That, in subserviency to the same great object, the Alliance will endeavor to exert a beneficial influence on the advancement of evangelical Protestantism, and on the counteraction of infidelity, of Romanism, and of such other forms of superstition, error, and profaneness, as are most prominently opposed to it, especially the desecration of the Lord's day; it being understood that the different organizations of the Alliance be left to adopt such methods of prosecuting these great ends, as may to them appear most in accordance with their respective circumstances, all at the same time pursuing them in the spirit of tender compassion and love.

"V. In promoting these and similar objects, the Alliance contemplates chiefly the stimulating of Christians to such efforts as the exigencies of the case may demand, by publishing its views in regard to them, rather than accomplishing these views by any general organization of its own.

"VI. That reports, minutes, and other documents in promotion of the above objects be published by the Alliance at the time of its meetings, or by its order afterward; and that similar documents may be issued from time to time by its various organizations, on their own responsibility."

The conference also adopted sundry GENERAL RESOLUTIONS. For want of space we can give the reader but two of them.

"IV. That, when required by conscience to assert or defend any views or principles wherein they differ from Christian brethren who agree with them in vital truths, the members of this Alliance will aim earnestly, by the help of the Holy Spirit, to avoid all rash and groundless insinuations, personal imputations, or irritating allusions, and to maintain the meekness and gentleness of Christ, by speaking the truth only in love.

"VI. That the members of this Alliance would therefore invite, humbly and earnestly, all ministers of the gospel, all conductors of religious publications, and others who have influence in various bodies of Christians, to watch more than ever against sins of the heart, or the tongue, or the pen, toward Christians of other denominations; and to promote more zealously than hitherto a spirit of peace, unity, and godly love, among all true believers in the Lord Jesus Christ."

A few remarks upon the importance of the movement, in a practical point of view, shall close what we have to say upon the subject at present. The objections to the Alliance we cannot now undertake to meet or even state. Some of our reasons for favoring it are the following:—

1. It affords an opportunity to evangelical Christians to show to the world that they agree in essentials. The articles of the basis are not framed in the language of Scripture, but are so worded as clearly to embrace the great doctrines of Christianity in the light

in which evangelical Christians hold them in common. The article upon the atonement, as stated, is held both by Arminians and Calvinists. It was not designed so to construct that article as to exclude those who believe in a limited atonement. This, as all will see, would preclude any union between the two classes. This being understood, neither party give up their peculiar theory. Still by the words, "sinners of mankind," both mean the same thing, and that is simply, *fallen men*. Here we all pause. Neither could proceed further to a definition of the *extent* of the atonement without separating from the other. The Calvinist still holds that Christ died *only for the elect*, while the Arminian and new School Presbyterian hold that he died for *all men*; but we agree to waive the point of difference as not essential to Christianity, and, consequently, as something upon which we may differ in opinion, and still love and hold fellowship with each other.

2. It furnishes an opportunity for evangelical Christians to become acquainted with each other. We have hitherto been too much estranged—have had too few opportunities for Christian intercourse, and for realizing that our differences of opinion are consistent with a high state of religious enjoyment. By religious intercourse we see—we *feel*—that our agreements are more numerous and important than our differences, and that we have hitherto made too little of one and too much of the other.

3. It will have a tendency to increase our love for each other. And as the bad feeling which is engendered by our controversies is what constitutes their greatest evil, it will greatly meliorate, if not entirely cure, the evils of religious controversies. Brotherly love and mutual confidence will change the character of all our discussions. As a learned Scotch divine observed in a speech at one of the public meetings in Exeter Hall, speaking of the influence which the intercourse of Christians with each other would be likely to exert,—“I am sure, if I should find it necessary to oppose any of the doctrines of the Wesleyan Methodists, I should have my beloved and venerated friend, Dr. Bunting, always before me. And I could not have it in my heart to write a sentence which would give him just occasion of offense.” When Christian men become well acquainted, and love one another as they should, they will not employ language calculated to wound each other's feelings. Men who are angry at each other, and wish to remain so, keep as far apart as possible.

4. It will silence the objections of infidels and of the world to Christianity—and will equally meet one of the strongest objections of Romanists to Protestantism.

5. The sacrifice of our sectarianism will, we most seriously believe, be acceptable to God, and will bring down the blessings of Heaven upon the evangelical churches of Christendom.

6. By a cessation of our mutual hostilities, we shall have more time and more moral power to employ in the common cause of our holy Christianity.

7. By the cultivation of brotherly love, we shall really come more nearly together in our doctrinal views. For it is not to be doubted that many of our differences are mere matters of feeling, or sectarian pride, or exist more in appearance than in reality. Charity will annihilate all such differences for ever—yea, “for ever and ever.”

8. It will be a means of mutual instruction. By this means we shall learn much from each other; and, without doubt, shall find, in many instances, that in the matters in which our brethren differ from us, they may be right, or, at least, they may have some rays of light which we can advantageously borrow from them.

9. It will increase our religious zeal—the power and consistency of our piety—and, by consequence, our religious enjoyment, and our meetness for heaven.

10. It is carrying out the true spirit of catholicity, taught us both by the precepts and examples of our sainted fathers, the Wesleys, Mr. Fletcher, and a host of their coadjutors.*

For these reasons, and many others, each of which would admit of great enlargement and numerous illustrations, we are most heartily in favor of the Evangelical Alliance.

* “And I beseech you, brethren, by the mercies of God, that we be in no wise divided among ourselves. Is thy heart right, as my heart is with thine? I ask no further question. If it be, give me thy hand. For opinions, or terms, let us not destroy the work of God. Dost thou love and serve God? It is enough. I give thee the right hand of fellowship. If there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels and mercies; let us strive together for the faith of the gospel; walking worthy of the vocation wherewith we are called; with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering, forbearing one another in love, endeavoring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace; remembering, there is one body, and one Spirit, even as we are called with one hope of our calling; ‘one Lord, one faith, one baptism; one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all.’”—*Character of a Methodist, Wesley’s Works*, vol. v, p. 245. See also a sermon by the same author, on a “Catholic Spirit.” *Works*, vol. i, p. 346; and published as a tract, (No. 116,) at the Methodist Book Room. See also *Fletcher’s Works*, vol. ii, pp. 352, 353.

ART. IX.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *A Comprehensive Lexicon of the Greek Language, adapted to the Use of Schools and Colleges in the United States.* By JOHN PICKERING. Third edition, greatly enlarged and improved, pp. 1468. Boston: Wilkins, Carter, & Co. 1846.

THIS is a new and greatly improved edition of the Greek and English Lexicon published at Boston in 1826. Since that time the course of Greek studies in our colleges has been enlarged, and we have been supplied by our own scholars with critical editions of the comedies of Aristophanes, the tragedies of Eschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the dialogues of Plato; most of which were once considered beyond the range of an ordinary classical education.

Such an advanced state of Greek studies called for a lexicon more copious in its vocabulary, and philosophical in its arrangement, than those heretofore in use. For the preparation of such a work we had no American scholar more competent than the late Mr. Pickering.

The basis of the first edition was the Greek and Latin Lexicon of Schrevelius, which had been in use for a long time both in England and in this country. In the preparation of the present edition Schrevelius has been almost entirely laid aside. Constant reference has been had to the larger lexicon of Liddell and Scott, as well as to the original German of Passow's own masterly work, and to the new and enlarged edition of it by Professors Rost and Palm, the publication of which is, we believe, now going on in Germany. Use has also been made of other Greek and German lexicons, and of that immense repository of Greek literature, Stephens's Thesaurus, which is now in course of publication at Paris.

From Mr. Pickering's reputation as a Greek scholar and general philologist, we should have been disappointed had he produced an inferior work. So far as we have been able to examine this volume, it has added to our high estimate of the sound scholarship of its author. We will refer to a few particulars. It has been said in reference to the Greek particles, that "the whole connection of a writer's thoughts, the method of his logic, and the force of his argument, depend upon the manner in which they are rendered." Mr. Pickering has shown that he had a clear discernment of their nicer shades of meaning; and to decide upon the merits of the work, it is only necessary to examine his full explication of the different particles.

Though not designed as a lexicon of the New Testament dialect, still this work will be found serviceable to the student of theology, as it contains the Hebrew and Syriac words which are used in the New Testament, and in the Septuagint version of the Old. Reference has also been had to the writings of Josephus and the early Christian fathers.

We think this work deserves the attention of the lovers of classical literature, and we believe its merits will be appreciated by them. It does honor to American scholarship, and will remain a monument of the industry and sound learning of its lamented author, who devoted the last days of his life to its completion.

2. *A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language; to which are added, Walker's Key to the Pronunciation of Classical and Scripture Proper Names; much enlarged and improved: and a Pronouncing Vocabulary of Modern Geographical Names.* By JOSEPH E. WORCESTER. 8vo., pp. 1032. Boston: Wilkins, Carter, & Co. 1846.

THERE are so many English dictionaries of different degrees of merit now in use, that it does not seem desirable to increase the number, unless we could be furnished with very marked improvements. The most important work on English lexicography that has appeared since Johnson is unquestionably Dr. Webster's large dictionary; a work of great learning and research, and possessing a more complete vocabulary of the language than Johnson's. "But the taste and judgment of the author were not generally esteemed equal to his industry and erudition."

Mr. Worcester has had more than ordinary advantages for the prosecution and accomplishment of his object; and we are glad to find, upon examination of his work, that it has been carried out so successfully.

This volume contains not only a complete vocabulary of the language, but also, in the "Introduction, may be found remarks on orthoepy or pronunciation, orthography, etymology, or the derivation of words, grammar, archaisms, provincialisms, Americanisms, and on various other points of philology and lexicography." These preliminary dissertations add much to the value of the work. Besides, Walker's Key, without which an English dictionary would seem incomplete, Mr. Worcester has added, as the result of his own labors, a pronouncing vocabulary of modern geographical names, which will prove very serviceable to scholars.

The limits of the work are not such as to allow the discussion of every doubtful point, or of much verbal criticism; but the design has been to give the greatest amount of useful matter in the most condensed form.

We are glad to learn that the work has been so well received, for though published but a few months since, the third edition has been called for.

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3. *Gesenius's Hebrew Grammar.* Fourteenth edition, as revised by Dr. E. RÖDIGER. Translated by T. J. CONANT, Professor of Hebrew in Madison University, Hamilton, N. Y. 8vo., pp. 400. New-York: D. Appleton & Co.

WE have given this large and elegant volume as thorough an examination as our time has permitted, and we are prepared to speak of it in the highest terms, as decidedly the best Hebrew grammar now before the public. This opinion is based on two grounds, the one material, and, of consequence, the other secondary, and comparatively unimportant, yet well deserving attention.

First, then, as to the matter of the book. We have here the con-

centrated labors of two of the best Hebraists and oriental scholars which modern times have produced. Gesenius stands at the head; and though tinged with neological views, and therefore not always safe where interpretation is brought in question, is still the most profound laborer in the mine of Hebrew learning to which that profound nation of scholars, the German, has given birth. And as for Rödiger, he is a worthy successor of a great master. These two men, eminently qualified, have spent years and years in making and improving, by constant revision, a grammar of the noble Hebrew tongue—that tongue which patriarchs and prophets spake and wrote, and which contains some of the most sublime poetry which is to be found in any language. By almost universal confession they have succeeded in accomplishing all that they undertook; and their grammar is just what such a book should be, clear, concise, exact, and copious,—neither so full as to be prolix, nor so brief as to become ambiguous and unsatisfactory.

It is precisely on this latter ground, namely, the peculiar skill shown in the arrangement of the grammar, that we are disposed to praise Gesenius's volume above all others in our language. There are many learned men in the world of letters who could no more write such a book as this than they could compose *Paradise Lost*; not that they do not thoroughly understand the language, but simply because they have not the peculiar qualifications needful to make a good writer on grammar; they have not the power of condensation, the happy tact of seizing upon the points necessary for the learner to know first of all, and then leading him on step by step to an exact acquaintance with the language of the Old Testament Scriptures. Learning alone is not sufficient to make a good instructor; while no man *without* learning can be a competent teacher, it is by no means every one *with* learning who can impart knowledge to others. And this, by the way, is a reason why many an erudite professor makes but a sorry teacher: aptness to teach does not always accompany profound scholarship. Where the two are united in one man he is the perfection of his class, and his influence is proportionably wide and powerful.

The other ground on which we commend this volume is not so important, yet is by no means to be underrated. It is on account of the superior style in which it is got up, the clearness of type, the goodness of the paper, and the accuracy with which it is printed. Now, though these are not in themselves competent to make a good book out of an indifferent one, yet still they add most materially to the value of one which, like the present, is renowned for the skill and acumen displayed in its arrangement and execution. To those who remember the early state of Hebrew learning, and the books published at that time in the United States on this branch of literature, the bare mention of the fact is sufficient; though we doubt if we could impress the present race of students with the full conviction of the marvelous change which time and enterprise have produced.

We must not forget to call attention to another valuable feature of the present volume; we mean the addition of a *Chrestomathy* and *Hebrew Reading-Book*, which makes it suited in all respects to the wants as well of beginners as of more advanced students.

4. *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise; with Notes of a Sojourn on the Island of Zanzibar: to which is added a brief History of the Whale Fishery, its past and present Condition.* By J. ROSS BROWNE. Illustrated by numerous Engravings on Steel and Wood. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS is an imposing volume, handsomely printed and admirably embellished by engravings on steel and wood. The main purport of the writer appears to have been to exhibit in strong colors the abuses which exist in our whaling service, of which, indeed, he presents some appalling pictures; and which, for the honor of humanity, we should hope are to some extent at least exaggerated. Doubtless, there needs some reform in this department of our commerce, and we, therefore, are the more disposed to commend this *exposé* by Mr. Browne; although we cannot but regret that a more correct taste had not governed the *manner* in which it has been executed. We refer to the use of expletives which we know, alas! are but too commonly in use with sailors, but which we think it would have been better to omit in the book. With this exception, the work is an exceedingly interesting and attractive one; it supplies us with a large amount of really novel and important information respecting countries and coasts of which we are comparatively ignorant; besides which, it reveals the very eventful and remarkable career of the author during his voyages. As a book of mere entertainment, therefore, it may take rank with Dana's "Two Years before the Mast," and that is praise enough to render it a general favorite with those who read merely for amusement. The aim of the author, however, reaches beyond this, and we, therefore, commend its perusal to all who wish to know anything respecting life on board a whaler.

5. *The Life of John Wicliff, D. D. Compiled from Authentic Sources.* By DANIEL CURRY. 18mo., pp. 326.

THIS is a timely and exceedingly interesting volume. The materials have been mostly drawn from the great work of *Dr. Vaughan*, which is the only complete history of the *John the Baptist* of the Reformation. Mr. Curry has performed a good work for the church, and we hope it will be highly appreciated and amply rewarded. Let this Life of Wicliff be found in all our families.

6. *Recollections of the Past.* By REV. ABNER CHASE. Of the Genesee Conference. 18mo., pp. 147.


THE great fault of this small volume is, that there is *too little* of it. The author is an old friend of ours—a leading member of the Genesee Conference at the time we were admitted into that body. We have devoured his *Recollections* with great eagerness, and were only sorry that he had not greatly enlarged them from the ample store which we are certain still remains. We earnestly recommend the work to all who wish to know how our fathers labored, and succeeded, and succeeded. God bless those of them who still linger upon the shores of time!

7. *Observations on Congregationalism and Methodism: or, a Review of Rev. Z. K. Hawley's Work on that Subject.* By REV. WM. C. HOYT. 18mo., pp. 194.

WE regret exceedingly that such a work should be called for at this time. This is not the period when Christians and Christian ministers may do battle with each other without good and substantial reasons. But, as it is, we are happy that the work has fallen into so able hands. Mr. Hoyt shows himself master of his subject, and has treated it ably. The work abounds in irony, but its spirit is, upon the whole, as kind as the nature of the case seems to admit. We hope the work may contribute to a better understanding of Methodist economy.

8. *A Treatise on Algebra: containing the latest Improvements. Adapted to the Use of Schools and Colleges.* By CHARLES W. HACKLEY, S. T. D., Professor of Mathematics and Astronomy in Columbia College, N. Y. 8vo., pp. 504. Harper & Brothers. 1846.

THIS work is received, and will be reviewed in our next number.



Engraved by W. Wilson & Co. 1840.

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